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Secession is an ongoing, urgent and worldwide issue. Scotland appears to be proposing a 
second independence referendum after Brexit; Quebec demanded two independence 
referenda and even though both votes went (narrowly) against secession, ultimately forced 
the Canadian government to legislate the Clarity Act, regulating how a province can be 
sovereignly independent. Secessionist conflicts in Palestine, Kurdistan, and Nagorno-
Karabakh have led to tens of thousands of deaths toll in recent decades. China controls Tibet; 
yet the ‘Tibetan Government in Exile’ in Dharamsala, India sees that governance as 
illegitimate military occupation. Secessionism also arose out of dissatisfaction with the unfair 
distribution of resources in western Australia in the twentieth century, and there are many 
other examples that could be given. Since secession normally produces political instability or 
violent conflict, both of which affect not only the domestic but also the global order, many 
disciplines hope to address the issue. Political philosophy is no exception, and a number of 
authors have sought to clarify how we should think about secession (among other issues), 
based upon what normative bases a claim to secede ought to be granted. 
 
I propose a political philosophical account of justified secession in order to tackle the thorny 
conceptual issue of what a right of secession amounts to, given that the state normally forbids 
or restricts secession by appeal to its legitimate jurisdiction, whereas secessionists and 
minorities advocate a primary interest in self-determination and ask for more permissive 
conditions on secession. The following core claim threads through my dissertation: even 
though (1) the current boundaries of (state) territory are a result of historical contingency, 
 III 
and (2) qualified claimants to secession are entitled to the same moral standing as the host 
states in securing their territorial interests, (3) both agents (i.e. secessionists and states) 
should limit their rights to propose or prohibit secession, because their rights to territories 
are justified provisionally and conditionally. The first proposition reveals a certain 
understanding of the modern state system, according to which we should recognise its 
contingent, arbitrary composition (i.e. where the boundaries are drawn and what particular 
group is subject to what state) and unjust genesis as a significant difficulty that the extant 
states as rulers ought to at least attempt to overcome. That is to say, states are obliged to 
mitigate the impact of their own unjust genesis and to convince their subjects to accept the 
arbitrary composition (i.e. the fact that they happen to be subject to a particular state) in 
order to justify their rights to particular territories (i.e. territorial rights). By ‘convince’, I mean 
that the state should ameliorate the arbitrariness with moral values in order to help its 
subjects tolerate that problematic feature. As suggested by Margaret Moore and Anna Stilz, 
on whose work I draw, these values are basic justice, rights of occupancy and collective self-
determination. 
 
The same historical contingency also shapes people’s rights to collective self-determination. 
First, if the composition of state is a matter of historical contingency, then who becomes the 
advantaged group(s) dominating a particular state or what group may claim secession is 
likewise affected by that same contingency. Second, while a dominant group in a state often 
prioritises their corporate (territorial) interests with respect to those of other subgroups, the 
right to territorial integrity or the state’s moral standing in terms of non-interference in 
domestic affairs usually exacerbates partiality or bias in favour of the dominant group. In such 
a scenario, the collective self-determination of the state reduces, wrongfully, to the self-
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determination of the ruling group. However, thirdly, this implies another account of territorial 
rights or state territory: that is, the state derives its territorial rights by securing the collective 
self-determination of all self-determining peoples within its territory. By self-determining 
people, according to Moore, we refer to a certain kind of territorially concentrated sub-state 
group, able to form a government, and holding a shared political (group) identity and history 
of cooperation. Provided that the state’s rights to territory is constituted by the territorial 
rights of its self-determining peoples, the state should be conceived as an entity in which 
several proto-states/self-determining peoples are potentially embedded. As a result, we 
should deem such a subgroup to be a qualified claimant to secession and so the group is 
entitled to the moral standing (same as the host state) in protecting their territorial interests. 
Connecting to the foregoing, statist account, I shall propose my dualistic account of territorial 
rights, accommodating and recognising the territorial interests of self-determining people.  
 
The achievement of a state in securing basic justice, rights of occupancy and collective self-
determination, or the identification of qualified claimant to secession, does not constitute the 
whole picture of the right to secede. I shall further argue that my dualistic account of 
territorial rights is justified if and only if the rights-holders (namely the state and self-
determining people) are also committed to the establishment of a global political authority. 
This reflects the Kantian idea of permissive laws that, firstly, states’ territorial rights over 
particular populations and territories should be taken as unilateral acquisitions and 
settlement from the viewpoint of outsiders, so that there is a case for a just global authority 
to be erected to address such unilateralism. However, secondly, before such an authority is 
erected, we should still grant unilateral jurisdiction over territory, provided that such 
recognition is necessary to bring about that global authority or rightful conditions around the 
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world. Besides, the new account of territorial rights can entail principles for justified secession, 
which articulate the circumstances in which a claim to consensual or unilateral secession is 
morally justified. It will be shown that the normative basis of justified secession, in addition 
to grave injustice, refers also to persistent alienation, while different degrees of that wrong 
make legitimate consensual or unilateral secession. Based upon these analyses, I propose that 
the right of secession, as a group right, should be redefined as the right of a subgroup to have 
an equal moral/legal standing when re-negotiating terms and conditions (for the protection 
of territorial rights) with the host state or any relevant agent. It thus consists in the remedial 
right to claim secession, the primary right to constitutional reform, and the primary right to 
erect a just global authority jointly with the extant, recognised states. A subgroup, however, 
can only propose unilateral secession as the remedy for grave injustice or serious violation of 
collective autonomy; it should also be endowed with the preceding primary rights for better 
protecting the territorial rights or group autonomy of its members.  
 
In arguing for the core assertion and the proposal above, my dissertation is structured as 
follow. Chapters 1 & 2 undertake the preliminary work of my thesis, on which I shall proceed 
a literature of review of past normative theories of secession and the methodologies behind 
them. I shall explain that the idea of territorial rights should be the very foundation of 
secessionist theory and argue for the necessity of pre-institutional moral reasoning in 
theorising a right to secede. Chapters 3 & 4 develop my dualistic account of territorial rights 
as the basis of my proposal for justified secession. Chapter 5 proposes principles for justified 
secession, based upon the situation in which the state’s hold of territorial rights is no longer 
justified. Chapter 6 sketches a new account of the right to secede based on the previous 
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Political philosophy should take a view of justified causes for secession, through which the 
relevant agents may understand under what circumstances and based upon what values they 
should support or reject a claim to secede.1 Such academic discipline is necessary to combat 
conceptual incoherence, status quo bias and might-is-right beliefs.2 This account of justified 
secession is then comprised of principles of secession and right(s) to secede as the two pivotal 
products of my dissertation. Before articulating the content of the right and the principles, I 
set out a definition of secession as the fundamental structure of my thesis (in this chapter), 
exploring a basic framework and suggesting that most theories of secession should share this 
definition; and subsequently articulating (in Chapter 2) the methodological reasoning behind 
 
1 It is preliminary to clarify what secession and the state amount to respectively in my dissertation. First, 
according to Buchanan, the classic sense of secession should be distinguished from irredentist secession. The 
former refers to our general understanding of secession that ‘a group in a portion of the territory of a state 
attempt to create a new state there; secessionists attempt to exit, leaving behind the original state in reduced 
form’ whereas the latter though attempts to leave their host state and yet achieves it by merging the seceding 
land with a neighbouring state.  My dissertation theorises only the justification of the classic sense of secession. 
Second, secessionists strive for building their own state but the state as a political concept is not unambiguous. 
According to Christopher Morris, modern states are ‘distinctive territorial forms of political organisation that 
claim sovereignty over their realms and independence from other states.’ This is also the account to which I 
subscribe. See Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), pp. 45-46; Allen Buchanan, ‘Secession,’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, accessed 13 Nov. 2019, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/secession/ 
2 The account of political philosophy I follow is that proposed by Adam Swift: (1) a specific branch of moral 
philosophy aiming to justify what each politically relevant subject ought (and ought not) to do; by which (2) a 
political philosopher is committed to two essential tasks: conceptual analysis and principle formation. This way 
of doing political philosophy aims primarily at how we should think of a given issue, particularly that of 
organising or evaluating the relevant ideas in a reasonable manner. See Adam Swift, “Political Philosophy and 
Politics,” in What is politics: The activity and its study, ed. Adrian Leftwich (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 135-
36. However, Guess holds a different view, suggesting that political philosophy should (1) begin with study of 
what politics actually is and what motivates each given political form; (2) focus on action and the contexts of 
action; (3) be historically located; (4) be applied like an art, rather than a science. See Raymond 
Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1-18. 
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my analysis. These two chapters pave the very foundational way for my account of justified 
secession.  
 
A plausible account of territorial rights should be the normative basis of justified secession, 
because the account clarifies what rights to political territory relevant agents can hold. It thus 
conceives justified secession as a consequence of the so-called dualist justification: (1) the 
statist justification points out under what condition an existing state can legitimately hold 
territorial rights, including a right to prohibit secession; and (2) the secessionist justification 
specifies what a qualified claimant to secession could do (or the rights to which they are 
entitled) in response to such conditions. I shall also argue for three fundamental territorial 
concerns that form a bridge between the right of secession and territorial rights: (1) how do 
we counter the unjust genesis of states? (2) How do we evaluate competing, overlapping 
claims to the same swathe of territory? And (3) how do we reconcile the right of self-
determination (which includes the right of secession) with the right to territorial integrity?  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 assesses different normative theories of the right 
to secession, in which the competition between the primary right vs. the remedial right only 
camp is illustrated, and I conclude that a cogent account of territorial rights is helpful and 
necessary. Section 2, therefore, introduces the idea of territorial rights and explains how it 
addresses the problem of secession by identifying three fundamental territorial concerns. 





1. A review of theories of secession 
 
Normative theories of secession began with inquiry into the right to secession. According to 
David Copp, this right refers to a cluster of rights constituted by certain liberties, claim-rights 
and moral powers.3 Claim-rights consist of (1) a claim against the host state that it should not 
interfere with the ability of a minority group to form a self-determining government or state; 
and (2) an obligation on the host state to respect the would-be state in the same way it 
respects other, existing states. A qualified claimant to secession has (3) the freedom to 
conduct an independence referendum, which again implies a right to be free from state 
interference. Finally, the rights-holder should possess (4) the powers to realise these 
foregoing claims and liberties i.e. they should be able to form a self-supporting state.  
 
Three different schools of thought, and two rival accounts of the right to secede, can be seen 
in the literature. The competing accounts are the primary right and the remedial-right-only 
camps. By definition, the primary right account means that the exercise of the right is 
independent of severe injustice being inflicted on the group that wishes to secede, such as 
violation of basic human rights, and so can be exercised unilaterally, without the consent of 
government. This, of course, does not mean that secession can be proposed and permitted 
in any circumstances: different theories provide different criteria that must be met by the 
claimants and/or seceded states, and the forms that secession might take. This primary right 
account amounts to the notion that a claim to secede is justified in its own right. That is, the 
primary right to secede is justified because, for example, it protects our collective autonomy.  
 
3 David Copp, ‘Democracy and Communal Self-Determination’ in The Morality of Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim 
& Jeff McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 278-279. 
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The plebiscitary theories and the ascriptivist theories all support the primary right account. 
The plebiscitary school of thought derives its name from its proposal to address secession or 
determine the boundaries of seceding territory through the application of majority rule. In 
other words, a state’s territory should be occupied by inhabitants whose majority has 
expressed a desire to form their own state. The ascriptivist school of thought, which also align 
with the primary right account, propose to impose more constraints on the claimants to 
secession, ascribing distinct corporate features to the claimants in order for the group to be 
able to claim secession, such as requiring the members of the group to share some common 
substantive characters, such as culture. That is to say, in addition to a desire for self-
determination, the ascriptivist theories confer the right of secession only on people who 
constitute a coherent group with a clear, common identity.  
 
By contrast, the remedial-right-only camp argues that the right to secede can only be claimed 
if a corresponding primary right is violated. In a secessionist context, primary rights refers to 
basic human rights or our fundamental interest in subsistence. Were such a right to be 
violated seriously, the right of secession could be exercised as a means of preventing or 
resisting such a violation being inflicted by the host state. The right to secede is thus 




1.1. Plebiscitary theory 
 
The most prominent plebiscitary theory is that of Christopher H. Wellman. He asks us to 
contemplate the transition from the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ to civil society, and consider 
whether our right to political self-determination (which includes the right to secede) remains? 
In other words, does our support for state require us to give up the right to secede? 
 
Generally, when a state succeeds in legitimating its political authority, it has the right to rule 
over its subjects and asks that they submit to its authority. Wellman argues that the legitimacy 
of such authority should be based on samaritanism, which asserts that the state’s political 
coercion is necessary and justified in constraining the freedom of citizens only if, as in the 
story of good Samaritan, this is necessary to protect the peace and security of society. The 
moral function of upholding the state is to facilitate peace (rather than perpetual conflict, as 
in the state of nature), while also maintain most individual liberties. However, unlike Hobbes’s 
absolutist account of state authority, Wellman’s account by no means suggests that the state 
can impose more constraints on the subjects’ liberty than the samaritan account requires. 
The argument runs as follows. First, a state cannot function if its boundaries are not defined. 
That is, the demand for jurisdiction over a certain territory is not merely a matter of historical 
contingency, but also a practical point. However, common jurisdiction still falls short of 
understanding how to exercise state authority legitimately. Following the samaritan account, 
second, the convenience and political stability achieved by clearly defining the boundaries of 
a state must benefit not only each subject individually, but also most of their fellow citizens. 
The state is justified in imposing the rule of law and coercing citizens into abandoning some 
of the liberties that originally existed in the state of nature in order to achieve political stability, 
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basic justice and (this particular regulated form of) personal autonomy. It is samaritan in 
virtue of the goods that the state can bring about; and the state in turn has a duty to benefit 
its subjects by realising those goods.4 Nevertheless, thirdly, the duty to benefit cannot then 
require each citizen to relinquish their right to political self-determination, since exercising 
such a right would not disrupt the peace and security of society. Subjects are committed to 
giving up their rights only to the extent necessary to prevent social disorder. In other words, 
if the exercise of a given liberty (e.g. the right of secession) does not sabotage the peace and 
security of a society, the state has no right to deprive its citizens of such a freedom. 
 
However, the final claim to the right of political self-determination can only be made if a kind 
of non-consequentialist account of political self-determination is advocated. One can contend, 
for instance, that such a right should not exist if the majority of members within a given 
society can achieve the greatest utility by revoking the right. To counter this, Wellman gives 
the following deontological reason for group autonomy. 5  He asks us to consider why 
democracy is valuable and why colonialism should be forbidden. It has been a prevailing idea 
that a democratic state or a democratic decision-making process ought to be supported, on 
the basis that each subject is entitled to an equal say in the construction of public affairs. 
Moreover, when a decision is made through such a procedure, we value and respect the result 
because the result should legitimately represent the common will. Valuing democracy thus 
amounts to a respect for self-determination and group autonomy. This holds true even if 
some undemocratic means may generate greater utility for the society. In terms of 
 
4 See Christopher H. Wellman, A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 21-25. 
5 Wellman has explicitly claimed that his argument for the primary right to secede is conditional on valuing self-
determination or group autonomy. See: Ibid., p. 38 
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colonialism, the same idea can be applied. It is believed that metropolitan states wrong the 
colonised, not merely because the resources of the colonies are exploited by them; the 
fundamental wrongness of colonisation is that it deprives the colonised populace of their self-
determination and group autonomy.  
 
Therefore, when group autonomy is grounded in the democracy argument and the fulfilment 
of such a value would not violate the very reason for upholding the state, Wellman concludes 
that the right to secede should be deemed to be a primary right, according to which ‘any 
group may secede as long as it and its remainder state are large, wealthy, cohesive, and 
geographically contiguous enough to form a government that effectively performs the 
functions necessary to create a secure political environment.’6 In addition, the determination 
of territorial boundaries should follow a democratic procedure, which means ideally, 
individuals should be allowed to apply the majority rule to the drawing of state borders, as 
long as the samaritan account of state authority is respected. The paramount goal of the 
proposal is thus to ‘create boundaries that are maximally consistent with the constituents’ 
preferences.’7  
 
However, Wellman’s plebiscitary theory has great difficulty in justifying the eligibility of the 
electorate or the scope of electoral districts that would participate in such an independence 
referendum. This reflects the lack of theoretical resources available for settling territorial 
issues.8 We value democracy and confer universal suffrage on each qualified voter because 
 
6 Ibid., pp.161-162. 
7 Ibid., p. 59. 
8 Amandine Catala attempts to address the territorial concern from the perspective of plebiscitary theory. 
However, her proposal is similar to Margaret Moore’s account, which will be introduced in Chapter 3. See 
Amandine Catala, ‘Secession and Annexation: The Case of Crimea,’ German Law Journal 16, no. 3 (2015): 581-
 8 
the political decisions they vote upon affect them.9 Thus, it seems that all citizens of the state 
have the right to vote on secession-related matters, because the outcome will have a huge 
impact on all citizens. However, this conclusion either contradicts our normal practice of 
nationwide participation in referenda by only taking place in the area hoping to secede, or 
only allowing those of a particular background (say, a particular ethnicity) to vote; or, if all 
normally eligible voters throughout the state are included in such a referendum, secession is 
likely to be voted down every time, since by definition secessionists are normally a minority 
group. Furthermore, people’s will to political self-determination plus the samaritan argument 
for state authority are still not sufficient to determine the scope of either the electorate or 
the boundary of the would-be state. For instance, the boundary between England and 
Scotland appears to be clear and indisputable. However, this would be less clear if the 
majority population in Carlisle or the Lake District (say, 80%) were Scottish. It could be argued 
that this area is de facto part of Scotland, particularly if the majority of Scots living in Carlisle 
or the Lake District were also in favour of Scottish independence. Thus a paradox arises: on 
the one hand, political self-determination and the views of the populace are likely to be public 
knowledge, rendering a referendum redundant; yet on the other, if we accept that the 
boundary of a new state should surround a population of which the majority are pro-
secession voters, such a boundary cannot be determined by a referendum. 
 
These difficulties are both practical and theoretical. That is to say, despite Wellman’s proposal 
that the primary right account can be justified (in light of the deontological reason for group 
autonomy and) under the condition that the secession proposed would not violate the 
 
607. 
9 This account of democracy surely reflects two principles as to the constitution of the demos, namely the all-
affected interest principle and the all-subjected principle. 
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seceding or seceded state’s duty to benefit, such a justification only accounts for a claim to 
the reconfiguration of political authority referring to the political relations between the state 
and subjects. Given that the right to secede should also offer an account of the relationship 
between the state and the territory, or the claimant and their claimed land, the plebiscitary 
theories fall short of providing a complete account.  
 
1.2. Ascriptivist theory 
 
This account can be glossed as ‘every nation10 should have its own state’. Compared to the 
plebiscitary theories, here the idea of national self-determination, though advocating a 
primary right to secede, requires more qualifications and conditions to be met by the claimant 
of secession. This includes the requirement that the claimants exhibit some substantive, 
group features proposed by the theory. For example, David Miller defines a nation as a 
community (1) constituted by shared beliefs and mutual commitment; (2) extended in history; 
(3) active in character; (4) connected to a particular territory; and (5) distinguishable from 
other communities by its distinctive public culture.11 Miller argues that a nation is entitled to 
the (prima facie) primary right to secede because there are good reasons for ensuring that a 
state’s citizens reflect its national boundaries. Those reasons are as follows. 
 
First, national identity is an important source of personal identity, significantly constituting 
the context of individual living and well- being. Denying or arbitrarily altering one’s national 
 
10 Surely not every theorists term such a group as nation. ‘People’ is also preferable to indicate this group 
formed by some substantive group features more than the willingness of political self-determination. See also 
Margaret Canovan, The People (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities 
(London: Verso, 2006); Michel Seymour, ‘On Redefining the Nation,’ The Monist 82, no.3 (1999), pp. 411-445. 
11 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 27. 
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identity can be taken as violating an important constituent of personal identity and 
consciousness. Secondly, nationality binds compatriots together and so creates mutual trust, 
community and solidarity, within which reciprocity can be enhanced. Co-nationals 
communicate with each other more easily than with non-members and public culture is a 
strong foundation of public and political practices, which are important parts of co-nationals’ 
daily lives. As defined by Miller, (national) public culture refers to ‘a set of ideas about the 
character of the community which also helps to fix responsibilities’.12 This is to some extent a 
consequence of political debate and its manifestation relies on mass media. For instance, he 
points out that North Americans value individualism and self-reliance, whereas the Swedish 
people value social solidarity and equality. Thus, US society emphasises individual efforts 
contributing to social affairs and thus demands the protection of personal freedom. By 
contrast, Swedish society construes their membership obligations in terms of co-ordination 
and equal treatment, and so focuses on whether the social structure encourages co-operation 
and whether policies treat citizens fairly. Thirdly, Miller argues that public culture is objective 
in the sense that it is formed through critical and public debate among fellow nationals. That 
is to say, each national has an equal right to shape public culture. Since it is not determined 
arbitrarily, nor by an individual, we should not perceive it as subjective. It is thus plausible 
that some demands derived from national public cultures become moral obligations, which 
shows that nations are obligation-generating communities. Finally, as suggested by Moore, 
the argument of nationality is primarily normative rather than being self-interested. 13 
Empirical evidence shows that political practices of states privilege certain nationalities while 
 
12 Ibid., p. 68. 
13 Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 32-35. 
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disadvantaging others (i.e. national minorities). For instance, stipulation of an official 
language is likely to benefit or privilege a specific nationality.  
 
Therefore, co-nationals owe obligations to one another to protect or promote their shared 
beliefs, mutual commitment and national culture: their personal well-being or autonomy is 
conditioned by the development of their nationality. Nonetheless, a nation is not like a family 
in which everyone is familiar with each other. Because a nation is an immense and impersonal 
community, these obligations need to be discharged effectively, by force if necessary. A 
nation, therefore, strives naturally for political self-determination, aiming at acquiring 
sufficient institutional resource and political authority to discharge the national obligations. 
If a state comprises two or more nations, the dominant one may allocate most resource to its 
co-nationals and place unreasonable duties on weaker nations. Here, Miller argues that there 
is a prima facie case to assert the superiority of mono-national states, because single 
nationality enhances the function of the state. This account is necessary if a nation hopes to 
promote itself and achieve goals that demand the co-operation of citizens (such as creating a 
nuclear-free homeland or national health insurance). Voluntary cooperation presupposes 
mutual trust, which each member of a state or nation needs to uphold. Therefore, in terms 
of political performance, a nation is the best unit through which to complete the functions of 
state. Regarding national development, independent statehood satisfies the demand for 




14 Miller, On Nationality, p. 101. 
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Miller concludes that the right to secede is a (prima facie) primary right, because there is a 
presumption in favour of national sovereignty that entails his principle of nationality. For 
Miller, the principle asserts that national self-determination ought to be promoted whenever 
feasible. Current boundaries ought to be questioned if national self-determination within the 
boundary is denied by state authorities. Yet how does one understand a denial of national 
self-determination? Miller argues that, ‘the problem of secession arises only in cases where 
an established state houses two or more groups with distinct and irreconcilable national 
identities.’ 15  As such, at least two conditions should be satisfied if secession is to be 
considered: (1) there are two or more nations within a state and their national differences 
cannot be reconciled peacefully; (2) the secessionists offer a plausible territorial account of 
the land they want to occupy.16 For example, the Kurds are a distinct nation and have lived in 
the mountainous areas of the southern Caucasus for centuries. However, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the Turkish authorities refused to recognise them as a nation and 
deprived them of many rights that would have protected Kurdish culture. This resulted in 
serious conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish government. Therefore, for Miller, a 
Kurdish claim to secession should be approved, as it meets his conditions. Ascriptivist theories 
such as Miller’s, though following political self-determination, have the theoretical resources 
to address the territorial issues. That is, a nation is justified in building a state in the 
 
15 Ibid., p. 113. 
16 However, this does not imply that (unilateral) secession should be permitted whenever a state is in these 
circumstances. Firstly, if the national minorities that live either within the boundary of the seceding state or in 
the seceded territory, could prove that they would become more vulnerable after state-breaking, then 
secession ought to be denied, because it fails to resolve the matter. Secondly, the State Viability Proviso (i.e. 
that a new nation should be able to function as a state) should be satisfied. Moreover, Miller opposes secession 
proposed on the grounds that secessionists would make better use of resources in the seceding area. However, 
he also proposes that secession arising from national self- determination ought to be supported even if the 
seceding state will take over much resource from the original state. 
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geographical area that they consider manifesting the material and symbolic value of their 
nationality, but such a link between people and place must be verified.17  
 
However, Miller’s account of secession is not without flaws. First, ‘nation’ is often a contested 
idea because the claim to social or cultural homogeneity implicit in the principle of nationality 
provides an excuse to stress national, ethnic or religious differences. In a secessionist context, 
the principle appears to discourage mutual respect for pluralism and national diversity within 
a territory. The right of secession is not intended to disrupt social cohesion. Second, the idea 
of a ‘nation’ may disappoint secessionists, because either the secession proposed does not 
aim to protect or promote nationality, or the idea of nationality falls short of creating the 
territorial entitlements they desire. According to Stilz, nationalist settlement views conflate 
property with territory in a normative sense.18 That is, even though settlement and related 
activities such as agriculture or mining change an area of land to a great extent, by which we 
may concede that a group ‘owns’ a piece of land through the labour they have expended upon 
it, there is still a difference between property and territory. Conflating the two notions would 
be very dangerous. For example, immigrants are likely to group together and form their 
communities based on their common culture, but that is not the same as that area of a host 
nation ‘becoming’ part of the country that those immigrants have left (although the idea that 
they have is often seen in the was such areas are known colloquially as ‘Little China’ or ‘the 
Jewish quarter’). In such a case, if these immigrants claimed to secede, we would hesitate to 
grant it. Or, a nation might shape its land due to political or historical developments, blurring 
the distinctions between peoples or nations. Taking the Soviet Union as an example, a multi-
 
17 David Miller, ‘Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification’, Political Studies, 60:2 (2012), pp. 252-268. 
18 Anna Stilz, “Nations, States and Territory,” Ethics 121, no. 3 (April 2011): 572-601, pp. 576-78. 
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national state could form its territory with a single economic plan and political (Communist, 
in this case) approach, making it harder to distinguish different cultural practices, even though 
many nations may be included. 
 
Finally, there is vagueness in terms of what exactly a claim to secede amounts to for Miller. 
The presumption of mono-national statehood seems to be derived from the (misleading) 
relationship between national self-determination and independent statehood, which takes 
the latter as the best political form for national interests. This is misleading, because the 
nationality principle still looks plausible even if we discard that mono-state presumption and 
rely only on the cause or value of national self-determination. That is to say, we can both 
appreciate the reasons for national self-determination articulated by Miller and restrict 
exercising of the right to independent statehood. Many existing, multinational states such as 
the UK or Canada have good development. Nevertheless, when the nationality principle firstly 
asks us to further the cause of national self-determination, and secondly considers the 
problem of secession to arise only if a state houses two or more distinct and irreconcilable 
national identities, Miller doesn't account for the normative basis of such irreconcilability, but 
gives examples such as different religions or conflicting understandings of common history. If 
the conflict between nations is the result of bias against one another, this certainly should 
not be recognised by a plausible account of the right to secede. Miller’s proposal, 




1.3. Remedial right only theory 
 
In contrast to the primary right account, Allen Buchanan argues that the right to unilateral 
secession is justified if the host state violates the basic human rights of the claimant. 
Unilateral secession thereby should be taken as a last resort or remedy for redressing such as 
egregious moral wrong. Let me illustrate his argument.  
 
First, Buchanan not only narrows the focus (correctly) to the right of unilateral secession, but 
also argues that any tenable account of the right to secede must be articulated by institutional 
moral reasoning, meaning that convincing reasons must be given for the recognition of 
relevant institutions. The term ‘institutions’, for Buchanan, refers not just to the host state’s 
institutional scheme, but also international law, because secession is a geopolitical matter 
and demands international recognition. So understood, international law is viewed as a 
higher norm, governing any claim to secede. A justified account of the right, therefore, should 
not undermine the basic framework or core values of international law, but enhance and 
promote it. The aim of secession theories should firstly elaborate what moral values 
international law should uphold and then consider what kind of right to secede best coheres 
with these values. Such methodology is in contrast to that underlying the proceeding two 
theories (namely pre-institutional reasoning), which, Buchanan argues, is impractical because 
they adhere to political self-determination only and devise their accounts detached from the 
current political, global structure (see Chapter 2).  
 
Second, in order to illustrate why we should not exaggerate the importance of self-
determination (as the primary right account does), Buchanan clarifies two modes of self-
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determination. Current international law advocates the self-determination of peoples, 
classified by James Anaya, into (1) the constitutive account, which asks a group to review the 
nature of its political status (that is, whether it should be an independent state); and (2) 
ongoing self-determination, which considers the completeness of self-government.19  The 
constitutive mode of self-determination emphasises whether legislation expresses and allows 
collective autonomy, whereas ongoing self-determination is mainly concerned with whether 
the people are able to pursue their ideal lives after legislation has been enacted. Furthermore, 
constitutive self-determination is highly likely to shape the national pursuit of a claim to 
independent statehood, since people expect to achieve self-rule by controlling political or 
legislative authorities. Yet, ongoing self-determination, in a weaker sense, does not 
necessarily demand independent statehood, because the people are chiefly concerned with 
whether they are able to achieve individual self-fulfilment. The formation of that ongoing 
environment is not the primary concern, because group members stress individual freedom 
and/or their ability to exercise that freedom. A claim to self-determination rooted in this 
mode thus does not necessarily demand independent statehood. Yet, if the claim is grounded 
in the first, constitutive mode of self- determination, then it should at least be a plausible and 
valid claim in a prima facie case as long as their (secessionist) collective autonomy is proved 
to be seriously violated. Thus, the overlapping idea of the two modes is the pursuit of an 
independent domain of political control, rather than independent statehood. Therefore, 
Buchanan concludes, even if a group wishes to pursue self-determination, the nature of their 
targeted political unit or the extent of their control over this unit is open to dispute.  
 
 
19 James S. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York: OUP, 1996), p. 81. 
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Third, if the existing international law is taken into consideration, which is a state-led 
institutional scheme, then the primary concern should be how to legitimate the state’s hold 
of territory. He proposes justice-based political legitimacy and argues that a state territory 
should not be ceded if the state meets that criterion. Secession could then only be proposed 
unilaterally when the state is judged to lack political legitimacy, which is understood as 
achieving a minimum standard of justice: the protection of basic human rights (e.g. the right 
to subsistence, personal autonomy and basic political rights such as the freedom of 
association or the freedom of speech).20 Secession, therefore, should be a last resort for the 
victim to remedy the violation of their human right, and can be claimed unilaterally, 
proceeding without interference provided one of the following three conditions is met: (1) 
large-scale and persistent violations of basic human rights; (2) unjust conquest of a legitimate 
state’s territory; or (3) serious and persisting violation of intrastate autonomy agreements by 
the state, as determined by a suitable international monitoring inquiry.21 
 
Buchanan’s proposal is problematic for to the following reasons. First, his political legitimacy 
presents a strong status quo bias; that is, whoever succeeds in securing minimal justice in a 
given area gains state sovereignty over that territory and can claim non-interference. Such an 
account, while ignoring previous unjust beginnings of states (such as conquest, annexation, 
colonisation, etc.) endows the extant power-wielders with very strong territorial entitlements, 
because the claim to non-intervention covers both outsiders and citizens i.e. those most 
affected by the unjust genesis of the state. This bias, as pointed out by Anna Stilz, may confer 
 
20 For a more detailed argument, please see Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 145-161; 247-60. 
21 Ibid., p. 218 
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legitimacy upon, or encourage, ‘benign’ annexation or colonialism.22  Suppose a civil war 
breaks out in a state. In the name of peace-making, a neighbouring state sends in its army 
and occupies a portion of the territory. If it restores basic justice on that land, according to 
Buchanan’s political legitimacy, the neighbouring state has the right to claim this land as its 
own, without outsiders’ interference. Buchanan may contend that his second condition for 
secession, (i.e. unjust taking of a legitimate state’s territory) prevents such events. However, 
my example exposes a theoretical vacuum, between an unjust, violent annexation and the 
normal, ideal establishment of minimal justice. If the original state cannot be restored and 
the people on that portion of land wish to build a new state, Buchanan’s territorial account 
would confront a difficulty, in that the annexing state appears to have the discretion to decide 
whether it should allow the new state to establish itself, or whether the annexing state should 
claim the newly occupied land for itself. Such an absurdity also reflects the second problem 
for Buchanan’s account: the minimal justice view of political legitimacy cannot be the whole 
rationale behind the three conditions for unilateral secession, and yet states’ right to 
territorial integrity is based only upon the protection of minimal justice. According to 
Amandine Catala, resistance to annexation and the endorsement of intrastate autonomy 
implies the recognition of self-determination as an important constituent of state’s territorial 
entitlement, because grave injustice does not necessarily occur during the annexation or 
persistent violation of intrastate autonomy.23 If so, unilateral secession can be permitted 
without grave injustice and so the protection or provision of minimal justice should not be 
the sole normative basis of state’s territorial entitlements. This conclusion clearly violates 
 
22 Anna Stilz, Territorial Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 91. 
23 Amandine Catala, ‘Remedial Theories of Secession and Territorial Justification,’ Journal of Social Philosophy 
44, no. 1 (Spring, 2013): pp. 74-94. 
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Buchanan’s account of political legitimacy or territorial integrity. We thus have sufficient 
reason to re-evaluate the validity of Buchanan’s remedial right only theory. 
 
Let me now draw a lesson from the foregoing review of secession theories. I believe that the 
most urgent issue is to provide a cogent account of territorial rights as another normative 
foundation of justified secession, because the right of secession touches upon both the 
authority over ‘people as subjects’ and ‘state territory as a place of jurisdiction’. Territorial 
rights, then, amount to an appropriate political relationship between the state, its subjects 
and territory, by which we understand what rights the state and its subjects can hold as 
regards that territory. All three theories emphasise the relationship between the state and 
people. Wellman offers his samaritan account of political legitimacy and points out the space 
for justified secession within it, in which secession gets the green light if the state can still 
discharge its samaritan duty. Such an idea, however, does not account for or verify 
secessionists’ claims to certain territory. Miller’s nationalist or ascriptivist theory starts with 
a group of self-determining people (i.e. a nation), but the conceptual mismatch between a 
nation and a group qualified to claim secession reflects again the importance of territorial 
rights, because a nation may not necessarily wish or need to be concentrated in a single 
territory, while a group wishing to claim secession does. Although Buchanan notes the 
importance of territorial rights in terms of secession, his territorial account is problematic due 
to the direct extension of political legitimacy to state territory; that is, his framing of political 
legitimacy still relies on the relationship between the state and people. Given the necessity 
of territorial rights in any theory of justified secession, I shall now proceed to unfold such a 
concept and how it connects to an account of justified secession.  
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2. Territorial rights and secession 
 
How does the idea of territorial rights deliver a better account of the right to secede? I shall 
argue that it does so by addressing (1) how to counter the unjust genesis of a states; (2) how 
to evaluate competing, overlapping claims to the same swathe of territory; and (3) how to 
reconcile the right of self-determination (which includes the right of secession) with the right 
to territorial integrity. First, I will define the concept of state territory. 
 
2.1. A basic understanding of territorial rights 
 
I take the dominant view of the jurisdictional authority account. This conceives of territory as 
the geographical domain of jurisdictional authority, within which a state can exercise control 
of its territory and claim the right to jurisdiction as supreme arbiter of political authority. 
While a land contains both people and natural resources, the right to jurisdiction implies also 
the right to access and use those resources and the right to control the border (such territorial 
rights have property-like dimensions, but as explained above, and as will be reiterated below, 
property and territory are separate ideas). Moreover, the state is entitled not only to create 
and enforce laws within its geographical domain but also to ‘alter the juridical status’ of the 
territory.24 This means that it can share part of itself with other political entities (e.g. joining 
the EU, UN or other supra-national bodies), submit to another jurisdictional authority (i.e. 
irredentist secession), or dismember itself (i.e. secession or devolution). The right of secession, 
 
24 See A. John. Simmons, Boundaries of Authority (Oxford: OUP, 2016), pp. 93-100; Margaret Moore, A Political 
Theory of Territory (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp. 26-30.  
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therefore, demands a cogent account of territorial rights, because it is necessary to 
understand who has the final say over the right to jurisdiction. 
 
The dominant view can be contrasted with the old-fashioned, possession view, on which a 
state holds its territory just like a person owns its property. The possession view treats 
political territory as the property of state, so the state’s rights to dispose of territory is almost 
absolute and inviolable. Thus, no-one has the right to criticise what the state does within the 
territory or to any person within the territory; and the territory is created to serve the state’s 
instrumental benefits. However, this view has at least two serious flaws that compel us to 
reject it. Firstly, it is counterintuitive in the contemporary era because, while we do not ask a 
property-owner to treat their property in a particular fashion, we do require states to treat 
their territories and the citizens of those territories in certain moral ways. That is, even though 
the state can legitimately possess non-privately-owned property and control the borders 
unilaterally (just like an individual acts towards their property), other behaviours are limited 
by what justice demands. Secondly, this moral treatment sheds light on what Arthur Ripstein 
calls ‘the internal norm of sovereignty’ inherent in the state’s relationship to the territory, 
and which ownership lacks. 25  The internal norm indicates that part of the normativity 
prescribing the relationship between the state and territory comes from a normative 
relationship between the state and the people within the territory. Namely, morality 
convinces us that states’ exercise of power should also be constrained by moral commitments 
to the interests of subjects, in addition to universal moral requirements. Compared to 
ownership, although the usage of property is limited to prevent harms to others, this 
 
25 Arthur Ripstein, ‘Property and Sovereignty: How to Tell the Difference,’ Theoretical Inquiries in Law 18 (2017): 
243-268.  
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normative principle is not generated by an internal relation between a property-owner and 
its property, but from an external moral norm (say, the Lockean proviso, or Mill’s harm 
principle). As such, we discard the possession view and subscribe to the jurisdiction view for 
an account of territorial rights, because only the latter can illuminate such an internal norm.26  
 
The jurisdiction view on territorial rights is a peculiar idea. We can frame it as an aspect of 
state legitimacy with respect to what condition justifies a state’s exercise of power within a 
specific land. The traditional account of state legitimacy attends to states’ rights to rule over 
subjects, while territorial rights focus on the territorial dimension of political authority. The 
territorial dimension has two significant features. Firstly, any individual and natural resources 
within the territory are subject to the jurisdiction it creates; yet secondly, only one particular 
group with certain characteristics (i.e. citizens), rather than every person within the territory, 
is able to be the source of the jurisdictional authority. This may seem to entail power 
inequality: if anyone within the territory is subject to the political authority, why is only some 
of those people qualified to constitute the authority? To counter this inequality, a just 
constitution of demos is necessary. That is, we should devise a fair institutional system 
protecting people’s political rights. However, the concern about demos cannot be 
satisfactorily addressed unless we understand the territorial dimension of state legitimacy. 
Prior to being a member of demos, one must be in a territory, and drawing particular 
territorial boundaries here or there determines what jurisdictional authority one submits to.  
For better analysing an account of territorial rights, let me formulate it as follows:  
 
 
26 For a more detailed criticism of the possession view, please refer to Moore’s A Political Theory of Territory, 
pp. 17-26. Cara Nine, ‘Territory is not Derived from Property: A Response to Steiner,’ Political Studies 56 (2008): 
957-963. 
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By virtue of (what normativity) N, (the rights-holder) H is justified to be attached 
to/particularise certain territory in a particular way of attachment A. 
 
Here N articulates a normative basis as why the rights-holder should be entitled to territorial 
rights; H refers to an appropriate candidate holding territorial rights; and A indicates an 
account of territorial attachment, i.e. how the rights-holder justifies its claim to jurisdictional 
authority associated with a particular territory.27 These three issues can be summarised as 
the normativity, eligibility and attachment problems, for which any theory of territorial rights 
should account.  
 
2.2. Three fundamental territorial concerns 
 
There are three further concerns making the above three issues (N, H, A) more complicated, 
shaping the form of justified secession.28 First, most states establish their territories in an 
unjust manner (e.g. conquest, annexation or expulsion). This entrenches some ethnic or 
cultural groups within an intricate, biased social structure. Simmons terms this ‘wrongful 
subjection’, according to which the state is involved in enforcing the submission of some 
subjects. This is a fundamental and structural flaw with respect to the oppressed subjects, 
because their inferior or disadvantaged political status prevents them from remedying the 
situation themselves. The Kurds in the Middle East again are a case in point: the Kurds inhabit 
a geographically contiguous area, divided up between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Historical 
 
27 I owe this formulation to Kolers. See Avery Kolers, Land, Conflict and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 22-23.  
28 The practical and compositional problem are found in the work of Miller and Moore. See David Miller and 
Margaret Moore, ‘Territorial Rights,’ in Global Political Theory, ed. David Held and Pietro Maffettone 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 180-197. 
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contingency thus makes this large group an ethnic minority in each of these states. While 
many secessionists appeal to some unjust historical event that has disadvantaged them, a 
plausible account of territorial rights should provide adequate resolution of wrongful 
subjection. This naturally implies the second concern: the practical problem, which shows 
that multiple and competing Hs (i.e. territorial rights-holders) may asserts their territorial 
entitlement to the same area of territory. This asks why the boundaries of state territory 
should be drawn as they are now. Should the territory of the United Kingdom always include 
Northern Ireland? Can the territorial claim of the Tibetan government (made in exile) to Tibet 
outweigh that of the Chinese government? The practical problem contests the current 
territory-holding of states.  
 
Third, theorists dispute what incidents of territorial rights we ought to assert: the composition 
problem. For instance, Cara Nine notes that the rights are composed of four elements: (1) 
jurisdictional rights over persons within the territory; (2) jurisdictional rights over resources; 
(3) ownership rights over resources; and (4) the authority to determine residence, 
immigration, and citizenship rights regarding the region, among which she argues only the 
first two are necessary (or morally justified). The compositional problem is especially 
important to an account of the right to secede, because it is commonly assumed that 
secession inevitably outweighs the state’s right to prohibit the dismemberment of the 
territory or the right to territorial integrity, given that the state holds territorial rights. One 
may thus argue that territorial rights should not contain the right to prohibit secession if the 
right of secession can be justified, or vice versa. The recognition of territorial integrity and 
self-determination/secession becomes an either/or question. Yet, as illuminated by Brilmayer, 
the right or principle of self-determination is not inherently in tension with the principle of 
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territorial integrity, and under a plausible account of territorial rights, the two principles 
should be coherent with each other.29 That is to say, an account of territorial rights enables 
us to articulate under what circumstances the exercise of the right to secede (derived from 
the right to self-determination) would not violate states’ right to territorial integrity. It would 
not be counter-intuitive anymore if the right of secession and the right to prohibit secession 
both existed. 
 
Thus, wrongful subjection, the practical problem and compositional problem are the three 
fundamental territorial concerns that a cogent account of territorial rights has to address if 
the right to secede or any proposal for justified secession aims to obtain a solid basis. To 
understand them more clearly, let me rephrase the three concerns into questions: (1) how to 
counter the unjust genesis of states; (2) how to evaluate competing, overlapping claims to 
the same area of territory; and (3) how to reconcile the right of self-determination with the 
right to territorial integrity. 
 
3. The fundamental framework of a theory of secession: dualist justification 
 
Given the literature review of past accounts of the right to secede and the significance of 
territorial rights for the right, I propose to revisit a normative theory of secession with the 
following account.  
 
 
29 Lea Brilmayer, ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,’ Yale Journal of International 
Law 16 (1991): 177-202. 
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Secession challenges two kinds of state authority: one over subjects, and one over territory. 
For this reason, any group claiming to secede has to show that the authority over themselves 
and the land on which the would-be state aims to build is no longer valid. This seems to 
suggest two sorts of investigation. First, we examine the relationship between the state and 
subjects, by which we ask whether secession as a political activity is still morally permissible 
if the conditions for state legitimacy are satisfied. We may consider whether the right of 
secession has similar moral worth to some basic human rights. Do people have a fundamental 
right to exercise the freedom of secession, or should the right to secede be subject to the 
discretion of the state? Second, we weigh different territorial claims between secessionists 
and the state, and see which is more morally compelling. That is to say, when claiming to 
repudiate state authority over a particular swathe of territory, we consider under what 
condition either claim is justified in overriding the other. This switches our focus to the 
territorial entitlement of people or states, as distinct from the first kind. These two types of 
state authority reflect two claims of secession: that one overrules subjects, and the other is 
about territorial control or territorial sovereignty. 
 
Nevertheless, a theory of secession with a cogent account of territorial rights should not 
advance two normatively separate investigations as to the two claims. A concern about rights 
to control territory should also be taken as a political activity, by which the two claims should 
be justified with holistic and coherent normativity. If one is justified by appeal to a balanced 
view of state legitimacy and self-determination, so is the other. That is to say, although these 
two investigations are conceptually different, they shall apply to the same concrete instances 
of secession. It should not be that one could be justified while the other cannot. In order to 
avoid normative incoherence and secure conceptual distinctiveness, I propose to revisit 
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secession with the dualist justification: the first part asks, what conditions justify a state’s 
claim to territorial rights (which contain a right to prohibit secession)? The second part aims 
to justify taking over a particular area of state-occupied land to build a (new) state. Call the 
first part the statist justification, because it provides the (territorial rights) criteria that a state 
has to meet if it claims the right to forbid secession. The second part, the secessionist 
justification, accounts for what rights to their territory secessionists are entitled to if a host 
state achieves the statist justification; and if the state fails to achieve this, how they might 
then justify their claim to secede.  
 
My fundamental structure is termed ‘dualist’ not only because it takes both the state and 
secessionist perspectives into account, but because it is also envisaged to capture a proper 
and balanced interaction (as to territorial rights) between the state and the people striving 
for greater group autonomy. Balance is achieved through the state territory being shared by 
the state and each subgroup who has territorial entitlements to their claimed land. Unilateral 
secession should be forbidden, provided that the ideal, balanced interaction occurs. The state, 
in order to justify its territorial rights over the whole state territory, should demonstrate that 
it is respecting and protecting subgroups’ territorial rights. The dualism, therefore, can also 
indicate an interaction between citizenship as a nationwide identity and territorial subgroups 
holding another distinct group identity, because subjects are endowed with citizenship rights 
through which to realise their individual and social goals when they are incorporated into the 
state’s jurisdictional authority. In other words, in what way the state can impose citizenship 
upon each subject without suppressing their corporate, territorial interests becomes the first 
issue that a justification for the right to secede has to deal with (see Chapters 3 & 4).  
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Subsequently, the flip-side of the preceding justification reveals under what circumstance a 
state’s territorial rights over the whole territory would be undermined and what a qualified 
claimant to secession should be, by which a territorial subgroup would have to find a way to 
secure their territorial interests. However, the answer to this question may not entail the 
justification of secession directly, because, as shown in Miller’s or Wellman’s account, 
secession is not the only means to achieve self-determination. What matters here is to what 
extent the state fails to protect the territorial rights of certain people. As such, the second, 
secessionist justification devotes itself to principles for justified secession, and derivatively, a 










In this chapter, I shall argue that, with respect to constructing a theory of secession, pre-
institutional moral reasoning cannot be excluded by the institutional; and accordingly, I shall 
subscribe to the two-stage view on the matter proposed by Daniel Weinstock. 1  Pre-
institutional reasoning is defined as that which does not consider what institution it may apply 
to; it thus theorises primarily about what acts should be undertaken based upon morality, 
seeing its application within an institution as a separate enterprise. Instead of this dualist 
position, institutional reasoning predicates the justification of the act on the form of the 
relevant institution, under which the ideal mode of institution is firstly specified as the higher 
norm (with its particular ends) and considers subsequently how the act should be 
incorporated into the norm. For instance, we devise a set of basic human rights as the 
universal and fundamental interests that every society ought to protect. Since the rights may 
derive their justification prior to any form of institution, they should condition the norms of 
any society pre-institutionally. Yet how the constitution of a given society should be 
conditioned by these rights is a different, distinct matter from the pre-institutional 
justification. This is the illustration of pre-institutional moral reasoning. By contrast, the 
justification of some act, like the decriminalisation of sex work, appears to align with 
institutional reasoning by which we justify the practice based upon what core values the 
institutions aim to safeguard. The practice is subject to, rather than independent from, the 
 
1 Daniel Weinstock, “Constitutionalizing the Right to Secede,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2) (2001): 
182-203. 
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form of institutions. Such discussion reflects the contemporary debate over the methodology 
of political/social philosophy, which touches upon ideas like feasibility constraints and 
practice-dependence.2 Yet, due to the terminology adopted in the literature on secession, 
those ideas are reframed by the contest between pre-institutional and institutional moral 
reasoning (henceforth PMR and IMR).  
 
It is not hard to see that the contest between these two systems of reasoning revolves around 
the question of whether PMR is necessary or helpful for settling the issue, viz. what right of 
secession we should advocate. With respect to IMR we need to clarify which institutions are 
relevant. Here, the institution in question refers to the current international order rather than 
the traditional understanding of statehood (i.e. the state and its subjects). That is to say, while 
the PMR camp holds the identification of independent moral values to be a prerequisite for 
reform or enhancement of international law, the IMR camp argues that we should think of 
rights in terms of their role within an international institution. In order to address this issue, I 
shall elucidate and analyse the dispute in Section 1 by spelling out the arguments for each 
line of reasoning, concluding that some PMR is still necessary to articulate, with respect to 
the question of secession, how the international order can be enhanced. Section 2 will 
introduce Weinstock’s approach which holds that both lines of reasoning are indispensable. 
Thus, while PMR aims to articulate the (moral) right to secede, IMR endeavours to recognise 
whether the institution at issue is justified in implementing the right, and if not, how the 
institution should meet the right in the future. Furthermore, this twin-track approach will be 
 
2 For an explanatory work on feasibility, see Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility: A 
Conceptual Exploration,” Political Studies 60 (2012): 809-25; as to the idea of practice-dependence, see Andrea 
Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2) (2008): 
137-64; “How Practices Matter,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (1) (2016): 3-23. 
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defended by showing its methodological advantages in demanding an account of territorial 
rights, endorsing the progress without radical reform (i.e. progressive conservatism) and 
upholding a proposal satisfying to a variety of moral codes (i.e. moral convergence).  
 
1. Pre-Institutional vs. Institutional Moral Reasoning 
 
IMR theorists argue that, in order for a principle to qualify as one that justifies secession, it 
needs to find a place within an institutional scheme. A value or principle that is not recognised 
by our best form of institutions was never really a value in the first place, or at least not one 
we should endorse. By contrast, PMR theorists argue that we should concentrate on getting 
our values straight and that whenever we have, they consist of pro-tanto reasons for inclusion 
in an institutional scheme. When a value or principle is hence dismissed, however legitimately, 
that is a matter for regret. The debate concerning better moral reasoning over secession has 
two key controversies. First, there is the argument as to whether secession is an inherently 
institutional concept containing necessarily a right to international recognition. Second, there 
is debate as to whether what morality requires of the right could help articulate what sort of 
(legal) right an institutional scheme (say a legal system) should recognise. The PMR camp 
replies to these questions with two affirmatives, whereas the IMR camp would give two 
negative answers. Moreover, the former tends to advocate the primary right to unilateral 




1.1. The significance of IMR 
 
IMR is mostly defended by Allen Buchanan and David Lefkowitz. They argue that, because 
secession is an inherently institutional (i.e. international legal) concept, any theory of 
secession must be developed in accord with IMR: ‘whether a particular account of the right 
to secede is defensible will depend upon whether embodying its principles in the 
international legal order would, all thing considered, promote the proper goals of the 
systems’.3 This argument has two important components. First, it demands holistic theorising 
about the right of secession, which advocates that the consequence of this theorising should 
be compatible with the legal or institutional scheme in question, in spite of the conceptual 
and justifiability difference between moral and legal rights in general.4 This is required not 
because we have an additional goal of implementing or legalising the right, but because the 
actual political activity of secession can only be carried out within a social, legal system. 
Secession calls into question established institutions and aims to form its own legitimate state 
enjoying the entitlements (like the host state) conferred by international law. Moral 
reasoning is helpful to the right of secession only if it takes such institutional features into 
account. Second, the theorisation of the norm (regulating secession) should precede the 
theorisation of the right in the sense that the latter should be devised to protect the former, 
not the other way around. The institutional nature of secession not only reflects what norm 
(e.g. international law) secession may concern, as well as the theoretical order that the nature 
or values of the norm should be primarily investigated and identified, but also explores 
 
3 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 348. 
4 I will explain this distinction more clearly in section 1.2.1. when introducing how PMR approaches secession. 
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subsequently what right of secession the norm should subscribe to. Based upon this argument, 
the IMR camp holds that a justifiable account of the right to secede should be  
consonant with our contemporary system of international law. It must possess the capability 
to shape a proposal for international law. To examine IMR’s assertion, I shall scrutinise how 
sound the two components are. 
 
1.1.1. Holistic theorising and international recognition 
 
As argued by Lefkowitz, secession should be defined in terms of  what it claims, and many 
such claims are bound up with the extant institution: international law.5 This implies that 
international law is the higher norm governing secession, and that theorising the right to 
secede should take a holistic view that takes the protection of such a higher norm into 
account. 
 
When secessionists make a claim to secede, they are demanding the same entitlements as 
those of their host state. According to Buchanan, the dominant view conceives of these 
entitlement as the right to territorial integrity; the right to non-interference in domestic 
affairs; the right to change its juridical relations to other states (such as making treaties or 
alliances); the right to declare (just) war; the right to exclusive jurisdiction over the subjects, 
natural resources and borders of the territory; and the right to participate in the basic process 
of international law.6 Each of these rights is conceived of as  non-absolute and requiring 
further specification when implemented. Those rights, however, are conferred and secured 
 
5 David Lefkowitz, “International Law, Institutional Moral Reasoning, And Secession,” Law and Philosophy 37, no. 
4 (2018): 385-413. 
6 Buchanan, Justice, 263.  
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by international law where compliance with and the source of the law refers to a group of 
mutually recognised states. This reflects the following points. First, a claim to secede is not 
merely a transaction between the seceding groups and their host states, but also involves 
international law, which can legitimately govern or intervene. Second, the alleged mutually 
recognised states are the main source of the authority of international law, just like citizens 
in relation to their sovereignty or the law. Third, the seceding groups cannot simply claim to 
be the protectees of international law, but must also to be one of the legislators that shape 
the global order, which necessarily demands the recognition of extant states. Therefore, 
fourth, a prospective seceding state should be required by international law or the extant 
recognised states to establish its legitimacy in terms of being recognised legally as an 
independent, autonomous agent whose status is equal to that of the current recognised 
states. This recognised legitimacy, fifthly, not only implies certain criteria that the seceding 
states should meet in order to join the body of international law (as immigrants have to meet 
certain conditions to become a citizen of a foreign state), but also confines the theorising of 
the right (to secede) to IMR, meaning that we should take the higher norm (i.e. international 
law) into account. An account of the right that would overthrow most extant states is deemed 
to be unjustified, not just because of impracticality, but also because of the connection to 
international recognition.  
 
Lefkowitz argues that to ignore this connection to international law (namely that secession is 
defined without recognitional legitimacy), would either imply that (1) secession does not 
require a right to territorial integrity, to border control and to exclusive jurisdiction over 
subjects; or (2) that the idea of secession proposed is based in an entirely different view of 
global order from the current one. The first implication conflicts with what secessionists 
 36 
themselves typically claim, while the second shows that secession is a contextually dependent 
act, which, in our era, depends on international law characterised as a multi-polar, horizontal 
global order. This contextual or institutional understanding of secession can also be illustrated 
when thinking a scenario different from our contemporary international order. For instance, 
a feudal lord in medieval Europe might justify his claim to ‘secede’ only in terms of changing 
his loyalty to the king he serves, while maintaining his allegiance to the Church. Given that 
the legitimate rule of kings was subject to the Church, understanding this vertical power 
relation between the kings and the Church becomes necessary in justifying such secession. In 
terms of secession in our own time, this relation between kings and the church has no 
significance, for our understanding of secession presupposes, 
 
a world composed of political communities that neither claim to rule nor to be ruled 
by one another, and who share to a considerable degree a common understanding of 
the jurisdiction that comprises the independence or sovereignty each enjoy vis-à-vis 
the other.7  
 
Secession thus understood is always an institutional concept and the concept of institutions 
in our time refers not just to statehood per se but also to the body of international law, both 




7 Lefkowitz, “International Law,” p. 390. 
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1.1.2. The norm comes first 
 
Holistic theorising does not necessarily support the priority of the norm (viz. international law) 
over the right to secede, because, when the norm conflicts with a given account of the right, 
it does not explain why a justified norm of international law should override a justified 
account of the right. Even though it is a common practice that international law can intervene 
in or against a secessionist movement, this practice plus any proposal for the right should 
both undergo scrutiny. Why should an account of the right always be subject to a norm of 
international law?  
 
Lefkowitz points out the distinction between a theory of the value of political self-
determination and a theory of a justified norm governing secession, and argues that any valid 
account of the right should follow the latter path, that is, be justifiable to a (justified) norm 
governing secession. A theory based on the value of political self-determination has two main 
tasks: (1) to explain why secession is valuable in terms of political self-determination; and (2) 
to explain under what conditions we can exercise such a valuable right. The rival theorising 
instead proceeds with (1)’ identifying what norm(s) secession would touch upon; (2)’ 
understanding (or re-interpreting) the nature and value of the norm; and (3)’ devising the 
principle of or the right to secession best coherent with the norm.  
 
Why does Lefkowitz think that an adequate account of secession should take the form of 
institutional theorising? Simply put, he believes the pre-institutional approach falls short of 
treating many important issues impartially. The first problem is the indeterminacy of action: 
the theory would fail to determine what course should be followed if there were other 
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options satisfying political self-determination as well. In other words, there may be reasons 
favouring secession, but inconclusively. If a primary right account of secession is justified, 
then it should further require either an account of why it is secessionists having the right to 
propose secession unilaterally (provided that the secession proposed would not impose 
injustice on others), or additional criteria for prioritising secession rather than other less 
extreme means. Secondly and thirdly, the pre-institutional theorising has potentially an 
unbalanced focus on secessionists, which may undervalue an account of reconciliation and 
accountability. It needs reconciliation when a given secession conflicts with the political self-
determination of other people or when it clashes with values other than self-determination. 
It also demands accountability, which refers to a set of rules of interaction among the agents 
at issue, without which the former issue (i.e. reconciliation) cannot be addressed 
comprehensively, nor can the higher norm (say international law) be sustainable, because the 
relevant agents do not understand what responsibility they should take, according to what 
the theory proposes.  
 
It is possible that a value theory of political self-determination could dismiss these doubts by 
supplementing the aforementioned accounts. However, this response would either align 
itself with Lefkowitz’s institutional approach or fail to address the problems, as it under-
theorises the concerns. For the three problems or requirements can only be addressed by a 
higher-order norm beyond any morality of secession, under which we secure not only political 
self-determination, but also other values. Theorising on secession is therefore conditioned by 
the higher norm, designed not only for secession, but also for other international human 
affairs. Such a commitment should lead theorists to prioritise an inquiry into the nature, value 
and sustainability of this higher norm, by which the aim of theorising should be this normative 
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theory, rather than a value theory of self-determination. It then implies a constraint on 
theorising: we should not assert an account of secession at the expense of a norm we 
commonly uphold to regulate secession. Once the first approach adapts itself to the priority 
of the higher norm, it starts to look more like the second approach. Otherwise, the norm 
devised would either be partial (because it values self-determination exclusively) or 
incomplete (for the norm proposed may need to be supplemented by a auxiliary theory, 
convincing us why many extant practices should be abandoned and how we may realise the 
new norm) given the insistence on the first approach (which means it still considers the three 
issues less important than self-determination).  
 
Therefore, granted that secession is inherently an institutional, international-law-related 
concept, and the institution in question secures more values than political self-determination, 
IMR should apply to the moral right of secession by devising an all-things-considered norm 
(i.e. international law) governing secession.  
 
1.2. The significance of PMR 
 
In contrast to IMR, the PMR camp insists on the conceptual distinction between what morality 
requires of the right and what (legal) rights to secession institutions should recognise: it 
advocates ‘a moral right of secession that is normatively prior to and independent of 
whatever legal right to secession might be best for incorporation into international law’. 8 
However, two points have to be clarified. First, PMR theorists do not insist that international 
 
8 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 56. 
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law must recognise whatever is derived from PMR. Instead, they can accept their proposal 
being turned down by institutions for practical reasons, but meanwhile argue that the non-
recognition is at the expense of the moral right. We should bear in mind that even though the 
institution (i.e. international law) is all-things-considered justified in not recognising the right, 
it is a moral loss that needs to be rectified in the future if possible. Second, it is a mistake to 
think that the IMR camp conflates moral and legal rights. IMR holds that an appropriate 
account of the moral right to secede, if it exists, should be compatible with and thus 
recognised by the higher norm governing secession because, as long as secession is inherently 
institutional, its morality should always be a matter of recognition determined by the norm. 
To rebut this view, PMR camp must either argue that secession is not inherently an 
international legal concept, or that this feature is not sufficient to make IMR outweigh PMR. 
In what follows, I shall firstly explain the general conceptual distinction between the 
justification of moral and legal rights; and subsequently show why the conceptual difference 
should still hold in a theory of the right to secede by showing the superfluity of the 
international recognition argument in 1.2.2. and the importance of the moral loss argument 
in section 1.2.3.  
 
1.2.1. Moral rights vs. Legal rights 
 
According to Dworkin’s metaphor of rights as trumps, rights have a special normative, 
trumping power that grants the right holders permission to act in a certain way even if some 
social aim or utility would be served better by doing otherwise. 9  Nevertheless, the 
 
9 Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps,” in Theories of Rights, ed. Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), 153-67. 
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normativity of rights can be derived in two different ways. Following Newman, a moral right 
is a justified claim or entitlement that only depends on what morality requires rather than 
what a legal system should recognise; conversely, a legal right refers to a claim or entitlement 
whose justification must be determined by a legal norm, which indicates the recognition of a 
legal system based upon a proper interpretation of the norm and how it incorporates the 
claim.10 Given that the concept of morality refers to the alleged common human interests, 
the idea of moral rights, once justified, can go across time and space and have some universal 
and general applications. By contrast, the validity of legal rights depends on the institutions 
to which they subscribe. Some conduct is deemed to be (legal) rights only in a particular norm 
that issues the recognition, because the social practices or conventions behind the norm 
reflect people’s shared understanding of or identification with, the conduct. The distinction 
is important because the justification of either cannot automatically entail the other, 
although their rationales sometimes overlap. For example, criminalising torture may be 
justified by the protection of the moral interest not merely in existence but also dignity. 
 
Yet, in most instances, the justification of moral rights should be distinguished from the basis 
of legal rights. For instance, we might advocate a moral right to free movement justified 
universally to each individual, but hesitate to support such a freedom being recognised 
immediately by the legal system of a state, meaning that the state is still entitled to take legal 
means to check anyone’s entry into the territory or the (legal) right to turn down a visa 
application. The hesitation is not necessarily a denial of free movement but concern about 
feasibility constraints, such as the need to build up a cross-national jurisdiction scheme first. 
 
10 Dwight G. Newman, “Collective Rights,” Philosophical Books 48 (3) (2007): 221-232, p. 222. 
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This repeats the logic of IMR: a norm or institution has its own set of rules evaluating the 
justification of a given action and we should take the sustainability of that norm seriously. The 
same result can be found from the opposite viewpoint: that is, a legal right is not always 
derived from a moral right. A case in point might be traffic rules such as traffic signals or the 
legal age of driving. It is highly implausible that there is a straightforward moral foundation 
for such rules, which are mainly the result of social conventions. Despite the lack of moral 
foundation, a legal system still needs to regulate the traffic, because by so doing society can 
have clarity and efficiency on the roads. As such, the legal right to drive and to follow traffic 
signals would be recognised by the legal system not because we first justified their moral 
rights, but because society recognised the need to control traffic for wider social benefits. 
Thus, a legal right is not always based upon a corresponding moral right.  
 
Nevertheless, the conceptual differences mentioned above cannot deny the possibility of 
some middle ground in which we might first moralise the institution and then contemplate 
what (legal) rights such moralised institutions ought to recognise. The IMR camp holds this 
view on secession. Yet to rebut this position, an emphasis on the generally conceptual 
difference between moral and legal rights is insufficient. The PMR camp must show that a 
direct application of morality to secession, without taking international law into account, is 
still helpful and necessary. Let me then introduce the first counterargument, which advocates 




1.2.2. The contingency of international recognition argument 
 
Recall that the most essential component justifying the theoretical advantage of IMR is its 
observance of secession’s institutional nature, that is, the right to secede necessarily consists 
of a claim to international recognition. As shown in sections 1.1.1 & 1.1.2, the latter concept 
denotes the right to be recognised not just as a protectee, but also one of the legislators, of 
international law. The right to secede, therefore, should go beyond the relationship between 
the seceded and seceding states and prioritise the protection of international law as the 
higher norm governing secession. Moral theorisation of such a higher norm should take 
precedence over the theorisation of the right to secede. 
 
PMR advocates counter such an approach by arguing that secession as an institution-related 
concept should be understood primarily on the basis of de facto statehood instead of an 
international legal concept, because international recognition of secession is no more than a 
contingent requirement. If we agree with this claim, there is no necessity to follow IMR and 
IMR theorists fail to dismiss the role of PMR in our understanding of the right to secede. What 
morality requires of the right should thus be independent from what international law 
recognises. Why is the demand for international recognition contingent? They ask us to 
imagine two possible worlds: the first has only one (world) government and the second has 
multiple states yet lacks shared international law.11 As long as these two worlds share the 
same idea of statehood as we do, we share the very similar moral principle of, or the right to, 
secession with them. These worlds (including ours) overlap in that secession begins with a 
 
11 Altman and Wellman, (2009), p. 58. 
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challenge to the political authority of states over their subjects and territories, and 
subsequently claims to establish its own state entitled to the same rights as the host states. 
The structure of international law is only one important variable amongst others, but not a 
necessary constant determining principles. Therefore, if PMR is rejected simply because it 
does not take international recognition into account, these examples illustrate that, given 
such a requirement is merely contingent, the alleged institutional nature of secession does 
not necessarily contain a claim to international recognition and thereby IMR lacks the 
theoretical advantage it claims to have. 
 
Such a contingency can be seen more clearly in another scenario, namely constitutionalising 
the right to secede. Consider the following questions. Can IMR apply to this case? Yes. Does 
it need to understand what morality requires of the right? I believe it should consider it in 
order for a society to realise what moral principles they can follow. Must it necessarily 
conform with the result of PMR for the understanding of the right? This is a context-
dependent question, resting upon what form of constitution is at issue, because, as previously 
pointed out, the concern about legal recognition is conceptually different from pre-
institutional moral reasoning. The institution is entitled to make the judgement in its own 
right. Yet it would not necessarily take international recognition or what right of secession 
international law recognises into account. The reason for this is more than the simple fact 
that a constitution has no authority over such an issue, but because the claim to international 
recognition is really a secondary, rather than primary, concern as to secession. We can 
therefore see that, for IMR, which factors ought to be taken into account depends on what 
institution is in place and the relations between the institution and secessionist claims. Given 
that international law is not inherently the institution governing secession, the claim for the 
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need for the permission of international law is contingent and not necessary to the right of 
secession. The PMR camp, by contrast, holds a more general and universal position that the 
right of secession concerns constantly and primarily the relations between the state, territory 
and a group of its subjects. It would be unreasonable to dismiss such pre-international-law 
moral reasoning when theorising the right to secede. 
 
IMR theorists may contend that, regardless of what the right would relate to in any other 
possible world, it must obtain international recognition in our current world; so, it is still 
necessary to take such an international legal idea into account for theorising here and now. 
PMR, therefore, has no benefit in our world because, again, it fails to take the body of 
international law into consideration. To evaluate this reply, we have to examine more 
carefully what this contingent but necessary-in-our-world fact truly entails. If the extant 
system of international law takes international recognition as its fundamental constitutive 
factor, then surely the right to secede should consider this seriously when the system decides 
what right it should recognise here and now. Given that international law is treated as the 
higher norm governing secession, IMR theorists may be correct to require moral reasoning to 
target, theorise the body of international law, weigh up different accounts of the right and 
determine which best fits in with the law. However, it is hard to concur with the IMR camp 
that simply because some claims of secession necessarily relate to international law here and 
now, we should deem international law to be the higher norm governing secession, rather 
than a revisable entity that can be shaped more or less by what morality requires for secession.  
 
The statement that international law is the higher norm governing secession, however, is 
quite misleading if we understand ‘norm’ and ‘governing’ as substantive terms. This is 
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because in practice, determining international recognition and deriving a justified way of 
establishing de facto statehood are politically/jurisdictionally separate; and current 
international law takes charge of the former, but abstains from the latter. Due to the extant 
structure understood as horizontal political order, the effectiveness of international law is 
restrained by the domestic jurisdiction and non-intervention principle12 and is thereby quite 
unhelpful to address most substantive issues that might emerge in the process of building de 
facto statehood, unless basic human rights have been violated. It is correct to hold that 
justified secession here and now should include justification of its right to international 
recognition, given that secession in our time is partly governed by international law, but it is 
dubious to take international recognition as the most fundamental, constitutive property of 
global order. Given that not all claims of secession are governed by international law, it would 
be unreasonable to require the law to overlook the result of PMR just because PMR does not 
take one of the characteristics of international law into account.  
 
Furthermore, the plain truth is that the current body of international law, unfortunately, is 
far from an integrated, coherent norm and so it is contentious to assert any prospect of the 
law as the ideal form that it should strive for, let alone what claims of secession might be 
subject to the law in the future. The future form of the international order could be either 
more centralised, such as a world government, or more piecemeal, such as a bunch of small, 
 
12 The principle is understood as follow: once a state de facto exists and gains the (international) legal 
entitlements equal to those of other existing, recognised states, it then acquires the right to freely determine its 
own political status and economic, social and cultural development. This is the alleged external right to self-
determination protecting a state’s autonomy in its domestic affairs. Based on this right, other states have the 
correlative duty not to intervene in this state’s the domestic affairs. The current practices of international law 
recognise and endorse these right and duty positively. However, this implies huge neglect of internal self-
determination that international law does not concern itself much with whether a group within a state can self-
determine their collective matters, not be suppressed by the state. See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of 
Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 45; pp. 174-176. 
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decentralised states, and the necessity or importance of international recognition fluctuates 
accordingly. Based upon the extant relation between the international order and secession, 
IMR theorists can legitimate their stance that the right of secession should not undermine, 
but rather secure the very value of current international law. Yet this fact should not lead us 
to dismiss the significance of PMR for secession as a potential tool for improving the 
international order because, as previously pointed out, the institution (no matter what form 
of international law) is justified only in not recognising what morality requires of the right, 
rather than denying the justification or existence of the right. Only if non-recognition 
represents nothing or is of no moral significance can the right be ‘squeezed out’ without any 
concern at all. Such an issue will be the theme of the next subsection.  
 
In summary, IMR advocates argue for the institutional nature of secession associated with a 
right to international recognition. Based upon such a conceptual connection, they further 
argue that the best account of the moral right to secede must be coherent with and serve the 
purpose of a higher norm (governing secession), thereby referring to international law. 
However, the right to secede does not necessarily include a right to international recognition. 
Even though the current international order conceives of international recognition as a 
necessary constitutive element, IMR theorists cannot demonstrate that the ideal form of 
international order must be characterised by such an element, let alone the relation with 
secession therein. Comparatively, the PMR camp holds a more universal and general position 
that secession should be understood primarily within a de facto statehood. Moreover, the 
PMR camp can accept its proposal being turned down justifiably by IMR, but further argue 
that legal non-recognition should produce a certain moral loss at the same time, which implies 
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some action-guiding force for our institution. Let me now proceed with such a moral loss 
argument. 
  
1.2.3. The moral loss argument 
 
How should we understand the outcome in which all reasoning for secession only establishes 
a moral right rather than one recognised by institutions? IMR regards this as, unproblematic, 
or that the putative moral right is not really a value we should pursue at all, given that the 
institution is justified in denying the recognition of the right. PMR theorists reply, however, 
that even if the law is justified in so doing, the justification or the non-recognition must come 
accompanied with regret, and that this has two implications: (1) the justification is achieved 
with the sacrifice of the right signifying certain moral loss, by which (2) it entails a normative, 
legitimate expectation that once the currently justified obstacle blocking the moral right is 
overcome, the legal system should recognise the right.  
 
But what is moral loss exactly? I shall define ‘moral loss’ as something that occurs whenever 
a justified pro-tanto moral right is overridden by some other justified practical reasons. ‘A 
right is pro-tanto’, according to Danny Frederick, ‘if and only if there are exceptional 
circumstances in which it is permissible to infringe it, even though it is impermissible to 
infringe it under normal circumstances.’13 Moreover, the alleged practical reason is twofold. 
Either it can be identified in the contrast between ideal and non-ideal theory, by which it 
refers more precisely to full vs. partial compliance theory;14 or it appears in the case of moral 
 
13 Danny Frederick, “Pro-Tanto Versus Absolute Rights,” Philosophical Forum 45 (4) (2014): 375-394, 375.  
14 Based upon Valentini’s conceptual analysis, the debate on ideal vs. non-ideal theory encompasses three main 
issues: (i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end-state vs. 
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dilemma that conflicts of rights are the inescapable trade-off characterising our human lives. 
The former manifests how rights are specified in morally reasonable 15  circumstances, 
whereas the latter denotes the difficulty or complexity of judgement distinct from the former 
even though principles of right can be articulated through philosophical reasoning. Let me 
illustrate this. 
 
First, suppose a primary right to secede is justified in the manner of PMR. What would happen 
if an institution, say the body of international law, refused to recognise it? For the sake of 
argument, allow me to simplify the account of the right as follows. Collective autonomy is a 
paramount moral value, explaining and justifying why we are averse to colonisation and tend 
to endorse democracy. Every (qualified) group is thus entitled to the right of political self-
determination, by which a group of people have the right to organise their political affairs in 
accordance with their will, provided that they express their will explicitly and have the 
capacity to realise it without imposing injustice on other people. Forming a state of one’s own 
is one way in which the right may be given effect, and with this in view we justify an expansive 
(moral) right of political self-determination, including the right to secede. Grounding 
secession on collective autonomy, each group is entitled to the pro-tanto right to secede if 
their will is explicitly expressed and their realisation does not impose injustice upon others. 
 
transitional theory. See Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 
7/9 (2012): 654–664. 
15 What is reasonableness? Generally speaking, Rawls says, ‘the reasonable is viewed as a basic intuitive moral 
idea.’ Scanlon further explains, ‘a claim about what it is reasonable for a person to do presupposes a certain 
body of information and a certain range of reasons which are taken to be relevant, and goes on to make a claim 
about what these reasons, properly understood, in fact support.’ So understood, the idea can be taken as the 
background condition for moral reasoning, under which people are entitled to moral agency, act on good faith 
and more importantly, are both subject and object of morality. Simply put, the idea asks us, particularly in 
collective action, to take other people’s interests into account when we live with others. See John Rawls, Justice 
as Fairness (London: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 82; T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 
(London: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 192. 
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Given this simplified justification, the PMR camp argues, there is a general moral duty to 
secure the collective autonomy of each group, even when they seek to discharge it by 
secession. If we project an ideal, full compliance theory of international law as the place in 
which every agent follows what morality/justice requires, we do not have to worry about 
some realpolitik concerns (e.g. groups may abuse the right to secede or people are overly 
obsessed with nationalism or state sovereignty) and so should directly apply this moral right 
(as the primary right to secede) to each qualified group. In reality, however, we may concede 
from the direct application that, due to the above practical or prudential concerns, the 
existing non-ideal, partial compliance system of international law may at most recognise a 
remedial right to secede, or even no right at all. This difference between the ideal and non-
ideal theory, however, should not be regarded as evidence that the justified moral value or 
the (primary) right lacks importance. Prompted by the ideal theory, we should measure the 
institutional judgement with a moral loss: the claimant’s collective autonomy is justifiably 
sacrificed to some weightier reasons and we should bear in mind that once those reasons 
cease to apply, the claim to collective autonomy should be recognised by law. So understood, 
a moral loss emerges when (1) a given moral right is justified, which indicates some 
fundamental interests of the right-holder in need of protection; yet meanwhile (2) we fail to 
secure those moral interests when the institutions are justified in not protecting them 
through a legal means. 
 
IMR advocates do not accept this moral loss argument and take it to be a mistaken view. 
Lefkowitz contends that unless the PMR camp can use IMR to construct an ideal theory of 
international law for the primary right to secede, we should not hold that fully just 
international law adheres to the primary right to secede. He concedes that IMR might agree 
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with such a prospect if it were to be established successfully. However, the proposal must 
come with ‘an empirically informed argument regarding the motives, institutional structures, 
and institutional capacities that constitute a global normative order containing a primary right 
to secession’. 16  That is, he claims that without articulating a transitional (re-)form of 
international law upholding the right that is still based upon the current global order, 
composed of sovereign states with the horizontal normative order, the argument framed by 
PMR cannot ground the primary right to secede in (allegedly ideal) international law and thus 
the argument is merely conjecture. Lefkowitz, therefore, responds to the claim about moral 
loss that such a loss with respect to secession exists only if (1) the extant institutions should 
recognise the right but fail to do so; or (2) an ideal form of the institutions is justified in 
conferring the primary right to secede. In other words, if we could not demonstrate that the 
core value of extant international law should recognise the result of PMR for secession, no 
moral loss would occur; and if the proposals sketched by PMR camp cannot meet the 
empirical demand of IMR, their conclusion should not have any guiding force but be 
considered merely a conjecture, by which it indicates, again, no moral loss. 
 
This interpretation of moral loss, however, is problematic in two senses. First, Lefkowitz 
confuses the significance of ideal vs. non-ideal theory delivered by PMR theorists, which is full 
vs. partial compliance, with the contrast between end-state and transitional theory. 
According to Valentini, the former is based upon two conditions: (1) all relevant agents follow 
what morality/justice requires; and (2) society, although resources are limited, is sufficiently, 
economically and socially developed to realise justice.17 Ideal theory is thus predicated on 
 
16 Lefkowitz, “International Law,” p.399. 
17 Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory” 
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these two conditions. Non-ideal theory, by contrast, is formed when the theoretical 
presumption does not satisfy either of the conditions. However, IMR’s understanding of ideal 
vs. non-ideal theory is that (1)’ ideal theory sets out an ultimate goal for institutional reform, 
whereas (2)’ the non-ideal considers how the goal might be achieved in gradual steps based 
upon existing social conditions. PMR theorists deploy the former account to illustrate why we 
should subscribe to, say, the primary right to secede, and by what reasoning international law 
may be justified in recognising that right or not. They simply argue for the moral truth out of 
full compliance theorising and independent of international law and so recommend the law 
recognise this truth whenever the global condition is close to the theoretical conditions. The 
requirement from the IMR camp for PMR theorists to construct an ideal, applicable form of 
international law prior to a right of secession, however, mistakes the rationale underlying 
PMR, simply because the PMR camp does not base their justification upon IMR. That is, if 
PMR’s original position does not take international recognition or international law as a 
necessary condition, there is no sense in demanding an ideally applicable form of 
international order from PMR theorists. The charge of mere conjecture is the product of such 
confusion.  
 
Further, it is worth noting that IMR theorists do not reject all kinds of rights framed by PMR 
for international law. Basic human rights as the product of PMR, Buchanan argues, are the 
foundation of international law. So, why does the international law not recognise, on the one 
hand, both the primary right to secede and basic human rights as pro-tanto rights, yet on the 
other allow the latter to override the former when they conflict? The IMR camp might 
contend it is because the recognition of the former would undermine the safeguard to the 
latter, which are the foundation of the law. However, if both sides agree the priority of basic 
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human rights, it should not be difficulty to adjudicate between them. It seems more plausible 
to argue, from the perspective of existing states, that instability would prevail if international 
law recognises the primary right of secession. Yet such an argument is more like a reason of 
prudence against the current recognition rather than a valid denial of the justification of the 
right. If two rights are both morally justified, the moral loss argument wants to identify the 
emergence of the loss whenever one is justified in overriding the other. Given the two rights 
in question protect two distinctly different moral interests, namely collective autonomy and 
a basic, decent human life, we should understand that basic human rights override the right 
of secession at the expense of collective autonomy. This is exactly the moral loss at issue and 
it entails two conclusions: (1) not only do we need identify what moral values are at stake, 
but we must also provide a solid ground justifying why some need be sacrificed; and (2) we 
should have an appropriate response to a moral loss, such as compensation or some policy 
minimising the loss. In other words, if a justification is derived at expense of some value, there 
is surely some moral loss demanding an appropriate response.  
 
A crucial point may be that IMR theorists do not construe the right of secession, or the value 
it aims to secure, as a fundamental constituent of international law, on the basis of which the 
right cannot be deemed as universal and general as the basic human rights and so should not 
be theorised by PMR. Since the IMR camp does not put them on a par with one another, the 
more fundamental (i.e. basic human rights) are justified and recognised pre-institutionally in 
shaping the institution, while other rights (say, the right to secede) must wait to be examined 
by and after the idealised institution. This method of theorisation implies a deeper 
methodological conviction called constructivism or the model-based approach, which is in 
contrast to PMR’s, radical pluralism or principle-based approach. According to Christopher 
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Bertram, the former holds a belief that ‘the practice of institutions in the actual world has 
some kind of constitutive significance for the kinds of normative principles that hold,’18 by 
which a hypothetical society or institution should be firstly theorised as the ideal norm for 
the targeted institution; subsequently a set of principles should be articulated as a firm 
structure that the people within the institution should act upon. The latter approach refers 
to ‘those moral and political theories that conceive of normative political theory as consisting 
in the application of some principle or principles to a particular subject, the social and political 
order, where those principles in some sense hold independently of that particular social and 
political order.’19 G. A. Cohen further explains this position that, 
 
we determine principles that we are willing to endorse through an investigation of our 
individual normative judgements on particular cases, and while we allow that 
principles that are extensively supported by a wide range of individual judgements can 
override outlier judgements that contradict those principles, individual judgements 
retain a certain sovereignty.20  
 
So understood, the conflict between IMR and PMR is more profound: whether we can 
prescribe our society or a given institution with a set of priority rules over the course of 
actions therein, by which it would not, according to Rawls, ‘give contrary directives in 
particular types of cases’ or create inconsistency of evaluating different principles in each type 
of case.21 Since IMR theorists hold that we should construct such rules, they can squeeze out 
 
18 Christopher Bertram, “Realism, moralism, models and institutions,” Journal of International Political Theory 
12, (2) (2016): 185-199, p. 187. 
19 Ibid., 186. 
20 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (London: Harvard University Press, 2008), 4. 
21 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 30. 
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a value without a sense of the loss if it contradicts the priority rules. By contrast, the PMR 
camp is inclined to take many moral judgements as made with certain inevitable trade-offs, 
because principles of rights ‘cannot all be satisfied all the time, nor do we have a method for 
systematically combining them.’22 As this methodological dispute further relates to some 
metaethical issues such as value incommensurability, I will refrain from delving into it further. 
However, I believe we can draw on this deep methodological dispute to claim that if the 
contest were to go this deep, then simply pointing out the conceptual connection to 
international recognition, which is highly questionable as necessary for a claim to secede, 
would not be sufficient or convincing enough to dismiss the moral loss argument, let alone 
the validity of PMR for the right of secession. I therefore conclude that both PMR and IMR are 
important and necessary to articulate what morality or justice requires of the right, regardless 
of whether it is envisaged to be applicable to international order. 
 
2. Balanced moral reasoning and the relevant criteria 
 
If PMR cannot be simply dismissed as IMR theorists advocate, and IMR has its distinct role in 
articulating what rights an institution should recognise, then the two moral reasonings should 
both be necessary for a tenable account of the right to secede. In this section, I shall argue 
that Weinstock’s proposal meets the demand for a balanced moral reasoning for secession, 
and then defend his method via a critique of the criteria articulated by Buchanan. Weinstock 
proposes his methodology of a normative theory of secession as a two-stage view, composed 
of the following basic questions: 
 
22 Cohen, Rescuing Justice, p.4. 
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(1) The abstract question: is there a moral right for a group to secede from a larger political 
association, and if so, what are its grounds? 
(2) The agency question: under what circumstances is it appropriate for a group to 
exercise the right in question? 
(3) The identity question: which kinds of groups can avail themselves of the right to 
secede? 
(4) The internal legal question: should a political association legally provide for the right 
to secede, and if so, what form should such a legal provision take? 
(5) The external legal question: should the international law recognise which governs the 
relations among sovereign states provide for the right to secede, and if so, what form 
should this recognition take? 
(6) The territorial question: does a group which exercises its right to secede have a right 
to the territory it inhabits simply in virtue of its having decided to secede?23  
 
This is called the two-stage view because it follows the basic framework of PMR that an 
account of a moral right should be distinguished from its legal application. Questions (1) to 
(3), and (6) are categorised as considerations bearing on the establishment of a moral right 
to secede, whereas questions (4) & (5) refer to whether a legal system should acknowledge 
the right.24 IMR at the second stage should take the consequence of the first stage/PMR into 
account, and yet each piece of theorising follows its own reasoning even if the conclusions 
 
23 Weinstock, “Constitutionalizing,” pp. 182-83. 
24 Weinstock himself does not say explicitly that question (6) is part of the first stage, namely the moral, abstract 
consideration. However, as I explained in my fundamental framework positing justified secession on the 
triangular relationship between states, subjects and territories, the concern of question (6) is necessary in any 
account of morally justified secession. In addition, I believe a plausible account of territorial rights is mostly 
framed by PMR instead of IMR. Based on these two reasons, I classify the sixth question into the abstract 
reasoning for the moral right to secede.  
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entailed contradict each other. By contrast, the one-stage view is what proponents of IMR 
advocate, according to which prudence and what institutions in question should properly 
react are taken to be the primary reasoning for granting secession or not. Based upon 
Weinstock’s six basic questions, IMR would prioritise question (5) and/or (4) in the sense that 
the answers to the other questions are mostly conditioned by the answers to questions (4) 
and (5). Since the six questions all follow the same moral reasoning, the answers should be 
all coherent. However, as illustrated in the previous section, we have sufficient reasons 
against such an approach. 
 
Weinstock thinks that only the two-stage view has the capacity to safeguard the significance 
of both moral and legal rights and to identify what moral loss may emerge. That is, he argues 
that the view is superior in practice because the assessment of its legal application can be 
more comprehensive, as the institutions in question are informed by and have weighed up 
the moral imperative from the justification of the right, the consequences determining 
whether to render legal provision for the right, and what unreasonable obstacle infringes the 
fulfilment of the right. As we could distinguish what infringes the prevalence of rights from 
what sorts of actions are truly valuable and also acknowledge the action-guiding force of 
moral loss, the institutions not only perform their ordinary function, namely dispute 
resolution, but also sustain the commitment to respect for rights by diminishing these 
obstacles. This shows that the two-stage view has a more comprehensive understanding of 
the purposes of institutions, according to which they are designed not only to settle public 
disputes but also to orient people’s moral conceptions and form a proper ranking of values.  
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Would proponents of IMR accept the conclusion that their one-stage view is methodologically 
inferior to the two-stage view? Let me examine Weinstock’s method through the lens of five 
criteria that Buchanan, who is an IMR advocate, proposes to evaluate the quality of a 
normative theory of secession; concomitantly I shall critique the soundness of those criteria. 
The standards are:  
(1) a cogent account of the territorial claim: a theory of secession should explain why a 
qualified claimant of secession can take over the claimed land legitimately; 
(2) the virtue of progressive conservatism: the principles proposed should improve the 
existing system at issue but not at the expense of sabotaging the very virtues of the 
system. Alternatively, other things being equal, if two competing theories both claim 
to improve the extant situation, but one achieves it by a radical reform of the system, 
then we reject the one with radical reform; 
(3) the virtue of moral accessibility: the theory worthy of more praise should create the 
least moral cost when implementing; 
(4) the virtue of incentive compatibility: likewise, the theory worth following should 
minimise perverse incentives as many as possible; and 
(5) the virtue of moral convergence: the theory determined should reflect high likelihood 
of compliance; that is, the more people of different ethical backgrounds accept it, the 
more valuable the theory is.25  
 
It is noticeable that the two-stage view is satisfied with the first criterion by articulating its 
sixth question. Confronting the remaining theoretical virtues, let me summarise them in 
 
25 Buchanan, Justice, pp. 348-50. 
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below. Progressive conservatism refers to how to advance the virtues of the system. Moral 
accessibility indicates the transitional cost/benefit of arriving at the aims proposed. Incentive 
compatibility demands the avoidance of negative and the promotion of positive side effects. 
Moral convergence focuses on the possibility of voluntary allegiance, which relates to a 
psychological concern about how far the principles proposed are from the ethical 
backgrounds of people in question. I shall argue that the two-stage view is superior in virtue 
of its more advanced performance on the second and the fifth virtue because it could provide 
a broader and subtler view of what should be improved; while rejecting the third and the 
fourth, since a normative theory of secession alone cannot complete such a calculation.   
 
Let me assume or clarify that the conclusion derived from the two-stage view is a synthesis 
of IMR and PMR, by which I mean a  mixed proposal that, say if the consequence of either 
contradicts the other (for the result of PMR may not be coherent with IMR), a supplementary 
or reconciliatory account of principles of secession should be given, according to which we 
know why the result of PMR is not recognised by IMR and more importantly, what impact or 
prospect would occur because of such non-recognition. Otherwise, the method is no more 
than a random joining together of IMR and PMR. As I have illustrated why PMR is 
indispensable for secession, here I focus on how this supplementary account invoked by PMR 
does a better job on progressive conservatism and moral convergence. First, through the 
comparison between the two stages (i.e. PMR and IMR), progressive conservatism can avoid 
(institutional) status quo bias by looking at the issue from the perspective of morality; that is, 
it can refresh or adjust the understanding of extant institutional virtues. Margaret Moore 
criticises IMR, writing that ‘it seems to give too much credence to those who do not wish to 
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recognize the legitimate aspirations of groups in society.’26 She then demonstrates the status 
quo bias in IMR by claiming that political rights for women and no right to slavery would both 
have failed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries if the virtues of the institutions at that 
time had been secured. If there is a difference between what morality requires and what best 
serves a justified norm, a fitting response is to ask why the norm does not follow what 
morality requires, rather than to label the former unrealistic or idealistic. By so doing, we 
check whether the norm devised contains status quo bias; subsequently, we whether explore 
what causes status quo bias and consider whether it should be tackled by legal means. Finally, 
if the difference between the two stages is justified, the theory should render an adequate 
response to the moral loss. Conversely, an account of the moral right to secede can also be 
informed by common practices. It is not merely a matter of feasibility but also what morally 
reasonable factors PMR theorists may underestimate or overlook. If we need to stay away 
from the defect of a value theory of political self-determination identified by Lefkowitz, PMR 
can address the problem by showing that the virtues of institutions do flourish by promoting 
self-determination. The virtue of progressive conservatism should concern both progressives 
and conservatives for the right reasons, rather than being partial to the former or the latter. 
The two-stage view can provide equilibrium, whereas the one-stage view lacks the theoretical 
resources to tackle the potential status quo bias.  
 
Second, the two-stage view is more able to support the right reasonable or genuine consensus 
of different ethical backgrounds (viz. moral convergence). Buchanan contends that, because 
existing international law lacks a mechanism with vertical power, voluntary allegiance 
 
26 Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 206. 
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becomes a necessary demand for an account of justified secession. Putting aside whether 
international recognition is still necessary to the theorisation of the right, we should not 
ignore what forms the allegiance. In particular, we should not conceive the condition simply 
as what a majority of states agree upon. This reflects the worry that moral convergence may 
simply reflect a tyranny of the majority. Of course, the worry may be exaggerated as the 
convergence in question has to be moral. The one-stage view, however, is indeed deficient in 
making the conceptual distinction between what norm (governing secession) should be 
commonly upheld and what justified form of secession should be commonly followed, 
without which a logical mistake would occur easily. In other words, there a real categorical 
difference between the consensus on the norm (happening to govern secession) and the 
consensus on a justified form of secession; and the reason for the former should not be 
confused with the latter. Given that the one-stage view reduces the latter to the former, how 
can it account for the circumstance under which the latter gains more moral convergence 
than the former? Moreover, it is a dubious position that the former account could gain more 
compliance in light of moral convergence rather than the enforcement or some unjustified 
convention within the norm.  
   
Finally, the third and the fourth criteria (i.e. moral accessibility and incentive compatibility) 
should not determine the value of a normative theory of secession. This echoes the 
observation of Hsin-wen Lee that Buchanan seems to confound moral values of political 
theory with its practical values; the realisation of the former brings our life more close to 
morality whereas the measure of the latter is how close a reform is to the current 
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circumstance or how much effort we have to pay for a reform.27 Needless to say, all valid 
theories of secession should attend to moral accessibility and step away from perverse 
incentives. Yet it is the measure of moral cost that creates concern, not how close the 
principles proposed are to the current system. Moreover, we care not just about the quantity 
but also about the quality of moral cost. That means: firstly, deriving a proper evaluation of 
moral cost is quite a different enterprise that refers to a mixed endeavour of empirical and 
normative research, by which neither the one-stage view nor its opponent has the theoretical 
resource to complete the study alone; secondly, while the one-stage view seems to base its 
advantage of moral accessibility on how close the principles derived are to the current norm, 
the two-stage view can also argue that it is better at identifying the principles with high moral 
quality, on which the moral value it pursues, once fulfilled, can either override or compensate 
the transitional moral cost. To settle the dispute, devising non-ideal or transitional theories is 
far from enough, because such theorizing simply articulates a temporarily transitional policy 
most close to ours (though it claims to advance the current situation). Empirical study is 
required to specify the measure of moral values/rights, by which we can quantify the extent 
of certain rights violation or realisation. The same defect also casts doubt on the virtue of 
incentive compatibility. Altman and Wellman have noted that what (quality of) incentives 
there would be is open to the interpretation of empirical data, which means incentive-based 
arguments made by normative theorists can at best be conducive to agnosticism. 28  For 
instance, Lefkowitz sides with Buchanan as an IMR theorist; and yet he argues for a 
precautionary approach based upon incentive compatibility to support the current practice 
of international law, namely a ban on any kind of unilateral secession. He argues that 
 
27 Hsin-wen Lee, “Institutional Morality and the Principle of National Self-Determination,” Philosophical Studies 
172 (1) (2015): 207-26, p. 214.  
28 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory, pp. 63-66. 
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secession cannot truly solve the problem of civil war, so the prospect of a remedial right to 
secede aiming at peace and human rights is dim. He also concurs with Donald Horowitz that 
the recognition of the remedial right to secede may cause a perverse incentive that motivates 
secessionist leaders to ‘welcome’ violent crackdown. 29  This shows again that get-the-
incentives-right arguments elaborated by normative theorists are quite fragile and their 
validity depends on a proper (empirical) measure of their alleged perverse incentives. 
Without the verification of social scientists, those conjectures on incentive compatibility are 
merely pseudo-evidence rationalising any methodology as to secession. I thus conclude that 
moral accessibility and incentive compatibility are not the necessary and plausible criteria 
determining the validity and soundness of a normative theory of secession, because the two 




In this chapter, I analysed the prevailing methodological debate on normative theories of 
secession and argued that pre-institutional moral reasoning is not only necessary but also can 
be helpful for institutional moral reasoning; by which, a better method of developing the 
theory should be the alleged two-stage view proposed by Daniel Weinstock. PMR is 
indispensable and useful because, despite that IMR is right to point out the significance of 
offering an account of the right to secede best coherent with the institutions governing the 
right, the claim that the form of the right should always be subject to the form of the 
institutions is not tenable. For international recognition just happens to be one of the claims 
 
29 Lefkowitz, “International Law,” pp.407-09.  
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of secession in our current world, which shows that secession is not inherently an 
international legal concept. For the non-recognition of the right determined though justifiably 
by the relevant institutions should be reckoned as a moral loss that indicates the failure of 
our extant institutional scheme to meet what morality demands and thus what legitimate 
reform we could have for the institutions. Based upon these reasons, the two-stage view 
which takes the benefits of PMR and IMR both into account is then preferred. To further 
defend the method, I argued that it not only meets the demand for a cogent account of the 
territorial claim but also has better performance in moral progressivism and moral 
convergence. Although the method may be criticised to not satisfy moral accessibility and 
incentive compatibility, I have illustrated that these two criteria are not adequate for 
normative theorising and so the charge is indeterminant because such evaluation requires 













In this chapter and the next I argue for a synthesis of Moore’s and Stilz’s proposals for 
territorial rights. After examining their proposals respectively (in Chapter 3), I shall propose a 
new account of territorial rights (in Chapter 4) based upon the combination of their theories, 
which explains (1) under what conditions a state can justify its claim to territorial rights; and 
(2) how such a claim can be held sustainably by the state, in the sense that a larger state-wide 
identity harmonises with (collective) identities of subgroups within that territory.  
 
There are two ways of understanding what is denoted by the term ‘subgroup’ and their 
connection to the land they live on. Firstly, the establishment of modern states was achieved 
through domination, suppression, or colonisation of various peoples. These could be 
indigenous people who used to follow tribal or nomadic lifestyle, people who lost their 
previous political institutions due to the collapse of an empire, or those who were unable to 
defend their homes and were subsequently conquered. Modern states thus often 
accommodate subgroups whose different collective identities derive from cultural forms that 
predate the state. Secondly, some subgroups with ethnicities, cultures or political ideologies 
that differ from those of the majority or rulers may assert their collective identity in the face 
of partial policies that disadvantage them and/or their group interests. For instance, before 
Japanese colonisation, the ethnic Han in Taiwan did not hold a common Han identity, but 
were divided into different small communities according to their origins. Japanese 
 67 
colonisation initiated the formation of a collective identity within this loosely organised 
subgroup, namely Taiwanese, by lumping them together and inflicting segregation and 
discrimination on them as a group that had not previously identified themselves with the label 
‘Taiwanese’. In this sense, the state may induce certain subgroups to perceive themselves as 
different from others by virtue of unequal, unjust policies. Therefore, in contrast to a larger 
state-wide identity normally supported by the ruler (e.g. British state), there are subgroups 
within states territories (e.g. Scottish people) either affiliated to their own collective identity 
alone, or holding both kinds of identity at the same time. A plausible account of territorial 
rights needs to accommodate these two identities. 
 
One may wonder why or how the idea of territorial rights is related to collective identity, 
whether referring to the rights of a subgroup or a collective right shared by a group of citizens 
as a whole. Two points are relevant here. First, the justification of territorial rights means that 
the state is justified in holding jurisdictional authority over the territory it legitimately 
occupies. This normative concern over state legitimacy explores how the state should be 
organised in order to be entitled to these rights. The most straightforward answer is that the 
state’s function should satisfy what justice requires. As such, the state should establish social 
order, provide basic infrastructure that every citizen is able to access, and distribute public 
goods in a just fashion. Yet this purely functionalist idea of justice is insufficient to justify the 
holding of territorial rights, because it generates a perverse incentive for ‘benevolent’ 
annexation. This reflects that, secondly, collective self-determination should be considered, 
thus leading us in turn to examine the importance of collective identity/autonomy. 
Benevolent annexation will occur if the justification of territorial rights depends merely on 
whether the state discharges its functional duties (of justice). The pure functionalist view does 
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not prevent a circumstance in which a state can legitimately coerce people living outside its 
territory if such an annexation both protects their basic human rights and secures their 
lifestyles. The often-cited example is the scenario in which the Allied powers continued to 
occupy Nazi Germany after the Second World War and settle their governments there to 
carve up Germany permanently. Such an annexation would leave most parts of the 
community intact. However, the German people were subject to foreign authorities. To avoid 
this wrong, subjects’ self-determination must be given due respect, which can surely be 
understood by appeal to their collective identity.  
 
Yet why should the justification of territorial rights concern itself with state-wide identity and 
the identity of subgroups? Although territorial rights should take self-determination as their 
aim and justification, the way a state operates generates an essentially normative tension 
between ruled and ruler. Rousseau conceives this tension as the conflict between personal 
autonomy and state authority. Alongside this, secession reflects another conflict between 
identity imposed on all subjects (i.e. larger, state-wide identity) and the identity of each 
subgroup as a valid claimant to their collective autonomy. The imposition of state-wide 
identity by many or the ruler is highly problematic, because subgroups may find it difficult to 
accept the identity imposed. This raises a question about the “self” in self-determination, viz. 
when territorial rights are exercised, how states ensure that in being ruled, people also rule 
themselves, given that the identity of the self in question can be unclear? Specifically, when 
different groups compete for state apparatus as a means to further their identity-based 
interests, what policies can accommodate the affirmation of all types of identity? In many 
cases, the result will only represent the culture and value of the majority. Or, when a minority 
seizes power, it may try to utilise political institutions to serve their own conception of ‘good’ 
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and so coerce others into compliance. Again, a plausible account of territorial rights should 
address the potential conflict between these two identities.  
 
Therefore, territorial rights should (1) account for both kinds of collective identity; and (2) be 
able to reconcile them. I shall argue that both Moore’s and Stilz’s theories address these 
concerns, although neither tackles them satisfactorily. That is, in the first section of this 
chapter, it will be shown that Moore’s proposal for territorial rights has the advantage of 
accounting for the collective identity of subgroups whose self-determination should be 
secured by the state. However, it lacks an explicit account that integrates all subgroups into 
a unit confirming that the state is acting as a vehicle for the self-determination of every citizen. 
In section 2, Stilz overcomes this by listing the conditions in which the state can plausibly claim 
that subjects’ self-determination has been achieved, whereby we derive the criteria for how 
a state should impose its state-wide identity, even though Stilz’s theory does not give 
subgroups’ collective autonomy/identity a significant role. From the mutually beneficial 
relationship between Moore’s and Stilz’s accounts, a new account can emerge, keeping their 
strengths and overcoming their weaknesses. This revised, synthetic version will be articulated 
in the next chapter, as the foundation of my proposal for justified secession. Because this 
chapter is in the process of deriving that proposal, the implication of the analysis will be 
sketched in the next chapter as the introduction.  
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1. Moore’s account of territorial rights 
 
Margaret Moore articulates an account of territorial rights based upon the value of collective 
self-determination and (group) identity. The core of the identity argument refers to the 
notion of legitimate expectation, which squares with the interest in stability of place. Let me 
explain the account in the following order: (1) what entity is justified in holding the rights; (2) 
how the rights-holder is attached to their claimed territory; and (3) why we should accept the 
rights as binding. In closing the section, I shall identify some disadvantages of the account.  
 
1.1. Who holds territorial rights 
 
Moore advocates that ‘a [self-determining] people… has jurisdictional rights… over land on 
which members of the group resides, if the group is in legitimate occupancy of the land.’1 
These self-determining people have a shared group identity, the capacity to form and sustain 
political institutions, and a history of political cooperation. Members must share a notion of 
themselves as a group, by which they not only identify with co-members subjectively, but also 
participate in a shared political goal or project; they must have the capacity to establish and 
maintain political institutions in order to complete a common political project in a self-
determining way; and they must possess a history of political cooperation, such as 
participation in state or substate institutions, or in a resistance movement. These are taken 
as objective credentials of solidarity and an ability to uphold society, and taken together are 
necessary and sufficient to locate the holder of territorial rights (i.e. the self-determining 
 
1 Margaret Moore, A Political Theory of Territory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 35. 
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people) as the ultimate source of jurisdictional authority. Hence, the group is entitled to 
demand institutional resources from the state to realise their self-determination. Moore 
bases this conception of a group people on the identity argument, which can be further 
understood in terms of (1) how these people are attached to the land they occupy; and (2) 
how relationships between members of the people as weighty moral goods form a legitimate 
expectation underpinning the territorial entitlement. Let me explain these ideas in turn.  
 
1.2. How political territory emerges 
 
Moore’s territorial attachment is a necessary condition of holding territorial rights and is 
developed in a two-stage process: (1) individual rights of residency; and (2) group rights of 
occupancy. The former is defined as ‘a liberty right to settle in an unoccupied area, and a right 
of non-dispossession, a right to remain, at liberty, in one’s own home and community and not 
to be removed from the place of one’s projects, aims, and relationships.’ 2  This simply 
indicates that any individual has the right to live in a place if that residency does not wrong 
others (e.g. expulsion of current residents, stealing their land, etc.); and once the residency is 
granted, a place-related relationship is established by and spread out from the individual by 
virtue of their life-plan and attachment (family, occupation, etc.) rooted in that place. This 
produces a weighty moral interest, placing others under a duty to respect their residency, 
which amounts to respect for continuous residence and a right not to be evicted from the 
place without a weightier moral reason. In addition, such rights should not be misconceived 
as only applicable to property-owners (viz. anyone holding residency in virtue of their 
 
2 Ibid., p. 36. 
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possession of land or houses as property). Instead, the rights apply to anyone who has formed 
their life-plan and social relationships around the place or community it lives in. That is to say, 
homeless people or foreigners in permanent residence are also entitled to these rights.  
 
These rights are not the same as, nor do they entail, the holding of territorial rights, for the 
right to residency falls short of creating social or legal institutions. To meet this demand, the 
rights-holder must also occupy the land legitimately. Here, occupancy implies more moral 
force than residency. For example, a legitimate occupant is entitled to dispose of the land at 
liberty, whereas a mere resident, say a tenant, cannot sell or reconstruct land or house at will. 
That is, if a group holds territorial rights to a particular land, given that the rights entitle them 
to reform the landscape and create their own community with common jurisdiction free from 
interference, the rights-holder must also legitimate their occupancy of the land. As such, 
Moore enshrines group rights of occupancy with these two propositions: (1) the occupancy 
rights amount to ‘a collective right which a group may have, over and above the individual 
residency rights of its members, a right to control the land or geographical area on which the 
people live and in which they have a special interest; and help to define the domain of 
residency rights’;3 and (2) individual rights of residency can entail such group rights, given that 
multiple residences intertwine and produce certain communal relationship goods that 
connect those with residency rights firmly to each other and the land, transforming them into 
a community. Thus, we can conclude that it is the group, rather than a bunch of individuals, 
holding the occupancy right. Let me account for this as follow.  
 
 
3 Ibid. I will further explain how such a group, namely a self-determining people, holds the collective right to 
occupancy in Chapter 6 when I specify how a legitimate claimant to secession, by becoming a self-determining 
people before making such a claim, bears the right of secession.  
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First, as one starts to live in a certain area and develops one’s social life therein, one’s life-
plan and well-being not only depend on but also are conditioned by the (social) relationships 
within the community in which one lives. For instance, a Catholic priest who has taken vows 
to preach the gospel must do his job and so develop a life either in a Catholic community or 
one that is not opposed to his mission. His life-plan is closely attached to his priesthood. The 
fact of residency thus generates a structure of social relationships, giving rise to a strong 
connection to the community and the meaning of residents’ lives. Such a structure is rooted 
in the community and becomes a fundamental component of, and context for, one’s life 
experience. It not only specifies the geographical domain of occupancy, but also amounts to 
two weighty moral interests, namely (1) being part of community should not be arbitrarily 
undermined; and (2) (necessary) participation in communal life means that the community as 
a whole can claim institutional resources required to sustain the social conventions already 
developed, or to cultivate some common life project.4 Second, these interests should be held 
by collectives, not just an aggregation of individuals, because they can only be accounted for 
with reference to the community as a whole. Relationship goods inherent in a community are 
of two kinds: generic, amounting to the need in basic justice or provision of public facilities 
and impartial legal systems (such goods would not bind individuals with a certain community); 
and relationship-dependent goods. The fulfilment of the goods depends on the support of 
members, rather than of any group of individuals, because a community normally produces a 
common life project reflecting the members’ anticipation or understanding of the community. 
That is, when a community is forged, social cooperation binds the co-operators together to 
consider or address certain collective issues, such as how the community should be developed 
 
4 I shall put aside the concern about the right to exclude non-members in Moore’s account, although I fully 
recognise this concern may arise when the collective right of occupancy is justified.  
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in the future, how public affairs should be determined or addressed, or how a non-member 
might become a member, and so on. Resolving these (group-based) concerns, institutional 
resource is necessary. Moreover, the community would further foster a shared group identity 
alongside the development, implying their shared understanding of social practices common 
in the community, which conditions the members’ personal life plans. This means, 
alternatively, that social practices have to be carried out by those appreciating and realising 
the meaning of the practices, i.e. the group members. Such a requirement denotes Jonathan 
Seglow’s idea of associative duties, according to which relationship-dependent goods are the 
normative basis of such duties and the duties are such that ‘each participant [i.e. each 
member] must be both an agent and a beneficiary for [dependant] relationship goods to 
arise’.5 In other words, whenever a community or group forges a common group identity, the 
members produce not only relationship-dependent goods, but also the associative duties 
obligating the members to discharge them (provided that the duties are consistent with other 
moral principles). Protecting the community, therefore, amounts to the moral demand of 
discharging the associative duties and so requires institutional resource. 
 
In addition, given that members have a duty to uphold their community, they must also work 
to secure the stability of the area in which the community is situated. That is, members of a 
community should be allowed stable occupancy in the place they live on in order to develop 
and uphold the community. This is not merely by virtue of their individual interest in building 
a stable life in a stable place, but also of the (group) interest in holding a stable form of 
community, protecting their group identity. These two kinds of interest, while jointly held by 
 
5 Jonathan Seglow, Defending Associative Duties (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 30. 
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a group in legitimate occupation, generate legitimate expectations of political institutions 
self-determining their collective prospects on a certain area and consequently, justify their 
hold of territorial rights. Even though this inference is based much upon certain historical 
facts of residency, occupancy, and group identity, it still manifests the idea of legitimate 
expectation by giving rise to a future-oriented claim to stability of place and security of 
communal goods. That is to say, as Moore says, self-determining people need territorial rights 
because ‘they have developed a symbiotic relationship with their environment, which is not 
just a moment by moment relationship, but involves planning ahead in the expectation that 
the plans can be brought to fruition.’6 Based on the argument above, we can conclude the 
following: provided that individual rights of residency are justified, we must also confer group 
rights of occupancy on a community in which individuals have rights to reside, and who have 
formed a group identity; otherwise, the community may suffer arbitrary expulsion, violating 
their individual rights of residency.  
 
Now it is clearer why a self-determining people must meet the three conditions mentioned 
above to hold territorial rights. First, shared group identity helps individuate the group from 
other groups because, as shown by the identity argument, a group eligible to claim territorial 
rights must first form a community in which co-members identify with each other. Given that 
identification with or relationship to a particular community aspiring to self-determination is 
a primary good entitled to protection, shared group identity becomes the first and foremost 
criterion. Secondly, in order to legitimise a group’s occupation of a territory, i.e. whether their 
attachment to the land and community is real, we need to examine their history of political 
 
6 Margaret Moore, ‘Legitimate Expectations and Land’, Moral Philosophy and Politics 2017; 2: 229-55, p. 244. 
 76 
cooperation. Finally, despite the fact that the aforementioned conditions may suffice to 
produce a legitimate expectation to control political institutions, the capacity to form and 
maintain such institutions is also necessary if the group wants to manage them in a self-
determining manner.7   
 
1.3. Examination of the account 
 
However, Moore’s account of territorial rights is not without flaws. I shall evaluate it in 
accordance with the criteria set out in the preface to this chapter, namely that territorial 
rights should (1) account for both kinds of collective identity (i.e. state-wide and that of 
subgroups); and (2) be able to facilitate their reconciliation. I shall contend that, firstly, the 
theory has a problem of under-inclusiveness in its account of for uninhabited lands and in the 
case where certain individuals (as subjects) show no signs of identification with any particular 
self-determining group. Secondly, if the idea of territorial rights is group-based (i.e. group 
rights), it may create some unwarranted marginalisation of outsiders (e.g. immigrants) by 
drawing a distinction between homeland and non-homeland peoples. Thirdly, the theory fails 
to provide a strong reason for the existing form of territorial sovereignty or against some 
cosmopolitan reform (such as a world government). That is, Moore’s proposal cannot 
delineate convincingly why the existing self-determining peoples have to subject themselves 
to the current states rather than others or a world government.  Given that Moore frames 
her theory primarily in terms of group identity/affiliation, this failure to account for a larger 
state-wide identity imposed by the state, as I shall point out, is caused by a gap (in terms of 
 
7 The concern about the group agency of such a self-determining people will be delineated in Chapter 6, as I will 
deploy this idea of people to qualify my account of claimant to secession and how they legitimate their claim. 
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scope) between the justification of state territory and Moore’s account of territorial rights, 
because Moore does not explain explicitly how the state acts as a vehicle of self-
determination for its people.  
 
Let me begin with the first problem of under-inclusiveness. As I have illustrated, territorial 
rights are conferred on self-determining people if and only if the people have a shared group 
identity, a history of political cooperation and the capacity to form political institutions. These 
conditions also satisfy Moore’s account of territorial attachment. Under such an account, the 
rights are eventually held by the people through integrating its members with the same 
residency and same group identity. This then produces the first kind of under-inclusiveness. 
That is, it apparently ignores the existence of some peculiar individuals who hold either no 
group identity at all or only the wider, nationwide identity, thereby undermining Moore’s 
account of territorial rights. The former kind of people, such as a group of anarchists, would 
make the Moorean state territory like a Swiss cheese, given that their residency falls short of 
forming a self-determining people and thereby legitimate occupancy. This is what Moore calls 
‘the problem of individual dissenters’, in which there is always a small number of individuals 
(say anarchists), who, while intermingling with a particular group, do not share the group 
identity of their community.8 In order to counter such a problem, Moore is correct to clarify 
and remind us that territorial rights are held by collectives instead of individuals. Therefore, 
dissenters living within a community cannot challenge the people’s holding of territorial rights, 
because, as illustrated, only rights to occupancy, rather than the right of residency, can 
legitimate territorial rights. While individual dissenters fall short of forming a self-determining 
 
8 Moore, (2015), p. 62. See also Kolers who also shares this under-inclusive problem. Avery Kolers, “Locating the 
people,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, (2018): 782-789.  
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people grounded in a certain land, producing associative duties and thereby rights to 
occupancy, their residency does not make a territory legitimately claimed by a self-
determining people piecemeal. However, the problem may escalate when the anarchists 
occupy a certain area not claimed by any self-determining people (but still within the 
boundary of state territory), in which case there is a concern as to how the state justifies its 
territorial rights to that particular swathe of land. Given that the anarchists may not satisfy 
Moore’s account of either a self-determining people or territorial attachment, that piece of 
land appears to be a ‘loophole’ within state territory and therefore the problem of individual 
dissidents still undermines Moore’s account. 
 
The second kind of under-inclusiveness (i.e. settlement of unoccupied land) is more 
problematic as, in Moore’s account, there should be grounds on which the state can extend 
its jurisdictional authority to unoccupied land within its territory.9 That is to say, given that 
state territory inevitably includes unsettled land, Moore fails to articulate the whole story of 
state’s jurisdictional authority if we grant a state control over those lands. Moore concedes 
that her peoplehood and self-determination account cannot be the basis of such authority. 
In addition, there is a difference between the boundaries of territory that a state can claim 
legitimately and her account of territorial rights. Having made clear that she considers some 
justification such as the principle of terra nullius untenable, she then concludes with the 
example of the Arctic in Canada, noting that ‘the Canadian state is in a kind of fiduciary 
relationship with the rest of humanity to keep the fragile Arctic from being exploited, in the 
absence of strong international agencies capable of doing the job.’ 10  The situation of 
 
9 Catala raises the same concern as well. See Amandine Catala, “Contested territories and corrective justice,” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, (2018): 790-797. 
10 Margaret Moore, “Reply to critics,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, (2018):806-
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unpopulated lands thus represents a task of common humanity that should not just be borne 
by certain states geographically proximate to those lands. Sound as it may be, this reminder 
may be easily forgotten when states are weighing between carrying out the protection of 
common resources collaboratively and moving new settlers to land that is unsettled. The 
latter policy not only satisfies Moore’s approach to territorial rights but also states’ ambition 
of expansionism. In other words, if we did reach a consensus that a solid ground for states’ 
jurisdictional authority should be established upon collective occupancy, we would merely 
encourage states to move their subjects to unoccupied land, just as Russia is doing in Siberia 
or China in Xinjiang. This would amount to the creation of a perverse incentive for enforced 
migration/resettlement.11 Therefore, we must search for a way to improve Moore’s proposal 
for territorial rights.  
 
The second disadvantage of Moore’s theory, argued by Stilz, constitutes an undue 
marginalisation of outsiders that disrespects their personal or collective autonomy (though 
the treatment may not be unjust). It is because the account, while construing the occupancy 
(or territorial) rights as ‘group’ rights, inevitably draws a distinct line between homeland and 
non-homeland peoples and so may undermine some rights of the latter groups.12 For instance, 
 
817, p. 814.  
11 Michael Walzer raises a similar concern in the example of the well-known White Australia policy. He points 
out that the argument of state territory based upon the alleged membership goods (such as Moore’s) has huge 
limitations in terms of the legitimate scope of state territory. That is, given that unpopulated lands are not 
necessary to the fulfilment of membership goods, states’ claim to those lands can be easily and justifiably 
turned down by ‘the claims of necessitous strangers’ such as refugees or immigrants from over-populated 
countries. He thus concludes that the White Australia policy faces two radical choices: ‘its members could yield 
land for the sake of homogeneity, or they could give up homogeneity (agree to the creation of a multiracial 
society) for the sake of the land [namely the whole of Australia]’. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New 
York: Basic Books, 1983), 46-51. 
12 Anna Stilz, Territorial Sovereignty (Oxford, OUP, 2019), pp. 53-4. For a similar concern, refer also to Joseph H. 
Caren, ‘The limits of collective self-determination,’ Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, (2018): 774-781. 
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a group of immigrants may be forced to alter their cultural expression in public, say as a result 
of a burka ban, simply because the homeland people does not regard that such cultural 
expression matches with or helps carry out their associative duties. This worry can be 
reformulated in terms of the argument as follow. First, given that a self-determining people 
successfully illustrates their (individual) residency rights and collective occupancy rights to 
certain land, they are entitled as a whole to the territorial rights to that particular land. Call 
this group also a homeland people. Second, holding territorial rights entitles the rights-holder 
with a jurisdictional authority over a particular territory. And thirdly, one implication of the 
group-holding is that any resident not identified with the homeland group in question would 
fall short of being a constituent of the jurisdictional authority. Therefore, fourthly, it seems 
plausible to legislate a policy enhancing the collective self-determination of the homeland 
people but constraining others provided that the policy is not unjust.  
 
This problem could be properly addressed if there existed an impartial arbiter adjudicating 
such matters of collective self-determination regardless of who comes first. The state no 
doubt plays this role. Moore could thus rebut the charge by saying that her theory on the one 
hand simply explicates how a state derives its hold of territorial rights; and on the other, the 
alleged non-homeland people would be part of the jurisdictional authority once a state-wide 
identity were created. That is, whenever most subjects of a state meet the conditions of being 
a self-determining people, their commonly-held political identity should be construed as a 
state-wide identity and so the subjects as a whole can claim the jurisdictional authority over 
the whole state territory. Hence a group-based form of occupancy rights would no longer 
produce the marginalisation of outsiders. However, I shall argue that, when taking all the 
conditions into account and/or applying them to how such matters play out in reality, most 
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state-wide identities will fail to meet this demand and there will then be no such identity. This 
then reflects the third problem of Moore’s proposal for territorial rights, namely the failure 
to account for larger state-wide identities imposed by states.  
 
It might be good to begin with how Stilz understands this failure. She argues that Moore’s 
account of self-determining people is insufficient to dismiss cosmopolitan scepticism whose 
adherents ‘tend to think that our modern system of separate bounded communities is one 
that we should be working to overcome, in favour of a more global system of governance’.13 
I elaborate on this conclusion below. At first glance, Moore does advance a justification for 
collective self-determination according to which the people requires necessary institutional 
resources for the fulfilment of their associative duties. We bestow territorial rights on such a 
group for this reason. Nevertheless, this aspiration to self-determination could be carried out 
in various forms, and not just through existing states, so long as the rights are secured 
successfully. In other words, if a given people’s interests in self-determination can be realised 
by a world government or other states, for what reason should it continue to associate with 
the existing state? The people’s consent seems to be a possible answer. But since Moore’s 
idea of territorial rights is not based upon such a norm, she has to provide a convincing reason 
against this kind of scepticism from within her own theoretical perspective. Given that her 
theory revolves around the normativity of group identity, I will explore how Moore’s account 
of territorial rights may have formulated a state-wide identity.  
 
 
13 Stilz, (2019), p.29. 
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As pointed out in the preface, state-wide identity is imposed on subjects by whomever seizes 
state apparatus. This draws our attention to at least two fundamental moral concerns. The 
first is the legitimacy of the imposition: under what condition a state is justified in embarking 
on this state-building project. Second, a justification for imposing such an identity is necessary; 
that is, we should develop a moral principle for this project according to which subjects’ 
original identities (of a subgroup or an individual) would not be erased by the imposition. 
Returning to our concern about legitimacy, Moore’s proposal is unsatisfactory because 
almost all state-wide identities are an after-effect of state-building, rather than the other way 
around; that is to say, Moore’s identity argument requires that the emergence of a state-wide 
identity precedes a state-wide identity-building project, which is something that has rarely 
happened. Why so? Recall that one of the conditions of being a self-determining people was 
a history of cooperation. Grouping the subjects of a state into a single collective containing 
many subgroups who do not share a history of cooperation, but rather of conflict with or 
suffering under a dominant majority or a ruler, means that they may be willing (although 
reluctant), to join a state not because  of a history of cooperation nor because of common 
group identity, but rather because of a legitimate expectation that this is a compromise under 
which they will gain more benefits than they now do. This could either be because the 
agreement offered by the ruler is attractive or the costs of resistance will be unbearable. Both 
of these ideas indicate that states normally have no such people qua group with a commonly-
held state-wide identity and history of cooperation before the promulgation of a state-
building project. I thus conclude that the criterion for the people set up by Moore is over-
demanding if applied to a state-wide identity.  
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Perhaps Moore would retort that I abuse, misapply or misunderstand her theory, as the 
problem above is about state legitimacy in general, rather than territorial rights in particular. 
States can justify holding territorial rights after the issue of state legitimacy or political 
obligation is addressed. In other words, if different groups with histories of conflict are willing 
to share a common future in the same society, or the interaction between the groups is 
inevitable, legitimating the existence of political coercion or authority, the state created will 
be entitled to hold territorial rights, on behalf of them, at any future point at which the three 
conditions of peoplehood and territorial attachment are satisfied. Moore summarises her 
argument as such: (1) state S holds territorial rights by acting as a vehicle of self-
determination for group G; (2) group G is a group of the right kind to be the ultimate source 
of territorial rights; (3) group G legitimately occupies territory T.14 In order to address the 
problem I raised, she must place another clause before the first proposition, namely that state 
S is justified in exercising its power over its subjects. We could then derive a temporal or 
logical order about the whole procedure below: state coercion or political authority should 
be first and foremost justified. Then we can identify a self-determining people with the three 
characterictics she proposes. Finally, territorial rights are justified once the people’s claim to 
self-determination is achieved by the state. However, this does not solve the problem if we 
hope to make sense of state-wide identity by appeal to Moore’s account of what a people is, 
because she conceives of the people as an existential precedent for their control over political 
institutions. If the group is characterized by state-wide identity, a valid corollary would be: 
either (1) insisting on Moore’s account, a state is established by a people whose members 
already share a common group identity and history of cooperation, which is empirically rare; 
 
14 Margaret Moore, A Political Theory of Territory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.66. 
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or (2) granting separation from state legitimacy in general and considering it a task within a 
state-building project, we should reject the application of Moore’s peoplehood account to 
the idea of state-wide identity and leave it to subgroups. I believe, as above, that the latter is 
more plausible. 
 
Thus, it is illustrated again that there is a gap between the justification of territorial rights 
held by the state, derived from all subjects within a territory, and Moore’s account of 
territorial rights, which is underpinned by people. This under-inclusiveness is shown in the 
case of anarchists who have not yet formed Moore’s self-determining people, but do occupy 
a certain area legitimately; and it appears again when I attempt to apply Moore’s idea to 
state-wide identity. Moore might close the gap, as previously suggested, if she explains in 
more detail how a state acts as a vehicle of self-determination. Two methods can be 
considered. First, we loosen the constraint on the rights-holder, by which all subjects, rather 
than a certain kind of collective, can participate in the construction of state territory. Second, 
a mechanism of self-determination is devised to explain how the state allows subjects self-
rule, by which the state can particularise its legitimacy over its claimed territory, just as Moore 
appeals to the normativity of self-determination for the justification of territorial rights. These 




2. Stilz’s account of territorial rights 
 
Anna Stilz approaches territorial rights from a different angle to Moore. She has the broader 
aim of examining whether the modern form of territorial state can be morally justified. That 
is, she tries to work out the moral criteria that any extant state should meet and on which 
any reform of global justice should be based. As such, her theory not only targets the 
justification of territorial rights, but also defends territorial sovereignty underlying the 
modern state. Accepting that Moore is right to identify the connection between the people’s 
group identity and the territorial dimension (although this has the problem of under-
inclusiveness), Stilz then aims to show how a state rightfully claims jurisdictional authority 
over a particular population and territory from an institutional perspective.15  
 
I proceed with a summary and examination of Stilz’s account. There are two basic elements 
to the theory. In terms of methodology, she proposes an ‘endogenous’ approach; and with 
regard to value, she argues for ‘political autonomy’ as the goal of state sovereignty. The 
method holds that territorial rights are justified in two steps: a group of individuals first 
appeals to the state to realise their pre-institutional rights and subsequently the state forms 
those persons into a whole by gaining their support for building political institutions of their 
own. The process aims at what Stilz postulates, namely political autonomy, by which the idea 
of state legitimacy is rooted in a certain territory and group of people. Simply put, the reason 
for territorial sovereignty is to allow each subject self-rule: to be co-author of the law and to 
have a self-directing lifestyle with respect for others’ personal autonomy. Moreover, this 
 
15 Stilz construes the state in a broad sense: ‘a public-law making authority with the power of enforcement’. 
Moreover, she defines institutions as featuring (1) binding collective rule-setting; and (2) the ability to enforce 
determinations in case of disputes. See Anna Stilz, Territorial Sovereignty (Oxford, OUP, 2019), p.14. 
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ultimate value is upheld by three other core values: occupancy rights, basic justice and 
collective self-determination. Like Moore’s account, occupancy rights are pre-institutional 
moral demands justifying the occupation by a particular population of a certain land, thereby 
necessitating the establishment of a state. The main difference from Moore is that Stilz does 
not construe the territorial rights-holder necessarily as a collective. Occupancy rights can 
instead be conferred on an aggregation of individuals formed without wrongful occupation. 
Furthermore, the justificatory process of territorial rights is complete only if political 
institutions help people bring about basic justice and collective self-determination. The 
former prescribes to a state the provision of freedom from injustice, by which the interests 
of subjects in personal security, basic liberties, property and subsistence should be protected. 
The latter safeguards people’s freedom to guide their lives without alienation, by which each 
subject can fulfil their life-plans without being dominated by others. This account, though it 
accounts for the territorial dimension of state-wide identity, falls short of safeguarding the 
subgroup’s territorial interests, because it is passive in the face of historical injustice. I will 
now explain those core values and then move onto a critique of Stilz’s proposal.  
 
2.1. The right to occupancy 
 
Stilz’s account of occupancy rights has much in common with Moore’s, particularly in the 
ideas that occupancy rights emerge once residency takes place; and residents’ life-plans 
become the moral source of their legitimate occupation. According to Stilz, occupancy rights 
consist in two more basic rights. First, if a person settles on a land, they are entitled to ‘reside 
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permanently in a particular place and to make use of that area for social, cultural, and 
economic practices.’16 Second, this liberty suffices the right-holder to  
 
a claim-right against others not to move one from that area, to allow one to return to 
it, and not to interfere with one’s use of the space in ways that undermine the located 
practices in which one is engaged.17  
 
The caveat of such rights, known as ‘no wrongdoing’ occupation, refers to a fair use proviso 
requiring that firstly, occupancy should not be due to the eviction of prior inhabitants; 
secondly, the mode of occupation should leave others with sufficient space to secure their 
own interest in located life-plans, a term that, as for Moore, Stilz uses to refers to a plan that 
demands the support of natural and social resources rooted in land or community. 18  If 
outsiders bear a duty to respect the occupancy rights of a given group, this group must allow 
access for outsiders to those resources if their fundamental human interests are at stake. 
 
Additionally, Stilz emphasises that the right of occupancy, though conditioned by shared 
social or legal institutions to a great extent, must contain the following pre-institutional rights:  
 
the right of individuals to live in a certain area; to make use of that space for their 
valued social, cultural, and economic practices; and, together with others, to authorise 
 
16 Ibid., p. 35. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Stilz connects the idea of a located life-plan with four practices: (1) economic practices; (2) membership of 
religious, social, and cultural organisations; (3) personal relationships; (4) attachment to locality. Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
 88 
a legal institution to enforce rules regarding ownership or to engage in social practices 
defining their ownership.19  
 
She terms this account of occupancy rights as the hybrid view, meaning that ‘limited forms of 
property can obtain in the absence of social institutions, though these claims are 
underspecified and leave many incidents of ownership undetermined’. The reason for this 
view is as follows. First, if occupancy rights were to be purely legal or conventional (i.e. all 
rights to material goods are determined by shared social or legal institutions), then arbitrary 
expulsion would be morally justified whenever states legalise such a policy, and the evicted 
people (such as indigenous people) lack a comprehensive legal system or state justifying their 
rights to occupancy. Of course, this does not deny the possibility that the state legalising the 
arbitrary expulsion may also recognise the violation of the legitimate expectations of 
continuous occupation that may have been held by those who have been evicted, according 
to which the state may consider some compensation for the violation. However, secondly, 
whether that recognition or compensation would be granted is really a practice-dependent 
matter, by which it means that the wrong of arbitrary expulsion depends on whether the legal 
system happens to share or take it as a common practice. The recognition of the ‘pre-
institutional’ rights to occupancy, instead, stresses that the wrong is rooted in a certain 
universal, moral value. So whenever arbitrary expulsion occurs, we should always consider it 
as violation of the moral interests of those that have been evicted, regardless of whether such 
an expulsion can be justified or necessary. In other words, if we consider the interests in 
residency/occupancy morally valuable, we ought to constrain the legislation, not the other 
 
19 Ibid., p. 39.  
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way around. To sum up, Stilz adopts a strategy similar to Moore’s in order to anchor the first 
reason for territorial rights: that is, ‘occupancy stresses the way in which individuals’ central 
life-projects are often bound up with specific geographic location, so that interference with 
their use and possession of these places undermines the lives people have built.’20 
 
However, Stilz’s occupancy account diverges from Moore’s when she advocates that (1) the 
right is not necessarily a group-right but essentially individually held; and (2) the idea of 
people as a political collective is formed endogenously through political institutions. The first 
proposition can be discerned when she accounts for the justification of occupancy rights and 
how a land that is occupied becomes a territory. 21  The second proposition reflects the 
normative difference of occupancy rights between Stilz (who takes occupancy as a pre-
political necessary condition for the establishment of a state) and Moore (who takes it as 
related to the claim of a self-determining people to self-determination).  
 
For Stilz, occupancy rights are essential for personal well-being and autonomy. This 
corresponds to how Moore conceives of individual residency rights. Once a person starts to 
live in a particular community, their well-being depends on whether they are able to realise 
their life-plans via social activities, which surely relies on a stable relationship with a 
 
20 Ibid., p. 11. With the rights so defined, particularly claiming that occupancy rights are pre-institutional, Stilz 
eschews Moore’s criticism of her earlier version, namely the problem of circularity. Because in Stilz’s early 
theorisation, she defined moral occupancy with a legitimate ‘legal residence’. That is, ‘a person has a right to 
occupy a territory if his legal residence within that territory is fundamental to the integrity of his structure of 
personal relationships…’ Since the condition legality can only appear after the establishment of states, 
individuals can claim rights of occupancy only if a state is built and its judicial system covers the whole territory. 
In other words, this earlier version shows circular reasoning by on the arguing that on the one hand, rights of 
occupancy is a pre-condition of state territory, and on the other that the rights is posterior to the state. See 
Moore, (2015), p.99; Anna Stilz, “Nations, States, and Territory,” Ethics, (2011): 572-601, p.585.   
21 I will provide a critical comparison between Moore’s and Stilz’s accounts of occupancy rights in Section 2.3 as 
the examination of Stilz’s territorial rights.  
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community rooted in a certain land. This again manifests the strong connection between a 
particular location and a person’s life-plans; and thereby reflects that personal well-being is 
largely determined by the quality of such a connection. The same logic of stable territorial 
occupancy applies to personal autonomy, which Stilz construes as ‘the capacity to reflect 
upon, and to endorse or revise, one’s own life-commitments for what one authentically 
judges to be good reasons, and to carry out these commitments in action.’22 While most 
people recognise that this should be secured by sufficient access to an adequate set of options 
and the ability to exercise critical thinking, it also requires: a stable social environment 
without severe external interference. For example, in a country undergoing civil war, the 
options available to the people and their ability to exercise personal autonomy are massively 
reduced. Stable territorial occupancy is thus considered necessary for personal autonomy. 
Even nomadic people who do not have fixed habitations still mobilise within the fixed 
boundaries of a territory and expect to be able to make use of land without interference. 
These two interests are held by individuals; that is, any resident whose occupancy meets the 
no-wrongdoing requirement is able to secure their interests and thus entitled to the right of 
occupancy. However, it seems that, without the concept of a collective, a geographical 
domain of occupancy is not specified, because we have no idea how broadly the boundary of 
occupation should be drawn. If ten families living closely together occupy a certain area, 
would an eleventh living 500m away also count as occupants? That is, if the issue cannot be 
settled, there is a danger of annexation when a particular group forces neighbouring groups 
(of non-members) to ‘join’ its community. To tackle this problem, we turn to how Stilz derives 





Stilz notes that there are some important reasons for having a reasonably contiguous territory, 
and that justification of state territory is obtained only if, in addition to occupancy rights, basic 
justice and collective self-determination are all achieved. This highlights two significant 
features of Stilz’s account: (1) legitimate occupancy only suffices to demand the 
establishment of a state; and (2) the boundary of a territory is anchored by political 
institutions, securing the three core values to a great extent. Both of these features indicate 
that prescribing a group right for holding territory is not necessary if a group of subjects can 
create a state with a certain territory. The burden of proof is then upon the state, which must 
justify holding territory with a certain boundary. I shall focus on the first strategy for now, 
because the explanation of the second is the task of later sub-sections.  
 
Stilz introduces two kinds of territory: core (the main living area, such as one’s permanent 
residency) and ancillary (the spatial gap between each area of core territory). Core territory 
is normally crowded with people and infrastructure, whereas ancillary territory indicates 
uninhabited wilderness, normally shaped only by roads and the natural landscape. Moore’s 
account of occupancy rights, so understood, can perfectly capture the importance of core 
territory, but not of ancillary territory, because her account does not account for unsettled 
land. Stilz’s account, nevertheless, has the theoretical resource for integrating ancillary 
territory with core territory, as follow. First, let us suppose that, as for John Locke or 
Immanuel Kant, states are necessary to address social inconveniences/conflicts (such as how 
to secure our moral interests in occupancy or settle conflict between different conceptions 
of justice or property rights) by building up impartial institutions and bringing justice to 
societies. Thus, we have a duty, in the state of nature, to be coerced by states to help secure 
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and construct a just society. Call it the natural duties of justice, of which I will give a clearer 
explanation in next sub-section. This prescribes a core territory to a state, because, as shown 
above, it has to set up just institutions for its subjects. Second, in order for the state to 
discharge its duties effectively and comprehensively, the state is compelled to form a distinct 
and contiguous territory, in the sense that a core territory should combine with the ancillary 
nearby. For example, if a mob robbed a bank in core territory and then escaped to ancillary 
territory, police should have the right to search for them in that area in order to carry out 
justice in society. Without a contiguous state territory bridging the core and ancillary, the 
authority of the police would cease at the edge of core territory. This draws our attention to 
the territorial nature of duties of justice: ‘we cannot establish a unitary interpretation of 
property and contractual rights, enforce those rights, and punish violators, unless people who 
live in proximity and interact regularly are subject to the same institution.’23  
 
Therefore, occupancy, under Stilz’s account, becomes political territory only if supplemented 
by the establishment of a state and the connection between core and ancillary territory in 
virtue of the natural duties of justice. Moore characterises occupancy rights with the 
relationship goods based upon group identity, so the rights-holder must firstly form a group 
qua group in order to hold the rights. It should be collective, which also helps underpin the 
boundaries of territory in terms of the people’s living area. Stilz, in contrast, construes the 
protection of pre-institutional interests in occupancy, prescribing the natural duties of justice, 
from which the state should be derived, so there is no necessity to conceive of the rights as 
group rights.  
  
 
23 Ibid., p. 201. 
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2.2. State legitimacy: Basic justice and collective self-determination 
 
The delineation so far leaves open the question of why occupancy rights are sufficient to 
demand the state carry out the natural duties of justice. State legitimacy is the answer, and 
Stilz argues for two constituents of the concept: basic justice and collective self-determination, 
both of which are invoked to defend the interests of subjects as both beneficiaries of 
functioning legal systems and co-authors of legislation. Only if achieving these two core values 
can territorial rights be justified and thus the boundaries of state territory.  
 
2.2.1. Basic justice 
 
Since occupancy rights are partly pre-institutional and partly institutional, people live in a 
state of nature despite the identification of their occupancy rights. Without an impartial 
institution that can be enforced, rights are not secured. A state providing a basic and just legal 
system is necessary. Stilz explains how this procedure is developed by appeal to the Kantian 
argument and subsequently why the value is necessary condition for an autonomous lifestyle.  
 
The Kantian view of state legitimacy can be stated as follows. First, each individual has the 
innate right to be immune from the domination of others. Second, in order to make each 
person their own master, everyone is entitled to equal protection of their external freedom24 
to the extent that the exercise would not be subjected to the wills of others arbitrarily. The 
 
24 External freedom is a derivative of innate right. Even though the latter idea articulates the limit of what we 
can will (i.e. we should not wish to dominate others), the right is silent about what (external) means one can use 
to achieve its will. The concern over what freedom we are entitled to in order to realise our wills thus becomes 
the issue of external freedom, which, according to Kantian theorists such as Stilz, considers the state as a 
necessary intermediary for making such freedom comprehensible and realizable.  
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idea of acquired rights is thus envisaged to specify the realm of protection, in which none can 
interfere without just cause, thereby to reach a self-determining life. Acquired rights refer to 
the rights whose content is determined conclusively and justified only by the presence of 
political institutions. This includes commonly shared occupancy rights. Of course, the 
constitution of the rights has to respect pre-institutional facts as articulated in section 2.1. 
Thirdly, in order to protect this, every individual ought to respect the rights specified, either 
voluntarily or under duress. This protection, fourthly, not only regulates the prospects of 
agents (i.e. the moral obligation to refrain from violating others’ rights), but further suggest 
an omnilateral arbiter able to interpret and specify the content of the rights (and the 
correlative duties) impartially, to decide what means can be used to realise rights, and to 
enforce these decisions if necessary. This arbiter is required in virtue of the problem of 
unilateralism, which, according to Stilz, amounts to (1) some moral rights, especially property 
rights, being indeterminate in a state of nature; (2) even where moral rights are determinate, 
individuals may disagree about what justice requires in particular cases; and (3) when faced 
with disagreement, individuals lack the proper standing to resolve them.25 That is to say, if 
legitimate occupants hoped to further their interests in occupancy rights, the problem of 
unilateralism they subsequently encounter would establish the state with omnilateral will. 
This implies that (1) individuals living in proximity to one another have a duty to ensure others’ 
access to just institutions in order to protect their interests (including occupancy rights); (2) 
there is no right not to be coerced to fulfil the duty of justice; and (3) just states have the 
legitimate pro tanto power to coerce dissidents violating the duty of justice. A state with 
omnilateral will should first and foremost fulfil basic justice by establishing some basic legal 
 
25 Anna Stilz, “The Value of Self-Determination,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2, ed. David 
Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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and social functions independent of anyone’s attitude towards them. This amounts to, for 
instance, the protection of personal security, the construction of an impartial judicial system, 
and fair distribution of public goods. Basic justice is necessary to personal autonomy because 
it protects the occupants’ ability to form, revise, and deliver life-plans on their land without 
interference. Analogously, a society without basic justice is like a game without rules; 
everyone is in the game, but no-one know how to play.  
 
Nevertheless, basic justice alone is not sufficient to equip a state with an omnilateral will, nor 
can it legitimise a state’s claimed territory, because the value enhances the context of social 
activities merely to the extent that each can secure its subsistence and develop life-plans 
without interference. Recall that benevolent annexation is permissible when the state’s 
jurisdictional authority is solely based upon a purely functionalist account of state legitimacy. 
To avoid this problem, the state with omnilateral will must also represent the subjects’ 
attitude or identity. We thereby come to the final core value, i.e. collective self-determination.     
 
2.2.2. Collective self-determination 
 
Theorists propose many ways of achieving collective self-determination. Liberal nationalists 
assert that a state should manifest the national culture(s) of its subjects or the majority. 
Moore switches our focus to whether the self-determining people, whose formation can be 
separate from political institutions, has their (group) identity-based interests secured by the 
state. Stilz holds a slightly different view from Moore, arguing that the ideal is achieved when 
a state forms a shared political will via the creation of political institutions in which a 
significant majority of subjects is able and willing to engage. Collective self-determination, 
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under such an account, sheds light on the necessity of political institutions devised to respect 
subjects’ personal autonomy and properly reflect their values, as well as the contribution of 
subjects (as political co-operators) to legislation, such that they can obtain a sense of self-rule 
and political accountability. That is, the shared political will of the people as a unified entity 
does not come into being pre-politically or purely institutionally, but is born out of the 
interaction between political institutions and subjects’ political participation. This 
peoplehood is then called the ‘endogenous approach’. 
 
How can we be sure that subjects are the co-authors of their political institutions, by which 
they are both ruler and ruled? Stilz deploys the idea of ‘reasonable affirmation’,26 which is an 
ideal account of collective self-determination in the context of a modern state. By her 
definition, ‘a citizen affirms participation when, upon reflection, she endorses her intention 
to “play her part” in some joint enterprise’ 27  and the agent’s affirmation must be a 
consequence of their own reflective judgements (rather than under duress). Thus, a citizen 
should be willing and able to carry out their civic duties. Yet how can affirmation be 
reasonable? Three conditions must be met. First, the participants must share some of the 
higher purpose behind the political enterprise. This indicates that all citizens should have 
some reason to endorse the basic procedure of collective decision-making and higher, 
abstract ideals of political cooperation sustaining the state, over and above their personal and 
substantial priorities. Second, the agent must be aware of how their participation contributes 
to the achievement of political cooperation, by which citizens can gain a sense of 
 
26 In Territorial Sovereignty, Stilz discards the term but appeals to Niko Kolodny’s idea of correspondence, 
although they both have the same sense and proposition.  
27 Anna Stilz, “The Value of Self-Determination,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2, ed. David 
Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
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accountability and a genuine connection to their social development. States should thus 
provide sufficient channels through which citizens can reveal their political cooperation to 
each other, as well as some means to repeal a policy made on behalf of subjects but against 
either the shared higher ideals or fundamental moral values. Finally, the joint venture 
requiring affirmation should be valuable i.e. the means and outcomes of political cooperation 
should not violate basic justice and personal autonomy. Granted these three conditions, the 
subjects shall be the co-authors of their common life structure as they form ‘shared political 
will’ via the channel of the state over legislation. That is, they self-impose the political 
institutions on themselves, which are shaped by their general political will.  
 
The idea above is not absolute, in the sense that violation, under some conditions, is 
permissible. Before getting to what can override the ideal, let me explain how it relates to 
collective self-determination more clearly. The key point is that collective self-determination 
is achieved if political participation follows reasonable affirmation. The argument is as follows. 
First, the state is a comprehensive coercive and hierarchical entity demanding the compliance 
of its subjects; moreover, these subjects are under the authority of the state involuntarily. 
This reflects the normative tension mentioned in the preface, which provides subjects with 
some pro tanto reasons to be hostile to state governance. However, secondly, reasonable 
affirmation can be employed to address the tension by forming a cognitive attitude through 
which the agent could take their participation to be valuable and worthwhile. This attitude is 
not desire-based, i.e. what is affirmed is not necessarily what one desires. If the account had 
been desire-based, the form of the state would have no doubt frustrated every subject and 
self-rule would never be achieved. What reasonable affirmation suggests instead is to make 
the process of collective decision-making meaningful, from which an agent experiences a 
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sense of valuable cooperation after a series of reflective judgements going back and forth 
upon what and how it contributes and what and how it gains. Although the outcome may not 
always reflect their participation, the agent should be able to derive, by reflection, a 
meaningful reason to continue to engage in the political cooperation of its society if the three 
conditions for reasonable affirmation are fulfilled. Since the subjects are willing to engage in 
the constitution of shared political will, this groups them into a self-determining people.   
 
For example, when the Scottish independence referendum was held in 2014, a large number 
of people who voted in favour of independence felt disappointed and alienated, because their 
will was not being enacted and staying within the UK contradicts their vision of the future 
society and perhaps, undermines their legitimate expectation of some benefits they 
anticipated had independence taken place. It may be plausible to question, from the 
viewpoint of a Yes-voter, whether they have freedom of self-rule. Some reflection, however, 
overcomes this challenge. First, before the referendum, there was national debate on the 
matter throughout the UK and the government and media provided many channels to let 
people express their opinions. Second, the decision was made via direct and equal political 
participation. It is not only determined by a referendum, but also allows many sorts of citizens 
(such as Europeans or those from other commonwealth countries) with legitimate residency 
to vote. Third, most Scottish people still believe that either they anticipate sharing their lives 
in the same state because they still share state-wide identity (British), or the basic structure 
of the society can still uphold and further their fundamental values. Fourthly, while they still 
trust the basic structure, some may believe they can remedy the situation through further 
political participation. Provided that the consideration above meets the conditions of 
reasonable affirmation, namely (1) the political will determining the 2014 Scottish 
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Independence referendum is freely formed by public deliberation; (2) the result still reflects 
the shared higher values and form of collective decision-making of Britain or Scotland; and (3) 
the outcome accords with basic justice, we can conclude that the collective self-
determination of disappointed Yes-voters in the UK has not been violated, because they can 
derive a meaningful reason to continue to embrace political participation. 
 
The flip side of reasonable affirmation implies alienation from the shared will when some 
subjects fail to achieve it, i.e. they no longer have a meaningful sense of cooperation or being 
part of society. Imagine a national minority which is only 3% of the total population. Its parent 
state affords them basic justice and, due to representative democracy, other members are 
aware of their views. However, their suggestions with respect to any identity-related policies 
are always turned down because they are tiny in number. Given the lack of institutional 
support, they may not be able to fully discharge the associative duties inherent in their 
community and so may undermine the development of their culture. Furthermore, the 
structure of a modern state worsens this alienation, since it not only demands compliance 
from subjects, but also penetrates deep into most dimensions of social life. This makes it hard 
for the minority to leave the subjection at will, as well as restrictive policies on migration that 
may exacerbate the problem. In such a scenario, it is persistent alienation that the minority 
suffers. For, even though the members exercise their right to political participation, ongoing 
infringement of their fundamental interests means that they are constantly frustrated. Their 
political participation is meaningless, as their fundamental interests and order of values will 
not be reflected in most legislation. Persistent alienation not only causes a rupture from the 
shared political will, but also indicates a serious violation of personal autonomy in virtue of 
relentless coercion by others without justified reasons.  
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Nevertheless, some valid forms of alienation can override this. Recall the last condition for 
reasonable affirmation: the political enterprise should accord with basic justice and personal 
autonomy. Two groups can be thus identified as we understand the condition, in a principled 
and practical way respectively. First, people whose conception of self-determination contains 
a contempt for basic justice or the independence of others are not entitled to institutional 
support because their substantive values violate the condition in principle. Stilz illustrates this 
with the example of political anarchists and imperialists. Anarchists aim to subvert states 
regardless of whether this brings about justice because they believe that the state as such 
can never be justified. We have to disagree with their claim, not in virtue of the belief being 
false, but based upon their way of achieving it: the group would rather sacrifice the benefits 
others rely on (i.e. basic justice) for the sake of their beliefs. Being unilateralist, they enforce 
their anarchism at the expense of others’ interests. The same problem applies to imperialists, 
who disrespects certain people’s personal autonomy and consider themselves morally 
superior, dominating others at the expense of basic human rights.  
 
In the face of these two groups, states are justified in depriving them of their right of collective 
self-determination, as their principles go against basic justice or personal autonomy. The first 
group, though holding their view in accordance with the values principledly, cannot fully 
realise their prospect because the institutional re-configuration they desire is impractical. A 
very small group, or one dispersed widely across a country is a case in point. For example, a 
small religious group scattered across a territory might make a claim to secede, as they hope 
to have a state incorporate their religion into state institutions and law. Even if the religion 
shares liberal values, their claim can still be rejected due to the lack of territorial claim, or 
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because relocating and concentrating the group in a certain area would cause unnecessary 
and unjust population mobility. That is to say, even though their conception of collective self-
determination is in principle consistent with basic justice or personal autonomy, the state still 
needs to assess whether the consequence of realising the claim with respect to the extant 
societal conditions would undermine the rights of others.  
 
As a result, the account of collective self-determination renders the last piece of the jigsaw, 
committing us to the following picture of the endogenous approach to peoplehood and the 
justification of territorial sovereignty. Initially, a group of individuals living in proximity starts 
to build up social lives from which occupancy rights emerge. In order to protect their rights 
and protect ourselves against the ‘Swiss-cheese’ problem outlined earlier, they subsequently 
subscribe to the establishment of a state with basic justice and contiguous territory. Yet, as 
the modern state must impose laws on its subjects, they appeal to the reasonable-affirmation 
account of collective self-determination. This collective self-determination further implies 
that (1) ‘a people is born only if its members engage in institutionalised political cooperation 
and come to endorse the cooperation’;28 (2) collective self-determination should submit to 
basic justice; and yet (3) this reveals the injustice of persistent alienation demanding 
rectification whenever a group’s self-determination is disrupted and the realisation of which 
would not violate basic justice or personal autonomy principledly and practically, the group 
is justified in having their claim met. In conclusion, even though our occupancy rights and 
natural duties of justice are generally held by each individual, protecting and respecting them 
is best served, as Stilz argues, by ‘a pluralistic and decentralised order of self-governing 
 
28 Stilz, Territorial Sovereignty, pp. 214-15. 
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territorial units’.29 Our endorsement of territorial sovereignty is thereby justified as states 
materialise occupancy rights, basic justice and collective self-determination within the 
territories they legitimately occupy. 
 
2.3. Examination of the account 
 
I now scrutinise Stilz’s account of territorial rights in terms of, again, whether or not it can 
capture precisely the territorial foundation of state-wide and subgroup identities. The state 
is the holder of territorial rights even though the source of normativity can be traced back to 
the subjects severally. While the people form the shared political will, according to which the 
state can claim to hold territorial rights and so derive its jurisdictional authority over the 
people concerned within that territory, whether a subjected group is alienated from the will 
is key to the continuous holding of territorial rights. Such a condition shows the benefit of the 
account: the reason for collective self-determination, namely political autonomy or non-
alienation, is explicit and persuasive. Moreover, in contrast to Moore’s account, which takes 
the self-determining people as the holders and trustee of the rights to the state, territorial 
rights in Stilz’s theory are truly the artefacts of the state: the rights are supported only if the 
state realises the three core values for its subjects. Except in the case of persistent alienation, 
subjects have no right to challenge states’ territorial rights. Yet if construing the occupancy 
rights as those held by individuals, it is hard to specify the area in which an alienated group 
can exercise their right to self-determination. How do we encounter people who intermingle 
with the group and yet whose occupancy rights are not at stake? While their territorial 
 
29 Ibid., p. 20. 
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interests are rooted in the land they legitimately occupy, why could they not be legitimate 
rights-holder to the land? 
 
Stilz’s reply is: even though occupancy rights are individual-based, the account allows space 
for these rights to become group rights. This means that interests in occupancy can be 
collective interests if they necessary to some group.30 Recall that a persistently alienated 
group has a moral claim to collective self-determination if the conception of this is in principle 
and in practice consistent with basic justice and personal autonomy. Suppose further that the 
group, who lives concentratedly in a certain geographical area, lacks institutional support for 
their culture. We can then apply Moore’s account of the connection between personal well-
being and the relationship goods upheld by the prosperity of community to such a group. 
Stilz’s moral occupancy, though individual-based, hence suffices to prescribe a group right of 
self-determination to the group whenever the interests can only be protected through a 
‘collective use’ of public space, namely cultivating the culture on a particular area of land 
collectively. That is to say, if they want to validate their claim of collective self-determination 
on the land they now occupy, which no doubt has the effect of overriding the self-
determination of non-members, they must claim it in terms of group rights, precisely 
denoting the boundary of the community and according to what excludes others’ self-
determination legitimately. Transformation occurs because the conditions they confront bind 
their individual interests to whether or not the culture can be sustained and developed within 
the community.  
 
 
30 The form of group rights refers to collectivity, based on the Razian account of individual rights: ‘if those who 
make up the group possess a joint interest in a good that justifies the imposition of duties upon others.’ See 
Peter Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression,’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 7(4): 1999, pp. 353-77.  
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However, I shall point out two problems with such a transformation. First, if group rights can 
be derived before the establishment of the state, which reminds us of Moore’s collective 
rights of occupancy and so could confer territorial rights on the group meeting Moore’s 
conditions of self-determining people, then Stilz’s account of territorial rights seems to be 
merely another version of Moore’s theory, and Stilz’s theory thereby loses its original appeal 
that states are necessary to create a people (i.e. endogenous peoplehood) and the 
appropriate holder of territorial rights. Several paragraphs reflect this similarity. Firstly, Stilz 
illustrates this derivation of group rights by envisaging different subgroups sharing the same 
land. They are a religious community (say Hutterites), a national group (Canadians) and a 
group of Somali immigrants.31 Their group rights to use that particular land is derived from, 
according to the definition, their (individual) interests in the engagement with the located 
social, cultural and economic practices. The derivation, however, faces a fundamental 
question of whether or not it could be reached independently of the state. I believe at least 
the first and the third groups do not rely on the state necessarily; for their religion or culture 
can be formed independently of states. So it is plausible to claim that some occupancy rights 
can be group-based without the existence of the state, a picture which rather resembles 
Moore’s idea of occupancy.  
 
Next, it is necessary to consider whether such occupancy rights can be construed as territorial 
rights directly. The concern leads us to the second sign that moves Stilz’s account closer to 
Moore’s. That is, she broadens the definition of the state to include traditional tribes (of 
indigenous people) with some formal decision-making process and some local self-organised 
 
31 Stilz, (2019), p. 54.  
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schemes whose scale is smaller than the modern nation-state; because she views any 
institution showing (1) binding collective rule setting and (2) the ability to enforce its 
determinations in case of disputes as  qualifying as a state.32 On the basis of such a definition, 
the Hutterites and Somalis could be capable of turning their occupancy rights into territorial 
rights, if their religion or culture inherently contained such institutional elements. Recall 
Stilz’s endogenous peoplehood account. They can appeal to their culture or religion as state 
and then transform themselves into a people eligible to hold territorial rights. Or, they can 
demonstrate their peoplehood by showing the institutional elements inside their religion or 
culture. This result draws our attention immediately to Moore’s identification of associative 
duties inherent in a self-determining people. That is to say, either the religion or the culture 
suffices to imply the alleged relationship-dependent goods entailing the associative duties 
that the group members are obliged to carry out. Consequently, the duties entitle the groups 
to claim territorial rights because their aspiration to collective self-determination demands 
the support of institutional resources on that particular territory. The occupancy rights, as 
illustrated, become territorial rights directly.  
 
Therefore, some groups could indeed be entitled to territorial rights before being subject to 
a modern, Weberian state. Either you follow Moore’s theory or Stilz’s loose definition of the 
state. Moreover, Stilz proposes an idea similar to Moore’s self-determining people as she 
asserts that a qualified claimant to secession should meet the following conditions: (1) 
suffering from persistent alienation; (2) possessing territorially based practices of political 
cooperation; and (3) being capable of forming institutions reaching minimal justice.33 Except 
 
32 Ibid., p. 14.  
33 Ibid., p. 135. 
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for the first condition, the remainer should remind us of Moore’s requirement for a people 
characterised by a history of political cooperation and a capacity to form a government. The 
critical point here is, however, not the degree of similarity but on what ground their territorial 
claim to a specific land as part of their territorial rights is justified. Is it the state to which they 
are subjugated that confers the rights on them or do they themselves, while possessing some 
common, pre-political features distinct from others within the state, create the rights prior to 
or during the subjection? In Stilz’s earlier version, her answer was the former and was 
therefore criticised by Moore on the basis that, when looking at many countries originating 
from the defeated empires such as Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian, the state should not be 
the only legitimate holder of territorial rights or the precondition of peoplehood.34 It is not 
even the necessary or fundamental constituent of the rights if following Moore’s account. To 
avoid this charge, Stilz seems to adopt a looser definition of the state and yet injects Moore’s 
ideas into her theorisation. Such a result, unfortunately, makes her theory diverge from the 
original appeal of a statist view and then become a more advanced, elaborate peoplehood 
theory instead.35 
 
Perhaps Stilz can make her account less Moorean by delaying the transformation to group 
rights or adding more conditions to the requirements for group rights. For instance, that 
deriving group rights is necessary only if a given group’s collective interests are at ‘great’ stake 
 
34 Moore, (2015), p. 106. For Stilz’s early account of territorial rights, see Anna Stilz, “Nations, States, and 
Territory,” Ethics, (2011): 572-601. 
35 The peoplehood view, according to Stilz’s definition, ‘attributes territorial rights to a self-determining 
collective that exists independently of the state’ but the collective is not characterised by culture necessarily. 
Admittedly, Stilz regards that her account has ‘significant affinities with the peoplehood view’ but ‘does a better 
job…at explaining why self-determination is something we have deep reason to care about.’ See Stilz, (2019), p. 
28-9. Simmons also has a similar concern about how we underpin Stilz’s hybrid view appropriately. See A. J. 
Simmons, Boundaries of Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 139-140. 
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(say persistent alienation). Nevertheless, I shall argue that this (strictly) conditional 
transformation would create a second problem of making the theory too passive to address 
some historical injustices if, for instance, a group aims to restore their past (legitimate) 
entitlement regarding past unjust suppression. This refers to concern over the scope of the 
group right. For the group right can only be created after persistent alienation, the scope of 
which may depend on where or what they control. Given that the claimant can only raise the 
claim in terms of their current political or social situation, this status quo bias therefore 
constrains their collective self-determination. This is the main problem with Stilz’s theory: it 
is insensitive to the historical illegitimacy inherent in the development of states. Most states 
have unjust origins, involving events such as invasion or annexation. The relics of this past 
continue to structure society, in which certain groups are destined to be the minority or 
majority, and certain cultures happen to be dominant. It seems that, since Stilz is concerned 
only with how subjects cooperate in political institutions here and now, an unjust history has 
no place in her account of state legitimacy. Her theory thus appears to suffer from status quo 
bias, privileging the current boundaries of territory shaped by unjust history.  
 
Stilz does recognize this issue of problematic genesis but does not grant it great significance. 
In her reply to Simmons, who advocates that the problem should be rectified by subjects’ 
consent to state’s subjection, Stilz refuses to acknowledge that ‘a theory of boundary 
legitimacy which does justice to our intuitions about unwilling minorities, and which allows 
for some revision of status quo boundaries, must take a historical rather than a presentist 
form’.36 Her presentist view argues that historical illegitimacy matters only if it still constitutes 
 
36 Anna Stilz, ‘Territorial Boundaries and History,’ review of Boundaries of Authority, by A. J. Simmons, Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics, XX(X)(2018): 1-12, p. 5.  
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the current pattern of injustice. She illustrates this by asking us to imagine how we should 
react if a group of British people wanted to restore their historical entitlement, tracing back 
to their Mercian ancestors. Ancient history has very limited moral force, especially compared 
to the claims of contemporary groups. Given that those Mercian descendants are unlikely to 
be discontented with their extant living conditions (or, if they are, their social problems are 
not likely to relate to historical injustice), it is absurd to concur with their claim to historical 
entitlement.  
 
Squaring our concern with the birth history of how our current states came into being is 
enough to show the problem of historical illegitimacy. Moreover, even if we agree with Stilz’s 
view on when/how historical illegitimacy matters, we should be aware that persistent 
alienation is a process, rather than a single event: a symptom of a series of alienations or 
unjust exclusions. While Stilz’s principle of non-alienation articulates when exactly the state’s 
claim to territorial rights is no longer justified for a certain group, the account fails to address 
a follow-up concern: to what degree should alienation be compensated for? Given that 
substantial control over the group’s living space or natural resources is conditioned by 
historical injustice, Stilz’s account gives no guidance on how far back restoration should be 
traced if status quo bias is to be prevented.  
 
Furthermore, correcting the wrong might not demand the reform of society in accordance 
with a particular phase of history, but rather a fairer structure of power relationships between 
groups in the present. A review of unjust periods of history does not reveal any moral 
justification for the inferiority ascribed to various groups. Unfortunately, Stilz’s proposal is 
insufficient to provide such a balance. Suppose a minority had been provided with a possible 
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world in which they were the majority of the state. What reason would they have to accept 
the existing world that discounts their collective self-determination? The Kurds are a case in 
point: this big ethnic group is carved up among five states, resulting in their political 
suppression in each state. Stilz’s answer refers to whether the minority can reasonably affirm 
their political cooperation with the assistance of political institutions. However, the proposal 
does not include the affirmation of the group’s political inferiority. Stilz, on the one hand, 
advocates that subjects should endorse the higher, abstract purposes behind the joint 
venture and the collective decision-making procedure of state; and on the other, interprets 
such endorsement in terms of the authenticity of political participation (i.e. whether the 
subjects are freely playing the role assigned by the state, by which the shared political will is 
formed). Some political dissidents, though living under an authoritarian regime, may devote 
themselves to political cooperation because they hope to reform the government through 
their participation. Their engagement is no doubt authentic but does not serve higher, 
abstract ideals or the formation of a collective decision-making process. Moreover, because 
historical illegitimacy profoundly shapes both those ideals and the decision-making schemes 
of society, participation could be taken as a reasonable compromise. While the wrong caused 
by historical illegitimacy should not be dismissed via status quo bias, I propose that 
reasonable affirmation should be led by a fair structuring of the power relationship between 
groups in order to reach what Stilz prescribes: the endorsement of a state’s higher purposes 
and collective decision-making. To meet this demand and also allow persistent alienation to 
be conceived as a long-term process to be taken into account, it is necessary to loosen the 
condition of transformation to group rights.  
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I have shown that if the condition for Stilz’s derivation of group rights are construed too 
strictly, the territorial dimension of subgroups’ identities are not given due weight, because 
it minimises the impact of historical illegitimacy. Yet if the condition were construed too 
loosely, Stilz’s theory would lose its statist appeal and align with peoplehood theories such 
Moore’s. However, Stilz does capture the territorial dimension of state-wide identity. First, it 
does not fit in with the identity whose genesis may be independent from the state’s. Second, 
it should follow the value of personal autonomy in which each subject has sufficient space for 
safeguarding their identity-related interests without interference. In other words, since such 
an identity is state-led and top-down, its development should take account of the suppression 
of personal autonomy. In contrast, the identity of subgroups focuses on whether the group 
can obtain sufficient institutional resources to sustain and develop their identity-related 
interests against the imposition of a state-wide identity. Because the identification of the 
group does not purely rely on the state it is currently within, their territorial rights might exist 
prior to the extant state and so cannot be fully grasped by political institutions as a whole. 
Based on this, Moore’s account rooted in the relationship goods of a group is superior to 




In conclusion, the examination of the two accounts not only identifies the flaws of Moore and 
Stilz’s territorial rights theories, but also illuminates, surprisingly, the mutually beneficial 
relationship between them; because Stilz’s work is useful when theorising the institutional 
dimension of territorial rights, whereas Moore’s work is useful when recognising rights in 
terms of communal relationship goods. This sheds light on a new account of territorial rights 
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that synthesises Moore’s and Stilz’s proposals and should be capable to (1) account for both 
state-wide and subgroup identities; and (2) reconcile them in a proper balance (i.e. resolving 
the problems identified in this chapter). Undoubtedly, this combination of the two theories 









Chapter 4: Territorial Rights for Two Identities (2) 
 
0. Preface  
 
The conclusion in the previous chapter implies that a new prospect of territorial rights 
combining Moore and Stilz’s theories can provide a better explanatory force upon the 
development of two primary group identities (i.e. state-wide and subgroup’s identities) as 
regards justified secession. This chapter is then dedicated to advancing this new account. Yet 
before that, it is preliminary to understand two kinds of collective self-determination 
underlying the two identities.  
 
In the modern era, it is often believed that the necessary conditions of state legitimacy are, 
first, basic justice (namely, respect for basic human rights) and, second, some kind of self-rule 
by the people.1 This presumption is reflected and explained in the previous chapter. The 
former condition can be accounted for in reference to the duties of justice, is general and 
applies equally to any individual on the territory of the state. In other words, states should 
grant basic justice to anyone in a society whether the person is entitled to rights of political 
participation or not. The second condition, which concerns the members of the state (i.e. 
citizens), has two dimensions. The first originates from a commitment shared by most 
members. Call this the formal self-determination demand (abbrev. FSD), according to which 
almost all subjects anticipate sharing the same society in the future or take such a 
 
1 See, Allen Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” Ethics 112, no. 4 (July 2002): 689-719; David Copp, 
“The Idea of a Legitimate State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol.28, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 3-45; John Horton, 
“Political Legitimacy, Justice and Consent,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 
15, no. 2, (March 2012): 129-148. 
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commitment for granted. To meet this demand, states are expected to deliver what we might 
call a common life project for their subjects. Talk of a common life project already presupposes 
some collective agency distinct from an aggregation of individuals able and willing to 
determine a shared living goal (i.e. a particular conception of justice, culture, social values, 
etc), a shared political will of a significant majority and the support of institutional resources.  
 
Fulfilling FSD inevitably raises a moral concern about subgroups. This is because firstly, it is 
unreasonable to assume that a common life project would correspond to each individual 
citizen’s personal views about what is of value. Secondly, there is always a majority and a 
minority, in the sense that the imposition of a common life project by many is controversial, 
because there are subgroups within a state territory such as national minorities or indigenous 
peoples who may not share the majority’s conception of the project. Provided that a self-
determining people (like Moore’s) can forge its distinct group identity and form the 
associative duties, they are entitled to realise their peculiar conception of collective self-
determination with the support of institutional resources. Call this second dimension of self-
rule the subgroup’s self-determination demand (abbrev. SSD). SSD answers the question of 
how to utilise institutional resources to achieve FSD without dismissing or violating SSD. In 
other words, given that FSD requires states to devise a common life project for securing the 
commitment to share the same society, SSD entitles minority groups to their rights of self-
determination as limits on the realisation of FSD.  
 
The state has to take both FSD and SSD into account in order to claim jurisdictional authority 
over a particular population and territory. First, in order to fulfil a common life project and 
integrate all subjects into a single unit, a state should cultivate a state-wide identity shared 
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by most subjects. Second, such an identity should allow sufficient space for subgroups to 
channel and materialise their collective self-determination through self-government. As I 
showed in the previous chapter, collective self-determination does not only involve a 
particular people, but also concerns the space they legitimately occupy. It thereby requires 
us to take account of the ‘territorial dimension’ of group identity. Stilz’s account deals with 
the territorial side of state-wide identity, while Moore’s account applies to the territorial 
interest of subgroups. However, if a state’s territorial rights are to be justified, the territorial 
interests of both group identities have to be protected. I thus conclude that FSD is best met 
by following Stilz’s theory, while Moore’s casts light on how we might fulfil SSD. In addition, 
SSD is based on relatively backward-oriented reasoning, while FSD looks to the future. This is 
because the warrant for the former depends on the identification of subgroup’s historical 
development and whether/how their shared identity is formed and supported by the state; 
whereas the latter looks at collective self-determination through the lens of political 
autonomy, with the idea that the jurisdictional authority of state will remain justified as long 
as the subjects do not suffer from persistent alienation.  
 
I term this hybrid view the ‘dualism of territorial rights’, as it protects the territorial interests 
of both identities. Since this view is constituted both by Moore’s and Stilz’s account, it has the 
following features.  
 
Firstly, a state legitimates its claim to a particular land as its territory only if the subjects’ 
interests (divided up by subgroup and individual) in terms of occupancy, basic justice and 
collective self-determination are secured by political institutions. This implies two territorial 
attachments: (1) a subgroup connects to territory in a collective manner if the territorial scope 
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reflects their living area and relationship goods rooted in the land; and (2) the rest of the 
subjects achieve their sense of attachment via being part of the people whose creation 
requires the imposition of political institutions.  
 
Secondly, territorial rights are jointly held by subgroups and citizens as a whole, by which we 
can gain a new understanding of the state. The inference is as follow: (1) citizens form a 
unified political peoplehood with the assistance of the state, while (2) subgroups’ political 
engagement also constitutes the people with their distinct group identity; and (3) given that 
the subgroup has, according to Moore, collective agency, Stilz’s peoplehood implies that a 
state (containing subgroups) embodies two kinds of collective agency in itself, through which 
the state is, normatively speaking, an entity with several proto-states potentially embedded 
in it.  
 
Thirdly, the former two features imply that the normativity of the rights consists in non-
alienation and associative duties (derived from the relationship goods of subgroups). That is 
to say, a state legitimates its jurisdictional authority if and only if the citizens as a whole 
achieve political autonomy and subgroups are able to discharge associative duties within their 
communities. Furthermore, such dualism of territorial rights is kept in a unity insofar as the 
subgroups’ associative duties are secured in a non-alienating way. When the duties are 
discharged, the subgroup is not alienated from the wider people or given a sense of forced 
assimilation. The new account thereby establishes a normative condition for justified 
secession, namely if a state fails to protect the associative duties of a subgroup in a non-
alienating way (discussed in the next chapter).  
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Fourthly, when departing from the ideal theoretical default (i.e. a closed society), my dualistic 
account follows Lea Ypi’s permissive theory of territorial rights, according to which a state’s 
territorial rights are justified provisionally and conditionally if it is committed to establishing 
a global authority realising global justice, in order to address the injustice of historical 
illegitimacy.2  However, the power of global authority is not absolute. The collective self-
determination of subgroups and the three core values proposed by Stilz (i.e. occupancy rights, 
basic justice and political autonomy) should condition any adjudication deriving from the 
authority.  
 
I shall proceed with an exposition of the new account (except the condition for justified 
secession) in this chapter. After showing that this dualistic account could avoid the flaws in 
its original forms (i.e. Moore’s and Stilz’s proposals), I shall aim to tackle the issue of multiple 
territorial rights holders within state territory, because there is a potential worry that this 
may undermine political stability. I shall argue that such political instability is both the cost of 
endorsing the new account and a necessary condition for granting the extant boundaries of 
state territory, because the dualism has the benefit of resolving wrongful 
subjection/historical illegitimacy. For, on the one hand, I shall contend that the idea of 
consent does not fit with a plausible understanding of wrongful subjection; and on the other, 
such injustice should be remedied via coordination between social and global justice in the 
pursuit of self-rule. This is because, as I shall illustrate, historical illegitimacy is also 
characterised by an unjust global background, and the potential tension between two 
identities (within my proposal) should not only appeal to the state but also to a commonly 
 
2 Lea Ypi, “A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights,” European Journal of Philosophy 22, no. 2, (2012): 288-312. 
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held global authority as a higher-order omnilateral arbiter. The first section will contain all 
the arguments for my proposal for territorial rights, while the second attempts to illustrate 
what the new account implies for justified secession.  
 
1. Defence of the dualistic account 
 
The moral importance of making FSD co-exist with SSD has been shown as a reason for 
advancing the dualistic account, which makes the proposal appealing at first glance. Yet one 
may wonder (1) whether each of Stilz’s and Moore’s account might not be sufficient on its 
own to secure the territorial interests of the two identities; (2) whether Moore’s and Stilz’s 
idea can coherently combine despite the problems in its original forms; and (3) whether the 
state would not be politically unstable since the proposed dualism advocates two kinds of 
territorial attachment and rights-holder, thus exposing states to the potential for unlimited 
secession and territorial disintegration. To remind the reader, the first concern was fully 
addressed in the previous chapter, in which I pointed out that Moore’s theory has the 
problem of under-inclusiveness whereas Stilz’s theory suffers from passiveness to historical 
injustice. Moore’s account cannot justify the holding of unoccupied territory or extend to 
individuals without strong group affiliation and so fails to extend a proper territorial account 
to a state-wide identity. Stilz’s account fails to take subgroups fully into account due to its 
passive attitude to the correction of historical illegitimacy inflicted on subgroups.  
 
However, one might still wonder how the new account tackles the second and third concerns. 
To resolve these worries, I shall firstly illustrate how the dualistic view can address the old 
problems. Secondly, I shall tackle the potential problem of political instability; and thirdly, 
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illustrate the necessity of empowering subgroups with territorial rights by showing what 
values it advances. I will then show that a state is entitled to jurisdictional authority over a 
particular population within certain boundaries of territory if it is willing to take the potential 
risk of secession and commit to reducing it, as an alignment with multiculturalism and a way 
of addressing wrongful subjection, and also, to commit itself to the establishment of global 
authority, in accordance with the territorial interests of the two identities. 
 
1.1. The hybrid view and the old problems 
 
Let me first summarise on what ground Moore’s theory is incompatible with Stilz’s and then 
illustrate how my dualistic account overcomes the incompatibility. In the previous chapter I 
outlined Moore’s peoplehood, self-determination theory and compared it to Stilz’s statist 
view. The difference between them, which might make the combination (i.e. my dualistic 
account) incompatible, boils down primarily to how they understand the significance of states 
regarding territorial rights. 
 
Moore believes that ‘the state may be the appropriate mechanism through which rights, 
vested in the people, are exercised, but the people are the fundamental holder(s) of territorial 
rights.’3 She hence advocates that a self-determining people is entitled to territorial rights 
and the state’s institutional support, provided that the people is capable of generating the 
relationship-dependent goods or associative duties, which grounds their common life 
 
3 Moore, (2015), p. 96. 
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projects on a specific territory. A state derives its jurisdictional authority over a particular 
territory only if it secures the territorial rights of its self-determining peoples.  
 
In contrast, Stilz takes states as necessary for realising three fundamental values (i.e. 
occupancy rights, basic justice and collective self-determination) and thereby entitled to hold 
territorial rights to a particular territory on its people’s behalf. As she articulates the 
endogenous approach to peoplehood, which says that a state achieves the ideal of collective 
self-determination by grouping the majority population into a collective and advancing their 
political autonomy, a state is deemed to be a precondition of collective self-determination (or 
a self-determining people). As such, if Moore’s account conceives the state as a vehicle of the 
collective self-determination of its peoples (who have held territorial rights already), Stilz 
claims that the state is indeed the maker of a self-determining people and thus entitled to 
territorial rights.  
 
In other words, Moorean peoplehood can exist independently of a state and create sufficient 
group agency or moral demands for holding territorial rights; whereas a Stilzean people, 
though retains the rights as well, is basically the incarnation of a state. This difference affects 
not only their proposals for the rights holder but also the kind of collective self-determination 
we should secure. Moore attributes the rights holder to her account of self-determining 
people and hence requires the state to safeguard the collective self-determination (i.e. 
associative duties) of its peoples. Stilz prescribes the state (or the people created by the state) 
territorial rights because it brings about the kind of self-determination that helps most 
subjects reach political autonomy. Due to this difference in account of collective self-
determination and rights holder, it seems impossible to integrate the two theories.   
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However, I have shown in the preface that the value of collective self-determination has two 
dimensions, namely FSD and SSD. To reiterate, the former refers to how the state delivers a 
common life project, out of respect for basic justice and personal autonomy, shaping the 
prospect of majority population whereas the latter concerns whether subgroups’ territorial 
group interests could be advanced, rather than suppressed, in the face of FSD’s coercion. To 
morally achieve collective self-determination in a state, therefore, these two dimensions 
should co-exist harmoniously. And given that Stilz’s account of self-determination explicates 
how a majority of subjects could realise their political autonomy individually under the state’s 
legitimate coercion, Stilz’s proposal explains not only the normative dynamic of FSD but also 
of state-led identity. This is because a state needs to construct a group identity that can 
motivate most of the subjects to carry out a joint project chosen, where this project should 
reflect the shared higher-order values that structure the state. Nevertheless, such a 
development should also be conditioned by or reconcile with subgroups’ justified aspiration 
to collective self-determination which may diverge from FSD. This phenomenon demands 
another theorisation connecting to Moore’s account of territorial rights; according to which 
some particular groups do have their group development or prospect distinct from what the 
states currently determine through a state-wide decision-making process. Such a result bases 
SSD upon Moore’s collective self-determination and subsequently prescribes a state to 
respect a different view of self-determination by providing its subgroups sufficient 
institutional resource. Based upon these reasons, it makes perfect sense to merge Stilz’s 
proposal with Moore’s.  
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The mutual benefits of the combination also emerge when we explore how the dualistic 
account tackles the old problems in their original theories. Recall that Stilz confronts the 
problem of high similarity to Moore’s provided that it advocates a loose definition of the state 
or less condition for group rights derivation. If Moore’s idea is incorporated into Stilz’s theory, 
Stilz can keep the statist advantage, namely the kind of collective self-determination that the 
modern state could legitimate and bring about, but also address the problem of close 
similarity of her account to Moore’s. For the state could, on the one hand, acknowledge the 
importance of its institutional impact on the subjects’ pursuit of political autonomy and yet 
on the other, recognise the territorial rights of the subgroups within its territory whose 
collective self-determination/associative duties should be given due protection. And given 
the recognition of the Moorean territorial rights, Stilz can put aside the concern about 
whether or not the condition for group rights derivation should be strict; because we now 
have sufficient theoretical resource to address the problem of status quo bias, which makes 
Stilz’s theory passive to resolve some historical injustice. In other words, the historical 
injustice can now be dealt with more actively given that states recognise the territorial rights 
of their subgroups and so are obliged to render necessary correction as a way to protect the 
rights.4  
 
 Moore’s theory can also be improved by taking some of Stilz’s ideas into account. Recall that 
Moore faces the problem of under-inclusiveness when there exists unpopulated lands or 
some individuals who not only hold no group identity at all but also occupy a certain swathe 
of territory. The former may produce the perverse incentive to forced migration while the 
 
4 This will be further elaborated in section 1.3.2. when I illustrate how the dualistic view advances corrective 
justice with respect to historical illegitimacy.  
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latter makes a territory piecemeal like a cheesecake or tends to legislate assimilation policies. 
For the first situation, Stilz’s distinction between core and ancillary territory and the reason 
for contiguous territorial boundaries can both be employed to account for the necessity of 
unpopulated lands. For the state may need ancillary territories connecting different core 
territories as the people have to take advantage of those unpopulated lands for the sake of 
transportation. That means the state’s jurisdictional authority has to extend to ancillary 
territories even though those lands are not the communal areas of people or less populated. 
There is a moral reason not to place those areas outside the law. In terms of the second 
situation, Stilz’s account of territorial sovereignty is more beneficial to explain why and how 
the jurisdictional authority should cover such a place. Because, despite the lack of 
identification with any particular subgroup, such individuals must rely upon the provision of 
institutions in order to secure their occupancy interests, the need for basic justice and political 
autonomy. Again, states derive their territorial rights not only by recognising subgroups’ 
territorial interests but also by delivering the three core values which subjects require. 
Furthermore, such a normative basis would also help address another problem in Moore’s 
theory: the worry of drawing unnecessary distinction between homeland and non-homeland 
peoples, which may generate unjustified oppression of outsiders’ collective self-
determination. By introducing Stilz’s viewpoint, this worry can be mitigated given that a state 
is set up to be the impartial arbiter weighing between different conceptions of collective self-
determination or looking for a balance between outsiders’ political autonomy and subgroups’ 
fulfilment of their associative duties.   
 
As illustrated, even though the synthesis of Moore’s and Stilz’s theories may confront some 
incompatibility, the incompatibility can be removed as the dualistic account captures 
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precisely two dimensions of collective self-determination (viz. FSD and SSD) and tackles the 
old problems in the original theories. However, since the new account proposes to recognise 
two distinct kinds of territorial rights-holder, one might be worried about whether such a 
proposal makes a state territory unstable. This then becomes the task in next section.   
 
1.2. Concern about instability? 
 
To evaluate whether the new account would undermine political stability, it is first necessary 
to recall what territorial rights are. According to the jurisdictional authority view, whoever 
holds these rights should have the power to create/adjudicate/exercise jurisdiction over, to 
utilise the natural resources of, and to enforce border control over, a territory. As such, the 
doubt concerning political stability can be stated in two ways. First, if the state and subgroup 
can both be the rights-holder, a subgroup may easily secede from its host state because it has 
the power to establish its own jurisdictional authority by deciding that the current legal 
system imposed on it is illegitimate, revoking the old territorial settlement and erecting a new 
one. That is, were the subgroup to have the same (territorial) rights as the state, there would 
be a worry about the tendency towards territorial disintegration. Second, since my dualism 
of territorial rights also proposes another territorial rights-holder (different from the state), a 
swathe of land may be subject to two competing legitimate rights-holders (i.e. the state and 
a self-determining people) which, if their interests are incompatible, seems to needlessly 
create a new conflict. This reflects the worry about incompatibility of the rights-holders. 
Specifically, this worry may create a perverse incentive that states want to prevent the 
emergence of subgroups by imposing forced assimilation policies on certain subjects. 
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Clearly, we need to dispel this doubt. First, it would be an exaggeration to think that 
secessionists can easily achieve their end at will because the idea of territorial rights is never 
absolute and exclusive. If we are not excessively worried by the fact that the account that 
takes the state as the sole rights-holder may be undermined because the rights are 
constrained by certain moral limits, then the same thought should also apply to the dualistic 
account. That is to say, we can envisage a moral constraint on subgroups’ exercise of 
territorial rights, which reflects a cautious and discreet attitude toward secession. It also 
implies that the constraint on subgroups could be different from the constraint on the state. 
Second, territorial rights do not conceptually contain the right to secede, whether or not such 
a right is understood as primary or remedial. What this concept entails is rather who has the 
final say on the jurisdictional matter; and yet what specific issue belongs to whose authority 
is nonetheless potentially variable. If it is the state, we grant authority to whatever emerges 
from the decision-making process at a state-wide level; if it is both the state and subgroup, 
we should distinguish the political issues attributed to the territorial interests of the subgroup 
from those of the nation, and give subgroups the final say on these issues. That is to say, even 
though the new account advocates two eligible rights-holders bearing the jurisdictional 
authority over a particular territory, who has the final say on the right to secede is another 
delicate question demanding a theory of secession, because any claim to secede inevitably 
concerns the interests of both (territorial) rights-holders.  
 
Of course, thirdly, a criterion for the distinction and how it sheds light on the right to secede 
is necessary to clarify the duties or rights of the state and subgroup respectively if political 
stability is to be secured more satisfactorily. The more thorough and clear it is, the less worry 
we will have about territorial disintegration; for we can understand under what condition 
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territorial integrity should be upheld and when it should not. Emphasis on the complexity of 
secession does not mean the two kinds of rights are conceptually irrelevant, but it rebuts the 
charge of political instability as it recognises secession as a distinct matter that does not easily 
fall into the authority of either rights-holder. Therefore, the doubt about territorial 
disintegration can be dismissed if the condition for retaining integrity is articulated. The 
incompatibility problem can be solved if a further distinction between the rights of subgroup 
and state is made.  
 
However, one may still be not satisfied with the general clarification on territorial rights and 
rights to secede because I have not provided a precise account of the distinction or the 
condition for upholding territorial integrity. The rebuttal is too general to remove the worry 
about political instability. What about the perverse incentive for the state to prevent the 
development of some group into a self-determining people, perhaps, because their 
population is too small to hold territorial rights? To supplement my stance, consider the 
following four elaborations.  
 
Firstly, if we are really worried about such a perverse incentive, the best way is still following 
my dualistic account as we take the three reasons below into account. Because, first of all, 
Moore’s account is necessary to identify any potential self-determining people despite that 
the group may be too small to form an effective government. Only if the potential candidates 
for such a people are identified can we understand whether or not the state is imposing 
forced assimilation. Second, we should follow Moore’s suggestion that these groups are 
justified in acquiring necessary assistance to fulfil their collective self-determination even 
though they currently fall short of being a legitimate territorial rights-holder. For instance, 
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the state should provide sufficient institutional resources for their group development or 
other forms of self-determination less than self-government.5 Third, Stilz’s theory is also a 
powerful weapon holding out against the perverse incentive. Because she advocates the 
moral occupancy based upon each subject’s (individual) interests in located life-plans and that 
states are obliged to protect not only the occupancy rights but also subjects’ political 
autonomy. This means that states should help advance those people’s aspiration to collective 
self-determination regardless of their capacity to hold territorial rights, provided that the 
individuals take their group development as necessary to their political autonomy. It is 
therefore shown that the perverse incentive to suppress any potential self-determining 
people would be better dealt with if my dualistic view on territorial rights is favoured. 
 
Secondly, I have shown the pivotal principle of the distinction, namely, to distribute political 
issues in accordance with whose territorial interest is at stake. If a given issue is justified to 
be in the interests of subgroup, then they are entitled to have the final say on such a matter. 
Conversely, if a policy has a nationwide impact, it belongs to the state’s authority. Again, if 
the matter is as intricate as secession, a theory is necessary. Thirdly, I have hinted that two 
sorts of territorial rights connect to each other while the associative duties of the subgroup 
are secured in a non-alienating manner. This is exactly the main condition for territorial 
integrity shaping the framework of justified secession (see the next chapter). Fourthly, the 
dualistic view is favoured not in virtue of the political stability it promises, but of the values it 




the values it protects are important enough to override the worry about political instability, 
we can derive some good reasons to support the dualism view.  
 
1.3. The values of dualism 
 
Two values uphold the dualistic account, namely group autonomy and individual autonomy. 
First, the territorial rights of the subgroup are the very foundation of some significant minority 
rights, particularly if the rights manifest subgroups’ territorial interests. Second, the new 
account not only offers a promising way of tackling historical illegitimacy but also advances 
both social and global justice by recognising more legitimate territorial rights-holders and 
protecting their rights. Let me account for these two values in turn.  
 
1.3.1. The basis of multiculturalism 
 
Before advancing my argument that the minority rights of a national minority or indigenous 
people are based upon their territorial rights, I shall review the argument for minority rights 
or multiculturalism. These are group-differentiated rights, broadly referring to the rights of a 
minority with respect to a majority of society, according to which the former is entitled to 
materialise conceptions of citizenship differently from the common or dominant one. 
Moreover, groups are distinguished by their different societal cultures, through which the 
cultures indicate ‘whose practices and institutions cover the full range of human activities, 
encompassing both public and private life’.6 Defined as such, a minority can refer to various 
 
6 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 75. 
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groups such as national minorities, immigrant groups, and suppressed ethnic groups or 
genders. Given the societal cultures of those minorities constitute or encompass most 
dimensions of their members’ lives, the rights of multiculturalism are sometimes suggested 
as the basic of a new ethos of political institution ensuring the protection of minority cultures. 
 
Yet how is multiculturalism justified? According to Kymlicka, the ethos is defended most 
convincingly in terms of the autonomy thesis.7 The thesis is twofold. Firstly, the ethos is 
consistent with personal autonomy, which is the precondition of having a good life: being free 
to pursue the conception of goods that one believes in and values without arbitrary 
interference. Multiculturalism accords with this freedom because it safeguards the options 
and environment that an agent could reasonably and assuredly choose. For instance, a gay 
man can stay with the person he loves without stigmatisation only if society recognises their 
choices as valid and is willing to protect their conception of the good with legal means. 
Secondly, the ethos can further promote personal autonomy by ensuring a meaningful 
revision or development of one’s choice, which reflects the morality of identity politics. Since 
the agent, say a member of  national minority, can be raised within her own culture and speak 
the language without discrimination, she would have little difficulty in finding a lifestyle fitting 
her personality, for she is able to examine and make the decision she values among different 
societal cultures (including hers) after sufficient self-examination. Moreover, because she can 
cultivate her own culture without unjust interference, she has more options and confidence 
in her nationality through participating actively in her national activities. The flourishing of 
groups often correlates positively with personal development. In other words, under the 
 
7 Ibid., 80-84.  
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ethos of multiculturalism, personal autonomy is promoted as one’s identity-based interests 
are further developed, by which self-respect in a multicultural society can be enhanced. 
 
Subsequently, let me consider why multiculturalism is not enough and why we need to accord 
territorial rights to subgroups. One may wonder that, despite the fact that our modern belief 
in diverse society and cultural pluralism has prevailed worldwide, such a commitment only 
suffices to prescribe a policy of multiculturalism to states8, rather than granting territorial 
rights to subgroups. What is the good of the latter prescription, then? It is also worth 
considering how Stilz’s account might reply to the necessity of prescribing territorial rights to 
subgroups. She holds that the state’s territorial rights are justified if and only if the three core 
values of the citizens as a whole are all secured. The political autonomy of subgroups has 
already been taken into account because it is surely a necessary condition for the political 
autonomy of all citizens. Thus, either the state fails to hold the rights over the whole territory 
if some of its subjects, such as a subgroup, cannot achieve collective self-determination 
through political institutions; or the state’s jurisdictional authority over the whole territory is 
morally justified. There is no need to demarcate territorial rights between state and subgroup 
because we care only about whether the state’s jurisdictional authority is justified in 
encompassing the territory it claims. It should be sufficient to prescribe some group rights 
other than territorial rights to subgroups in order to safeguard their territorial interests. 
 
8 As Tim Hall points out, following Kymlicka, multiculturalism should be endorsed because ‘states routinely 
engage in such forms of nation-building in promoting an official language, establishing a core curriculum for 
education and creating citizenship tests for migrants’, all of which indicate the unjust integration of different 
cultural groups within a state. State neutrality, which holds a clear demarcation between public and private 
affairs and treats the latter with benign neglect (i.e. laissez-faire) attitude, does not place the same weight on 
different ethnocultural groups. See Tim Hall, “Liberalism: the Pluralist State.” In The Modern State: Theories and 
Ideologies, ed. Erika Cudworth, Timothy Hall and John McGovern (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 
56. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 327-76. 
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How do minority rights connect to territorial rights? It is not hard to see that what I refer to 
as the territorial rights of subgroups corresponds to the rights of national minorities in 
Kymlicka’s terminology. First, he defines the group as ‘formed complete and functioning 
societies in their historic homeland prior to being incorporated into a larger state’. 9 
Indigenous peoples or substate nations (such as Scotland) are cases in point. My 
understanding, following Moore’s account of self-determining people, further advocates that 
a subgroup entitled to rights of self-determination can form their group identity not just out 
of their common past history before being incorporated into the host state, but also out of 
the alleged common political experience during subjection or incorporation over time. 
Second, while a national minority proposes, for instance, to revive their culture or language 
by designing a curriculum framed with their culture, we may ask why and how to implement 
such a policy. In addition to Kymlicka’s autonomy argument for the proposal, Moore argues 
that the members’ interests in culture or language rely massively on the protection and 
development of the group’s territorial interests, which is based on particular bits of land. Of 
course, this does not hold in all cases. Yet when a national culture or language is to be revived 
or cultivated, its substance or content usually refers to an imagined community attached to a 
particular area, because language or culture is not maintained by a few individuals, 
collaborative work is necessarily at play. Furthermore, societal culture implies that members 
are acquainted with some shared conventions, the sustaining of which reflects the support of 
membership plus the alleged associative duties in the community. Since these duties are 
derived from securing the interests in the relationship goods of group, the goods reasonably 
 
9 Kymlicka, Contemporary, 349. 
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create a legitimate expectation to keep developing the group, namely discharging duties in 
the territory it currently occupies. In consequence, the minority rights of a national minority 
or indigenous people reflect a significant territorial interest that generates pro tanto moral 
claims based on territorial rights.  
 
The same conclusion could also be drawn when pondering where to implement the policy. 
We might hesitate to extend the curriculum to a national level because firstly, asking a non-
member to learn a culture or language not one’s own is inconsistent with Kymlicka’s 
autonomy thesis or Moore’s idea of legitimate expectations, because the person does not 
belong to that minority. Moreover, it may be inadequate to force non-members to comply as 
this imposition interferes with their autonomy to pursue the culture they prefer. Secondly, 
institutional resources should be distributed in the most efficient and fair way. Provided that 
non-members have a need to secure their societal cultures and it is unreasonable to require 
each citizen to learn all cultures in a society, it is more economical to confine the policy to 
where the minority lives. Again, the commitment to the territorial rights of the subgroup is 
not only consonant with the value of multiculturalism, but also becomes the normative basis 
of some minority rights.  
 
If the argument above is correct, a better reply to the potential challenge from Stilz can be 
summarised as follows: since some minority rights represent the holders’ territorial interests, 
the rights are best protected by territorial rights, which should be distinguished from the 
whole territory of the state and posited in their residency. This claim also echoes my critique 
of Stilz’s account, in which there is no moral justification of any subgroup’s social inferiority 
caused by historical illegitimacy and according to which persistent alienation should be 
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recognised as a series of violations of subgroup’s identity-related interests. Restoring the 
territorial rights of a subgroup not only strengthens the basis of minority rights but also helps 
rectify historical illegitimacy and empowers the subgroup to resist persistent alienation. In 
the next subsection, I shall exemplify how this happens as a tool for corrective justice.  
 
1.3.2. Corrective justice with respect to historical illegitimacy 
 
The dualistic account helps us to understand the problem of historical illegitimacy: I shall first 
revisit the moral significance of historical illegitimacy and then illustrate how my account 
explains how to redress such injustice.  
 
1.3.2.1. Historical illegitimacy as deep structural injustice 
 
None would deny that the extant boundaries of states are the outcome of a series of injustices. 
As I illustrated with Simmons’s analysis in the first chapter, the historical illegitimacy of a claim 
over certain territory derives from the problem of wrongful subjection, where some subjects 
(including where they lived) were incorporated into the authority of states by unjustified force. 
The constitution of population and territory in most modern states is thus tainted by an unjust 
genesis which puts the moral legitimacy of their boundaries in question. However, I hold a 
different view from Simmons. Instead of thinking of  this problem as something categorically 
distinct from structural injustice, I suggest viewing it as a form of deep structural injustice, 
thereby echoing Catherine Lu’s insight that our current states/interstate system ‘is a product 
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of the global expansion of a Eurocentric society of states and hence is itself a legacy of 
European colonialism’.10  
 
According to Simmons, historical illegitimacy reflects an injustice in which some subjects are 
wronged by their states because the history or procedure of subjection has never involved 
their consent. This individualistic account of the will to submit to state authority should be 
distinguished from ‘the injustice in the institutional rules of society’s basic structure’11, which, 
according to Simmons, is the concern about structural injustice. If the expression of consent 
is ignored or denied, it should be taken as a violation of personal autonomy. The wrong is 
further exacerbated given that states assert that their subjects are under a political obligation 
and prohibit secession. Since historical illegitimacy is conceptually distinct from structural 
injustice, this cannot be rectified through a just social structure (e.g. recall the imagined case 
of post-war Germany in Chapter 3), and the bias of structural justice would thereby mislead 
us as to the remedy proper. Setting history right is therefore, according to Simmons, the most 
‘natural’ solution to the problem, a solution through which the states ought to return the 
freedom to obey to their subjects.  
 
Nevertheless, the most natural is not same as the most plausible and I believe the latter 
should dictate the shape of the solution in order to derive a comprehensive solution. It is true 
that historical illegitimacy violates the autonomy of many innocent persons, and the claimed 
rights of the state against their subjects worsen the violation. Yet the injustice originating 
from historical illegitimacy develops, transforms over time and becomes entrenched in the 
 
10 Catherine Lu, Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 195. 
11 A. John Simmons, Boundaries of Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 50. 
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very structure of society. Also, the people whose consent was vital are now long gone, and 
thus the problem is a more complicated matter. One may then ask the following questions. 
Firstly, why should we be concerned with whose consent was most required? Should we 
instead accept the supersession thesis, according to which historic injustice, particularly the 
lack of consent by victims, can be superseded over time by virtue of the subsequent changes? 
Secondly, what does it mean to say that historical illegitimacy develops into deep structural 
injustice? Would such an assertion create a paradox in which I, on the one hand, point out 
that a purely functionalist account of state legitimacy falls short of addressing the moral right 
to self-determination; and yet on the other, articulate that historical illegitimacy leads to deep 
structural injustice, calling for the redress through statist functions? Let me account for the 
issues in order.  
 
When I state that the people whose consent was vital have nearly all passed away, I am 
arguing against the validity of consent as an approach to corrective justice. In fact, the 
questions above are all about corrective justice as a concern, about how to reverse past 
wrongdoing and make reparation. Yet we have to recognise that not only may different 
historical injustices demand different solutions, but also different generations have different 
claims under the same type of historical injustice. For instance, my grandfather’s claim to 
reparation for his persecution by the government should be different, in terms of the mode 
of reparation, from my claim to correct the wrong of my grandfather’s suffering (provided my 
grandfather has passed away). Lu argues that there are two kinds of corrective justice: 
interactional and structural. Based on this distinction, I shall argue that the idea of consent is 
appropriate only to interactional justice and for the direct victim. The argument goes as 
follows. Firstly, interactional justice refers to ‘the settling of accounts between agents for 
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wrongful conduct or unjust interactions, and for undeserved harms and losses or injuries 
arising from wrongful conduct or interactions’; 12  while structural injustice highlights 
‘institutions, norms, practices, and material conditions that play a causal or conditioning role 
in producing objectionable conduct or outcomes’.13 For instance, if I speed, run a red light 
and strike a pedestrian, I should be responsible for that person as I imposed interactional 
injustice on them. Yet if I as a coach driver fell asleep at the wheel because the schedule 
forced me to work very long hours, although I should still be responsible for the accident in 
terms of interactional injustice, it should also be conceived as structural, as my wrongdoing 
was partly caused by the unjust background condition (i.e. an exploitative working 
environment).  
 
The term ‘direct victim’ refers to the (first) generation suffering from the state’s unjust 
subjugation. To claim that seeking the consent of this group is most important as a way of 
addressing historical illegitimacy means not only can the wrongful subjection be fixed but the 
reparation of other grave injustices brought about by the former (say invasion, conquest, or 
fraudulent purchase of lands) also depends on their consent. It is clear that these injustices 
are interactional, which refers to the wrongdoing of a state imposed on the victims without 
their consent. (However, I do not exclude the possibility that there is any structural injustice 
behind the state’s wrongful subjection.) Of course, I am not implying that consent can solve 
all these interactional injustices. The approach is evidently not able to repair the harms in, 
say, military invasion or fraudulent transactions, which require other kinds of reparation. 
However, consent plays an important role because it is part of the efforts that the state ought 
 
12 Lu, Justice, 33. 
13 Ibid., 34. 
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to make to restore the lifestyle and collective self-determination of the victimised. 
Furthermore, consent is necessary and meaningful because the direct victim experienced 
substantial, transitional change, e.g. from nomadism to sedentary life, and consent reflects 
that they are entitled to self-determine which form of society they wish to live in.  
 
In addition, interactional justice must be predicated by a clear and reasonable causality. For 
example, if I agreed to lend my friend my car and he then strikes a person through driving 
while fatigued, the wrong he has committed does not compel me to be responsible for the 
injury simply by virtue of my consent, because I merely consented to him/her driving my car, 
not to striking a person. There are surely two independent cases here: first, I have the right 
to claim reparation for the damage to my car, but because I have expressed the consent to 
let my friend drive my car, corrective justice should be limited to the restoration of the car; 
second, the innocent pedestrian has a claim to compensation for his/her physical harms due 
to my friend’s error. It is evident that my friend is involved in the two cases, but the fact that 
I consented to let my friend drive my car does not establish a direct connection between me 
and the victim.  Given that interactional justice is confined to the relationship between the 
participants in each individual case and consent as a solution to wrongful subjection is 
necessary and meaningful only in the case of direct victims, we should hesitate to expand the 
application of consent unless interactional injustice is implicated in the case. 
 
The normative significance of interaction can also be found in Kant’s ideas about the wrong 
of colonialism, despite his position that coercing others into a rightful condition (in this case, 
a state) is justifiable without consent. That is, while the latter account confers the right to 
coerce stateless people or any neighbouring people, it appears to counter the former account 
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in which the state should not expand to confront those groups (such as indigenous people) 
and compel them to be colonised or forcibly assimilated. How can Kant address this 
contradiction? There are two replies, in Perpetual Peace and The Metaphysics of Morals. In 
Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that a state proposing a conquest of stateless people should be 
deemed to be violating the concept of right, given that such a concept is the very reason that 
the state is morally justified.14 The moral duty of the state, as previously pointed out, is to 
deliver civil social conditions for people in the state of nature. However, those states 
attempting to colonise or conquer stateless people are concerned only with the resource they 
hold in order to increase their political power. Moreover, this increase in power is reached at 
the sacrifice of some of their subjects’ lives. That means the misconduct (colonialism or 
conquest) proposed simply satisfies the cynicism or private interest of the rulers, rather than 
the public interests of the people. Coercing stateless people contradicts what the concept of 
right demands. 
 
A similar idea is articulated more explicitly in The Metaphysics of Morals when Kant describes 
how the acquisition of property is justified. As explained in the previous chapter, our rights to 
property can only be justified only if the state or the alleged omnilateral will attempts to forge 
a conception (of property) that most subjects commonly share. That is to say, in order to 
settle conflict between different conceptions of property right or justice, the state is justified 
in coercing the people concerned into its authority. Such coercion must take place naturally, 
by which, according to Stilz, it can only be justified if the interaction is unavoidable. A state 
should not actively approach stateless people to found a colony on their territory,15 because 
 
14 Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writing, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 102-
105. 
15 Anna Stilz, “Provisional Right and Non-State Peoples,” in Kant and Colonialism, ed. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi 
 139 
the circumstance in question does not constitute an adequate reason for the establishment 
of a state. The rationale behind justifiable coercion without consent is that the security of 
rights depends on the cooperation of any person affected, because a person’s will or social 
life is subject to the wills of others. The problem of the arbitrary will of others emerges only 
if, say, my action or decision is substantively influenced by them. Given that many historical 
conquests or European colonies did not follow this logic, by which the interaction with 
colonised or conquered societies is avoidable, there is no justified moral reason to compel 
them to submit to an authority they do not recognise. If such a moral reason is omitted in the 
case of forcible assimilation such as colonialism or conquest, the consent of the direct victim 
plays a pivotal role in justifying the wrong of such interactional injustice. 
  
So, are the descendants of direct victims necessarily entitled to ask for the voluntary political 
(dis)association as a reparation for the wrongful subjection of their ancestors if the state fails 
to deliver restoration (including the expression of consent) that the direct victim deserved? 
The answer is ‘no’, because the mode of interaction with the state determines the method of 
reparation. The situation changes for subsequent generations, because, first, for the direct 
victim, the (interactional) justice due to them cannot be realised once they pass away, 
although we should do justice to the event in some form. Second, the injustice ‘passed on’ to 
the following generations becomes structural as they are born subject to the social structure 
that forcibly subjugated their ancestors and consequently determining their inferior political 
status compared to other groups. These two points highlight the background difference 
between the direct and indirect victim: the former was not subject to the state originally but 
 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 207-8. See also Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary 
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53. 
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forced to be at some point, while the latter, though significantly affected by the suffering of 
their ancestors, was born to be subjected to the state within a social structure unjust to them. 
This difference allows me to infer that, in terms of interactional injustice, past injustice is 
irremediable if the state fails to redress it in time. Yet, this is not the end of story because the 
injustice would be entrenched in institutional or ideological structures, by which the 
irremediable interactional injustice would become deep structural injustice over time. Of 
course, such a conclusion does not mean that the subsequent generations would not also 
become victims of continuous interactional injustice. As the descendants of the direct victim, 
the interactional injustice of the state is highly likely to be imposed on them continuously. But 
the distinction between interactional and structural injustice or the emphasis on structural 
injustice just provides the very reason for that continuous interactional injustice, by which, if 
the injustice is to be rooted out, we ought to adopt different model of resolution from the 
one for interactional injustice because we identify some interactional injustice is caused by 
and deeply entrenched in deep structural injustice.16 
 
It’s worthy of note that the injustice of wrongful subjection, identified by Simmons, comprises 
of two or even three conceptually different wrongs if we apply the distinction between 
interactional and structural injustice to the issue. Conflating them overlooks that different 
forms of injustice require different solutions. First, the direct victim has suffered not only from 
interactional but also from structural injustice because they confronted the state’s unjust 
repression and were forcibly incorporated into social structures that mistreated them. This 
 
16 For the similar view, please see Tommie Shelby, Dark Ghettos, (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2016), pp. 2-4. In the book he proposes a systemic-injustice framework in contrast to the 
alleged medical model. Despite both approaches aim to address social problems, the former is necessary if the 
problem is demonstrated to connect to the background structure of society. 
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victimisation clearly contains both interactional and structural injustice. Second, the indirect 
victim (or the descendants of direct victims) has suffered from the unjust social structure, 
although whether the state interacts with them unjustly, say via discriminatory policies, 
depends on scrutiny case by case. What this group has suffered is certainly structural injustice, 
but interactional injustice may not necessarily come into play. Third, any other subject who 
has never expressed their willingness to be subjected can also be conceived as having suffered 
wrongful subjection, referring to a kind of structural injustice because the structure of state 
legitimacy is undermined by unjust historical development; Simmons says that one may 
understand such a wrong as interactional because subjection without consent is an unjust 
interaction. When articulating the problem of wrongful subjection, Simmons refers to these 
three groups but by and large illustrates the wrong in terms of the first two.17 As only the first 
group is most plausibly entitled to the use of consent, we should not conflate all three 
together and wish to solve these different injustices simply by appeal to consent. 
 
One might take the argument above as support for the supersession thesis, from which 
historic injustice may be superseded by some present changed circumstances and so we can 
claim nullification of the injustice. To clarify, the argument does not advocate such 
nullification because, after all, the injustice in question still persists. It has not disappeared 
but transformed into deep structural injustice.18 This transformation returns us to Catherine 
 
17 For instance, when Simmons explains Thoreau’s civil disobedience, he argues that it is not only because a 
citizen should not participate in the affirmation of unjust social structures, but also by virtue of the morally 
questionable authority of state over each subject. Such readings surely encompass the three groups in question. 
And yet when Simmons attempts to show how problematic the injustice of wrongful subjection really is, he 
appeals mainly to contemporary Palestinians and Native American tribes. See Simmons, Boundaries, 36-58. 
18 My understanding of historic injustice and why we should adopt a different approach to descendants of direct 
victims corresponds to Simmons’s clarification, in which the supersession thesis should not be confused with 
‘our eminently plausible conviction that moral rights may be overridden,’ by which ‘we may sometimes have to 
violate moral rights in the interest of pursuing a more pressing, competing moral goal.’ Ibid., 158-59. 
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Lu and her investigation on how the colonial history still haunts our pursuit of social and global 
justice. According to Lu, ‘the state-centric institutions and practices of global governance 
reflect deep structural injustices that emanate from the colonial origins of the modern 
international order’.19 Modern states in Africa are a case in point, as their boundaries were 
the consequence of negotiations among European powers during 1884-85 for the sake of the 
European power balance in the continent. There was no consideration of Africans and many 
modern ethnic or territorial conflicts, such as the Eritrean-Ethiopian war beginning in the late 
twentieth century, can be attributed to such a legacy. Other countries in Asia suffered from 
the same phenomenon. For instance, Taiwan was the colonial stronghold of the Spanish 
Empire and the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth century, forcibly incorporated 
into the Chinese Empire in the eighteenth, and ceded to Japan as colony from the late 
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Contemporary problems in Taiwan, such as identity 
disorientation and territorial disputes with China and Japan are the legacy of colonial history 
and structure the very framework of public discourse in Taiwanese society. A final example is 
the egregious injustice done to the Rohingya people in Myanmar in recent years, which is yet 
another colonial legacy, this time of the British Empire, which manipulated the ethnic 
composition on the land. Thus we can see that historic injustices such as colonialism, if not 
properly addressed, can transform the initial unjust interaction into persistent and deep 
structural injustice. Lu concludes that, 
 
when structural injustices inform laws and norms, shape the design and purposes of 
institutions and social practices, and produce material effects, they enable, legitimise, 
 
19 Catherine Lu, “Decolonizing Borders, Self-Determination, and Global Justice.” In Empire, Race and Global 
Justice, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 252. 
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normalise, and entrench conditions under which structural and interactional injustice 
may persist on a regular and predictable basis.20  
 
My account of historical illegitimacy is not only against the supersession thesis with respect 
to historic injustice, but also notes how it continues to sabotage our pursuit of justice. In fact, 
the reason Simmons may overlook this deep structural injustice derives from his conception 
of injustice. He regards the idea as incapable of addressing wrongful subjection because it is 
confined to the political institutions of a state or society as a whole. Influenced by Rawls’s 
ideal theory, this conception is envisaged and applied to an isolated society. Yet while 
emphasising the unjust history of state formation, it makes no sense to restrict our 
understanding of structural justice to this narrow, closed-society view at a non-ideal level. If, 
as I have shown, the past unjust state behaviour was partly caused by some higher-ordered 
(ideological or institutional) structure, and our contemporary injustice is still haunted by these 
events and structures, then a perspective of structural justice is certainly an useful way of 
solving the historical problem, indicating the decolonisation is a lengthy process, rather than 
a simple and swiftly-reached goal and we are still on the way to complete that process.  
 
1.3.2.2. Rectifying historical illegitimacy with the dualistic account 
 
My dualistic account of territorial rights therefore addresses the problem of wrongful 
subjection by firstly recognising it as deep structural (global) injustice and then providing the 
victims (i.e. the subgroups) with the necessary capacity or power to restore their entitlements, 
 
20 Lu, Justice, 35.  
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including self-determination. I have already explained the first part at length. Now let me 
proceed to the second.  
 
The benefit of the new account is that it supplies the necessary capacity to restore the 
entitlements of the victim of historical illegitimacy without recourse to consent.  The 
argument is as follows. First, conceiving historical illegitimacy as deep structural injustice 
implies that restricting the holding of territorial rights to the current states is a statist bias, 
reflecting and reaffirming the wrong of colonialism. Second, given the insistence on the 
current practice of territorial integrity and the deep (global) structural injustice conditioning 
the behaviour of each state 21 , neither the respective states nor the extant form of 
international scheme (which is dominated by the current, recognized states) can address 
territorial conflicts positively. Call it the problem of statist inertia. Third, in order to break this 
inertia and thus enhance the international order, the subgroups who fall short of self-
determination and suffer from wrongful subjection are entitled to territorial rights against 
their states. To remove the unjust global structure, the statist conception of territorial rights 
should be loosened by recognising other legitimate holders of territorial rights. The dualism 
of territorial rights responds to this demand.  
 
While there is no need to argue whether an institutionally unjust state (say, a totalitarian or 
authoritarian regime) would be committed to reforming global justice, let me firstly consider 
whether a well-ordered society would experience statist inertia against global justice. An 
 
21 That is, (1) a state’s sovereignty and claim to territorial integrity becomes inviolable and unchallengeable 
once it achieves international recognition as a sovereign unit, even if it fails to meet a normative account of state 
legitimacy over time; (2) some states can take advantage of and gain benefits from the global unjust structure so 
are unwilling to improve the unjust international structure. 
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internally legitimate and just state is entitled to the statist territorial rights on which the state 
has exclusive jurisdictional authority over a particular population and territory and against 
the interference of others in domestic affairs. On this view, the pursuit of global justice is 
actually the promotion and spreading of social justice. This is the Rawlsian account, the ‘Law 
of Peoples’, according to which peace and human rights would be secured almost everywhere 
when most societies, by the definition of a well-ordered society, have already achieved social 
justice, whereas the alleged outlaw states would be forced to reform their institutional 
structure under the sanction of the league of (nearly) just societies.22 This account, as I have 
argued, apparently ignores its partial understanding of state legitimacy: the problem of 
wrongful subjection cannot be rectified merely by the reform of social structure, because 
some deep socially structural problem is related to or caused by the unjust global structure. 
Furthermore, our contemporary international order, which is similar to that of the Law of 
Peoples, has shown much evidence of its impotence in terms of protecting human rights, 
because there is not much incentive for states, even the well-ordered, to act upon 
humanitarianism instead of national interests.23 If a sanction on an outlaw state were to 
contradict the national interest of acting states, most states would be reluctant to impose the 
sanction. At times, states impose sanction, not for humanitarian reasons but from national 
interest. After all, the idea of a well-ordered society guarantees only the realisation of rights 
on its territory, rather than considering the globe as a whole. This refers to a theoretical flaw 
 
22 This refers to John Rawls’ proposal for international order. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1999). 
23 In June 2019, the UN chief accepted the independent report on the human rights crisis of the Rohingya 
people in Myanmar. The report concludes that the overall UN system has been ‘relatively impotent to 
effectively work with the authorities of Myanmar, to reverse the negative trends in the areas of human rights, 
and consolidate the positive trends in other areas’. See “UN chief accepts independent report on Myanmar, 
highlighting ‘systemic’ failure surrounding Rohingya crisis,” UN News, accessed 30 June 2019, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1040681.  
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of the account that without the construction of global authority over international and 
humanitarian affairs, the Law of Peoples would be contested and undermined by the semi-
state-of-nature background conditions, under which any commitment to global justice would 
suffer from indeterminacy, moral disagreement and unilateralism in global order.  
 
Another more promising account worthy of consideration advocates that the alleged statist 
global order or territorial rights are justified provisionally and conditionally insofar as the 
state is committed to establishing a global authority conforming to some cosmopolitan moral 
principles. Lea Ypi may be the most well-known theorist holding such a view, who posits the 
argument on the principle of permissibility. Adopted from the Kantian idea of permissive laws, 
the principle applies to the circumstance in which an act is permitted, even though it violates 
principles of right in general, because it is also ‘subject to a commitment to bring about states 
of affairs which realise the idea of equal freedom, and for as long as principles of right are not 
in place’.24 The rationale for having the state is a case in point and Ypi tries to apply the same 
logic to the acceptance of statist territorial rights as a premise for just global order. Recall that 
in the state of nature, persons possess their property unilaterally, by which they not only hold 
different conceptions of property rights but also different understandings of how to reconcile 
any conflict about the relevant matters. This lacks a practical authority to determine such 
issues, so the appeal to the state is necessary and morally justified. Yet before the 
establishment of rightful condition, because no commonly-shared authority can be appealed 
to in order to settle the issue, people can only recognise the current holding of each other 
provisionally on the condition that the public, omnilateral order alongside the state will be 
 
24 Lea Ypi, “A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights,” European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2) (2012): 288-312, p. 
290. 
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formed to resolve their conflict. The idea of permissibility thus indicates the mode of 
behaviour necessary in a transitional phase in which some moral hazard or historical wrong 
plus the settlement of such problems have to be granted or suspended until the transitional 
period is overcome and a just background structure is established. Applying the idea to 
territorial rights, Ypi argues that the states’ current claims to territories are justified 
provisionally and conditionally if and only if they commit themselves to forming a global order 
realising cosmopolitan justice applying to all human beings and places.  
 
However, Ypi’s proposal faces a problem of statist inertia for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the proposal envisaged for the sake of global justice seems to circumvent the concern about 
internal self-determination or significance of constitutions too easily, as it both purports to 
delegate the issue to a global authority, and yet permits the (provisional) justification of statist 
territorial rights.25 This gives rise to at least two problems. Generally, it makes the normative 
relation between a global authority and how it should address the issues of collective self-
determination an open question. It is a potential worry that such an authority cares only for 
the provision of basic justice and so ignores the value of collective self-determination. 
Moreover, while the idea of territorial rights entails the right to prohibit secession, the 
permissive account asks the victims of wrongful subjection to forbear their claim of self-
determination until the establishment of a global authority. This clearly risks statist inertia 
because it neglects the simple fact that constitutional democracy (plus perhaps the 
 
25 Ypi holds this position, articulating that ‘permissive principles should be understood as transition principles; 
they can be retroactively invoked to justify a unilateral past acquisition in the absence of rightful conditions of 
reciprocal interaction’ and ‘once the mechanisms for a rightful distribution of territorial claims [i.e. a global 
authority] are in place, the wrong of unilateral settlement ceases to be absolved…it requires states to submit to 
the rules of a collective authority adjudicating the distribution of territorial claims according to principles of 
right.’ Ibid., 305. 
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coordination with states at the periphery if necessary) can theoretically address internal self-
determination, including a claim to secede, without recourse to global authority. It refers to 
one of the statist functions: being an omnilateral arbiter on public, domestic affairs. As long 
as a theory can show that internal state legitimacy on territorial boundaries is not as solid as 
it might be presumed to be, a state should not only comply with the establishment of global 
authority, but also recognise other rights-holders within its territory and thereby assist in 
fulfilling their claim to self-determination through an impartial and just procedure, namely a 
constitutional scheme. Such recognition then leads us to the second cause for statist inertia: 
the representative problem in the creation of global authority.  
 
This authority is normally under the control of majority or advantaged groups, making the 
institutional design by and large partial towards their interests. The representative problem 
accordingly invokes the practical concern that if some extant states could not truly represent 
the subgroups they claim to govern (because their territorial rights are not protected by the 
host states), a global authority thus created would fall short of representing all human beings. 
Without recognising that there are more legitimate territorial rights-holders than the extant 
states, by which they are also entitled to shape global authority, the same partiality would 
not only happen but worsen in the exercise of global authority. This has already occurred in 
the case of unrecognised but de facto independent states as those anomalous entities are 
excluded from recognition within the international system. Their interests in global order are 
always misrepresented by some other (UN-recognised) countries, which results in peoples in 
unrecognised states often being beyond the reach of international law and thereby unable to 
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remove threats to their external self-determination.26 To establish a just global authority, it is 
necessary to take the representative problem into account. Just as the state should recognise 
universal suffrage, we should also recognise any legitimate agent as a potential subject to 
global authority, which no doubt includes subgroups within a state. Therefore, even though 
Ypi reformulates the orthodox account of territorial rights with the principle of permissibility 
and the commitment to global authority, statist inertia still plagues the proposal and this 
makes corrective justice to historical illegitimacy unlikely in her approach. Thus, we should 
enlarge the recognition of territorial rights-holders, by which the exercise of a global authority 
should be conditioned by the territorial rights of subgroups or Stilz’s three individual core 
values (i.e. occupancy rights, basic justice and political autonomy).  
 
My dualism of territorial rights would meet this problem by recognising the rights-holders 
within or even across states and so reforming social and global order with a sufficient and 
qualified number of participants. There are two ways of understanding my approach. Firstly, 
the state as a kind of public, practical authority should proceed to devolution by recognising 
the territorial rights of subgroups within its jurisdiction. This also means that the state should 
embark on constitutional reform (i.e. multinationalism) in which both sides (i.e. the state and 
subgroups) are entitled to equal status when determining who has jurisdictional authority 
over what matters on what land, as well as a new and fair decision-making process for 
national issues. The dualistic account addresses the problem of wrongful subjection firstly 
through a reform in constitutional structure that decentralises the power of current states 
and restores the subgroup’s claim of self-determination, including legislation on the right to 
 
26 Nina Caspersen, Unrecognized States (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 
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secede. However, the above social-justice measure cannot address the deep structural 
injustices stemming from the unjust global order. As such, secondly, my account follows Ypi’s 
permissibility approach that all qualified territorial rights-holders have an obligation to help 
establish and deliver a just global authority if they want to maintain those rights. Although, if 
the social-justice manner is followed, some subgroups’ self-determination can be fulfilled, it 
still falls short of taking proper account of the interests of transboundary peoples or the need 
for boundary-redrawing. Such a concern refers to some indigenous people whose traditional 
territory is situated alongside the cross-border region between two states, or some ethnic 
group who used to share the same political institutions and yet now is carved up by different 
states, such as the Sinixt living around the US-Canada border and Kurds whose living area 
includes Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. So, while there are still many peoples whose self-
determination has to rely on international cooperation and the appeal to a global authority 
as omnilateral arbiter, my account empowers all qualified, legitimate territorial rights-holders 
to engage in drafting terms and conditions on how to set up the limitation of global authority, 
the duty to realise cosmopolitan justice, the decolonisation of extant global order and the re-
evaluation of the substance of territorial rights (i.e. what the rights consist of).   
 
Why and how would my dualistic account deconstruct the substance of territorial rights? I 
concur with Lu that we should discard our insistence on the exclusiveness and unilaterality of 
territorial rights if we really aim to resolve humanitarian crises and reconcile different agents’ 
claims to self-determination.27  For while human territoriality reflects how human beings 
utilise border control as a way of living, any redrawing of boundaries should nevertheless be 
 
27 Lu, (2019), 267-68. 
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sensitive to changes in circumstances. Given that modern lifestyles change rapidly, any 
proposal for hard and permanent borders may quickly become outdated and impede the 
evolution of human territoriality. As my proposal re-conceives of the state as having plural 
agency, namely multiple territorial rights-holders co-existing in a territory, the account helps 
emancipate the idea of territorial rights, nudging the rights-holders towards abandoning the 
traditional, statist understanding because, borrowing from Stilz, they are now compelled to 
accept that it may be easy to confirm the boundaries of their core territories, but not of the 
ancillary. In other words, they are more willing to reconsider the value of unilateral border 
control and the exclusiveness of sovereignty because the boundaries between the rights-
holders are more and less overlapping, indicating that they should loosen political control 
over the borders between the overlapping area of ancillary territories if territorial conflicts 
are to be prevented. Of course, the potential above depends on the establishment of a just 
global authority, taking the territorial rights of subgroups into account. Yet the key point of 
territorial justice should not be confined to the creation of global authority, which is 
envisaged to settle secessionist movements or redraw state boundaries in a just way, because 
the boundaries are more or less arbitrary, e.g. an outcome of compromise, or only reflect the 
interest balance between each side modus vivendi. We should rather change the focus to 
empowering each legitimate agent to negotiate this issue without suppression and ensure 
communication with each other is genuine. I believe the dualism of territorial rights can 
achieve this goal effectively.  
 
Let me summarise my approach below. On the one hand, the newly-recognised territorial 
rights-holders are the countervailing force against the statist conception of territorial rights, 
by which they, normatively and realistically, obtain the necessary bargaining power and moral 
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status to re-negotiate their conditions of self-determination (including the demand for 
corrective justice) in the parent states. On the other, since being recognised as a legitimate 
representative in the construction of global order, they are entitled to international legal aid 
and the standing to suggest the redrawing of boundaries not only with their parent states but 
also other relevant states. Finally, these features both suggest loosening the statist 
conception of territorial rights, by which we can truly liberate the (structural) arbitrariness of 
boundary-drawing and realise global justice as a legitimate global authority is built.  
 
2. Further clarifications and implications  
 
Before closing this chapter, a few clarifications must be made, to prevent misunderstanding. 
First, my dualistic account is really a sketch devised for the preliminary framework of justified 
secession. That is to say, the account is far from complete and comprehensive, as it lacks any 
account or elaboration of natural resources and migration, both of which are necessary to a 
theory of territorial rights. Even though I advocate that states’ extant territorial boundaries 
should be contested and we should not endorse the exclusiveness and unilateralism of border 
control, my account says very little about, for instance, the entitlement to control over or 
benefit from natural resources, and under what condition a state can exercise the right to 
exclude. However, this does not undermine the validity of my proposal, because much of the 
discussion is related to distributive justice and the reconciliation of citizens and non-citizens.  
 
Secondly, while territorial rights as a normative idea are concerned with the subject and 
object of jurisdictional authority, and how strong the control should be, the delineation so far 
seems to focus mainly upon groups instead of individuals. One may question how my dualism 
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deals with individual dissidents. Do states have a justified jurisdictional authority over 
someone who identifies with neither a nation nor a subgroup, and has never expressed its 
consent to submit to its state? There are two ways of responding to this. First, following 
Moore, a theory of political territory should prioritise ‘how territorial rights arise, not an 
account of how political authority over individuals arises’.28 I subscribe to the jurisdictional 
authority view, namely, the relationship between states and territories is embedded in the 
relationship between states and subjects.29 An account of territorial rights can presumably 
put aside the concern of political obligations/authority because the former is primarily 
concerned with whether and how a government body can continue to sustain and develop a 
judicial system in a certain land, whereas the latter concerns whether the subjects are obliged 
to obey the law. An account of obedience and of creating a legal system should perfectly 
match only if we prescribe the understanding of jurisdictional authority to a consent-based 
political authority. In other words, if the justification of political authority is not based upon 
consent, the justification of territorial rights likewise would not be undermined by individual 
dissent. Since my dualistic account is not based upon a consent theory, individual dissidents 
do not undermine my proposal. Second, it would be a misunderstanding to regard the dualism 
of territorial rights as a collective-based account. While I incorporate Stilz’s theory into my 
account, it accommodates any individual affiliated not with a national or subgroup identity 
(or both). Moreover, Stilz’s idea of peoplehood makes the identification with a state-wide 
identity a situation in which people embrace the political institutions realising their basic 
justice and political autonomy. As such, what matters here is not whether the state derives 
the subjects’ consent, but on what grounds the dissidents can challenge or revoke the 
 
28 Margaret Moore, A Political Theory of Territory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 62. 
29 Simmons, Boundaries, 29-30. 
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territorial rights of states. Shown in the previous chapter, if their disobedience violates the 
value of basic justice or personal autonomy, the state has the authority to coerce their 
compliance and so the hold of territorial rights is still justified. Yet if persistent alienation is 
inflicted on the dissidents plus the way of remedy would not violate the above two 
fundamental values, the state’s territorial rights are indeed undermined, by which secession 
may be justified potentially. The detail of such consideration will be further analysed and 
addressed in the next chapter.  
 
Recall that there are three fundamental questions connecting territorial rights to an inquiry 
of secession. I shall then provide adequate responses based upon my dualistic account. The 
first and second fundamental questions concern how to counter most states unjust genesis 
and how to evaluate rival claims to the same territory. My proposal articulates two main 
values for political/state territory and addresses the concerns by advocating that, in terms of 
drawing boundaries, the two values should be at most instrumental to both secessionists and 
states. Firstly, political territory is important because, according to Stilz, it brings about 
political autonomy, which is a necessary condition for personal autonomy; and by virtue of 
Moore’s theory, it helps realise the associative duties of self-determining peoples living inside 
a state. These may be taken as the intrinsic values of state territory. Nevertheless, secondly, 
how to draw the boundary inevitably involves some arbitrariness, which suggests that we 
should loosen the traditional idea of a territorial boundary and change the focus to 
empowering each legitimate agent to (re-)negotiate the matter as necessary. Based on this, 
the resolution to wrongful subjection (i.e. the unjust genesis of state) and the evaluation of 
rival territorial claims should be a matter of genuine communication between the relevant 
agents. Any normative theory should restrain itself from giving a rigid account favouring 
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either sides (i.e. secessionists or the state). Stilz identifies two kinds of territory (core and 
ancillary) and argues for the importance of contiguous boundaries combining the two. Yet the 
value is instrumental as it is endorsed for the sake of administrative efficiency, not to mention 
that it had been abused as an excuse for conquest and fraudulent land transactions during 
the development of states. Moore conceives territorial boundary as manifesting the 
communal border of self-determining peoples, but such a view is still instrumental because 
the living areas among different peoples may overlap or some weightier moral reasons might 
override the idea of a hard border. For example, when she considers some country with a 
contested territory, say Kashmir, the connection of group identity to occupancy falls short of 
giving precise guidance on boundary-drawing, since the land is populated by many different 
ethnic groups. Moreover, a referendum on secession is not a promising solution because the 
situation is very complex both politically and socially, and a fair vote is unlikely. Under these 
circumstances, Moore suggests that some imaginative form of power-sharing is necessary, to 
involve, 
 
not just the withdrawal of a heavy Indian army presence and a referendum, but 
military withdrawal combined with the creation of political space in which Kashmiris 
can develop relationships and understandings amongst themselves about what kind 
of relationships they want.30  
 
As illustrated, boundary-drawing only has instrumental value and should be reconciled with 
other moral considerations if the reality deviates from theory. This leads naturally to my 
 
30 Moore, (2015), p. 126. 
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proposal that, instead of devising a perfect theory of boundary-drawing, we should delve into 
how to empower each legitimate agent to raise and negotiate the issue and to make the 
communication authentic and impartial. I believe the thorny issues such as wrongful 
subjection or the evaluation of rival territorial claims can be better addressed by such an open 
account. 
 
The third fundamental question asks, ‘how can we reconcile people’s right to self-
determination and the state’s claim to territorial integrity?’ My resolution is to argue that a 
qualified claimant should first be a qualified territorial rights-holder in order to reasonably 
contest the state’s claim to territorial integrity. Firstly, as pointed out in Chapter Two, a theory 
of secession must also provide a reason why a certain area of land is claimed by some group 
(i.e. the claimant) rather than another bunch of individuals residing on the land. My account 
not only echoes such a necessity but articulates the reasons in terms of the interaction and 
balance between FSD and SSD. That is, secondly, the dualistic account accounts for the 
concerns in a reciprocal way. On the one hand, while looking at how the state may lose its 
territorial rights (i.e. FSD), the account refers to the condition in which a subgroup within the 
territory suffers from persistent alienation. So, the state fails to claim jurisdictional authority 
over the area where the victimised resides when persistent alienation takes place within the 
subgroup. On the other hand, from the perspective of a subgroup (i.e. SSD), secession can 
claim certain land legitimately because the land manifests their group identity and communal 
life. Specifically, the land is a precondition for discharging the associative duties stemming 
from group membership. Given that individuals cannot live without their communal lifestyles, 
their legitimate expectation to develop and continue their lives upon their occupied land thus 
becomes sufficient reason for realising secession on the claimed territory. As such, my 
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proposal not only points out under what conditions a state should forfeit the territorial rights 
to certain land, but also identifies how a claim of secessionists to particular land is justified. 
Both imply reciprocity between the state and subgroups, in which the latter should submit to 
the jurisdictional authority of the former if and only if the exercise of that authority follows 
my dualism of territorial rights. This no doubt provides the normative basis of rights and 
duties that both secessionists and states should abide by, according to which we understand 
how to reconcile the right of self-determination (which includes the right of secession) with 
the right to territorial integrity. That is, a qualified claimant to secession should count as a 
legitimate territorial rights-holder, because the qualification of the latter renders the criteria 




In conclusion, let me briefly review what I advocate in this chapter. First, I identify two types 
of self-determination with two kinds of identity, FSD and SSD, on the basis of which it is 
beneficial to merge Stilz’s theory with Moore’s. Second, under Stilz’s principle of non-
alienation, the synthesis would not provoke political instability such as unlimited secession, 
although it aims to destabilise the jurisdictional authority of current states. However, thirdly, 
the cost is necessary and can bring about two important values: multiculturalism and 
corrective justice. Particularly, corrective justice is both backward- and forward-looking. We 
care not just about reparations to the victims of historical injustice, but also the unjust global 
structure constituted by the legacy of colonialism. Given the commitment to protecting 
territorial interests of the two identities, my dualism of territorial rights therefore meets the 
demand by recognising the territorial rights of subgroups, encouraging constitutional reform 
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within states and the construction of global authority (securing both the ideals of justice and 
collective self-determination) supported by all legitimate territorial rights-holders. Finally, I 
admit that my dualistic account is far from comprehensive but sufficient to be the normative 
foundation of justified secession. The validity of my proposal is not undermined by its lack of 
accounting for natural resources, migration and individual dissidents. Moreover, I illustrate 
how my understanding of territorial rights helps connect it to justified secession. Political 
territory is valuable as it constitutes the background social condition of personal autonomy 
and safeguards the associative duties of a subgroup and yet neither can claim an intrinsic 
value of territorial boundary alone, by which we should, again, commit ourselves to 
empowering each legitimate territorial rights-holder to raise a genuine and mutually 
respectful negotiation on boundary-drawing with other relevant agents. In addition, the 
dualistic account confirms that a qualified claimant to secession should be a territorial rights-
holder necessarily because the examination of a claim to certain land and the rights and duties 
of states and the claimant are all based on a theory of territorial rights.  
 
However, there are still some indeterminate and crucial issues. First, I have not clearly 
specified group agency in my dualistic account, even though the relevant entity (a “people”) 
in question is accounted for already, whether we apply Stilz’s endogenous peoplehood or 
Moore’s self-determining people. Since the exposition of a qualified claimant to secession is 
to be articulated in the next chapter, I will delineate the concern about collective agency then. 
Secondly, as I still value each local state as the primitive omnilateral arbiter and their 
legitimacy of constructing a state-wide identity, I shall spell out further the terms of how a 
state sustains harmony with the territorial rights-holders within its territory. Firstly, I shall 
evaluate whether my dualistic account of territorial rights entails the right to prohibit 
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secession, and if there is such a right, under what conditions it may be exercised. 
Subsequently, I shall further the investigation into the nature of the right to secede and into 
principles for justified secession. What normative principle we can derive from the dualism of 













There are two tasks in this chapter: (1) to illustrate the philosophical foundation of the 
principles for justified secession; and (2) to articulate under what conditions the principles 
would apply, so that we have criteria to judge when a claim to consensual or unilateral 
secession is justified. Such an endeavour correlates with, but is distinct from, the aim of the 
next chapter, which revisits the right to secede in light of the investigations undertaken here.   
 
In the first section, I shall outline the principles for justified secession. Two sub-principles 
taken together constitute the main principle, reflecting two alternative readings of the main 
principle. This fundamental principle (i.e. the non-alienation principle) has its normative basis 
in a conception of personal autonomy associated with self-realisation. This account will then 
be applied to politics, connecting to Stilz’s idea of political autonomy and Moore’s idea of a 
self-determining people. This will shed light on why persistent alienation should be taken as 
a serious violation of territorial rights, and therefore a legitimate ground for secession. 
 
I will then extend the above account to the issue of secession in the second and the third 
sections. I suggest recognising a normative continuum from consensual to unilateral 
secession. The main principle could entail two subprinciples, according to different degrees 
of violation. The less serious violation (i.e. structural alienation) pertains to the first 
subprinciple and justifies a claim to consensual secession, while the more serious violation 
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(i.e. existential alienation) relates to the second subprinciple and unilateral secession. Derived 
from Lu’s account of self-determination, structural alienation indicates that a social structure 
deprives an alienated group of the power to participate in society meaningfully, while 
existential alienation reveals a more serious problem in which the victim suffers from 
something like aphasia, becoming incapable of self-understanding or performing authentic 
actions in a society. The term ‘genuine communication’ is used here to refer to the objective 
of any means to address these problems, empowering all subjects or subgroups to achieve 
self-realisation and implying that the state should protect or facilitate genuine 
communication between subjects/subgroups. In addition, the reliability of government or 
constitution also underlies the two sub-principles. Even in a situation of structural alienation, 
we should still assume that government is trustworthy, because such a wrong merely entitles 
the victim to rectify their condition of self-government (which may or may not include 
secession).  
 
Consensual secession here may be a form of political leverage to force the government to 
resolve the structural alienation. Violation of the second subprinciple suggests that the 
government or constitution cannot be relied upon to address the problem, because 
existential alienation indicates a long-term bias of the majority against the alienated group, 
implying great potential for grave injustice. It is reasonable for the group to give up on 
negotiating with the government and instead claim unilateral secession in order to avoid such 
injustice. This, then, suggests that the first subprinciple implies the value of structural dignity. 
The state should recognise each subgroup’s pursuit of this by, for instance, distributing 
identity-related resources (such as what language should be learned at school or whether the 
government can promote the practice of a particular religion) fairly to all subgroups in society 
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to address structural alienation. If the state cannot recognise a subgroup’s structural dignity, 
consensual secession must be considered as a solution. The second subprinciple, given that 
the state is no longer reliable, reflects not only a safeguard against existential alienation but 
also a sign of grave injustice, both of which justify a claim to unilateral secession, proposing 
the establishment of a society that will achieve genuine communication.  
 
To finish the chapter, I will articulate the idea that even though my principle shares or can be 
associated with the ideal of non-domination, it still bases itself on non-alienation as its core 
rationale, because the justification for secession should be a serious infringement of self-
realisation, which stresses the importance of social equality. Non-alienation plays a role in 
manifesting this social dynamic, while the ideal of non-domination alone cannot fully account 





1. The fundamental principle: The principle of non-alienation 
 
In my dualism of territorial rights in Chapter 4, I echo Stilz’s proposal that the normative basis 
of justified secession refers to the resistance to persistent alienation. It then entails the non-
alienation principle, articulating that the state’s territorial rights fail to be upheld whenever 
its exercise of power inflicts persistent alienation on a subgroup (as defined by a common 
group identity, a history of political cooperation and the capacity to form a government), by 
which the alienated group is unable to realise their collective life as they wish. As such, this 
fundamental principle reflects a positive claim against the state, whose duty is to help to 
advance or secure the associative duties of a subgroup within its territory in a non-alienating 
manner. Such a claim reflects the idea that the subgroup is entitled to meaningful or genuine 
political participation in society.  
 
On this view, I define the non-alienation principle (henceforth, Pna) as follows: 
 
Pna: Insofar as a subgroup G (as a qualified holder of territorial rights) is subjected to 
the political authority of a host state, G is entitled to the fulfilment of its 
SSD/associative duties in a non-alienating manner. 
 
‘Non-alienating’ safeguards against persistent alienation. Yet to what extent a group is alleged 
to be alienated from genuine political participation or how alienation can be taken as a 
normative criterion for a claim to secede is still under-theorised in the previous chapters. To 
address this theoretical deficit, I make the following proposals. First, it is grounded on a more 
fundamental value, namely personal autonomy. Second, the fulfilment of personal autonomy 
 165 
has to be situated within a particular social context associated with Stilz’s proposal for 
political autonomy. Yet, third, because how an individual secures its political autonomy is 
conditioned to a great extent by how the group to which it is attached achieves its collective 
autonomy in the host state, whether the associative duties of the group can be performed in 
a non-alienated fashion should then be a normal condition under which secession would be 
justified, in response to the need to safeguard territorial rights. 
 
1.1. Non-alienation as a political ideal: Personal and Political autonomy 
 
Applying the concept of alienation to secession gives rise to two points. First, it actually 
implies a political analogue to personal autonomy, by which the ideal of personal autonomy 
should map onto our social, political joint venture. In other words, the organisation of political 
institutions (on a state territory) should manifest the shared, deliberate judgements of the 
subjects. This ideal is what Stilz terms political autonomy, which can be associated with the 
classic, Rousseauian idea of general will. Second, a form of securing political autonomy (or a 
way of understanding what the shared, deliberate judgement amounts to), which I argue is 
the normative basis of justified secession, refers to the collective autonomy of subgroups 
whose evaluation is based upon the fulfilment of their associative duties. Let me account for 
these two points below, leading towards the normative basis of my non-alienation principle. 
 
Recall Stilz’s proposal for political autonomy: a subject reaches that political ideal as it (1) 
identifies with the higher purposes behind its citizenship (derived from shared political will); 
(2) understands how its political participation shapes the collective decision; and additionally 
(3) the joint venture it follows endorses basic justice and personal autonomy. And presumably, 
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personal autonomy can be understood as a kind of self-realisation which requires an agent to 
carry out actions reflecting its evaluative and moral understanding, where such 
understanding should manifest the agent’s authentic reasoning.1 In other words, we can take 
personal autonomy as a necessary condition for one’s self-realisation and whereby the person 
is able to actualise his or her will in reality. Given this conception of personal autonomy, 
political autonomy can be further illuminated as follows.  
 
Firstly, if politics and self-realisation are mutually affected, then it is reasonable to require 
collective decisions to reflect the general will of people who are both the subject and object 
of that decision. It goes without saying that we project our political vision onto policies or 
elect statesmen in order to actualise our conceptions of the good life. We thus carry out part 
of our self-understanding in terms of political participation. Such a demand corresponds to 
the requirement for self-realisation that it should reflect the agent’s will. Yet, as pointed out 
in Chapter 3, a politically shared will is formed not in a way that mirrors each citizen’s first-
order, personal judgement, but in the second-order sense that the majority of citizens share 
certain common political projects, abstract values and the procedure of decision-making. 
While most citizens subscribe to such a general will, they recognise and identify with their 
roles in terms of citizenship.  
 
Secondly, given this identification with citizenship or political participation, citizens, as in self-
realisation, should understand how their participation shapes the society and what larger 
narrative or vision is behind the joint venture. Further, they not only internalise the role of 
 
1 See Stilz, (2019), pp. 105-6. For a detailed exploration of the connection between autonomy and self-
realisation, see Rahel Jaegii, trans. Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith, Alienation (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), pp. 32-42.  
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citizen but also perform political participation for its own sake, because the activity is carried 
out to manifest their shared political shared will. The majority of citizens actualise part of 
themselves in society, as they impose their will on the political institutions and anticipate the 
realisation of that will through policies.  
 
Thirdly, because neither political nor personal autonomy is absolute, the fulfilment of ideals 
should be conditioned by balancing with other weighty values. The limitations on these two 
ideals can be seen below. Self-realisation requires the activity to be carried out not only with 
authenticity but also as a result of a practical reflective equilibrium. The former demands 
correspondence to what the agent recognises, while the latter prescribes self-realisation as 
involving a reconciliation between what one desires and how the external world conditions 
that desire. In other words, the articulated self or activity has never been totally subjective or 
objective, in the sense that there is always a concern about what external conditions are 
justified in prohibiting or forming intended actions. In terms of political autonomy, it goes 
without saying that self-realisation in politics should be confined by the boundaries of 
morality. We should respect basic rights, treating everyone as free and equal. Adherence to 
basic justice ensures the same amount of external freedom for each subject and the 
commitment to personal autonomy respects each subject’s individuality as an independent 
person, able to determine and taken responsibility for their fate.  
 
Nevertheless, there remains a concern about what constitutes the alleged higher, abstract 
purposes and values behind citizenship. As shown in Chapter 3, Stilz argues that shared 
political will can be brought about with the assistance of political institutions or political 
participation as long as an endogenous account of peoplehood is formed. I also appealed to 
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Brexit as an example to illustrate how such general will operates with respect to the diversity 
of society. Yet, as illustrated in Chapter 4, political autonomy should not only be pursued in 
terms of FSD, but also in terms of SSD. That is to say, a subgroup defined by Moore as a self-
determining people is a pivotal source of certain political projects and higher, abstract values 
to which the members subscribe, given that their personal identity is shaped by the group 
identity. While some subjects are both citizens and a member of a subgroup, their 
contribution to the shared political will is no doubt derived from the higher values and 
political projects associated with the subgroup. Recall Moore’s account of territorial rights: 
the subgroup’s commitment to certain values and political projects reflects relationship-
dependent goods and thus amounts to the associative duties within the group. I will illustrate 
in the next chapter how to understand such duties more specifically when accounting for why 
the right of secession should be a group right. For now, suffice it to say that the commitment 
to FSD and SSD or the dualism of territorial rights should lead us to prescribe the fulfilment of 
subgroup’s associative duties to political autonomy, given that we both value each citizen’s 
self-realisation and recognise that the constitution of the self is shaped by group identity.  
 
Thus, successful self-realisation/personal autonomy requires the establishment of political 
autonomy in a society and relies on the fulfilment of a subgroup’s associative duties. If SSD is 
not achieved (i.e. the political participation of the subgroup does not allow them to complete 
their associative duties, producing persistent alienation), the members do not have secure 
territorial rights, despite holding citizenship. Their political participation now amounts to a 
rubber stamp in terms of collective decision-making. To address this, political autonomy 
should contain a nonalienation principle, Pna:  
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Insofar as a subgroup G (as a qualified holder of territorial rights) is subjected to the 
political authority of host state, G is entitled to the fulfilment of its SSD/associative 
duties in a non-alienated manner.  
 
If this principle is violated, the subgroup in question is entitled to claim secession. I will argue 
for the following ideas in the rest of the chapter. First, given that most secessionist 
movements are embedded in deep structural injustice, this implies what Catherine Lu calls 
structural and existential alienation, which reveals different degrees of alienation. The 
resolution of such alienation refers to genuine communication, as discussed. Thus, structural 
alienation can be a justified cause of consensual secession entailing the first subprinciple, 
whereas the second subprinciple proposes that existential alienation is sufficient to justify 
unilateral secession. Second, I will propose these subprinciples as positive and negative 
readings of the main principle. This differentiation depends upon the extent of the safeguards 
put in place to secure the non-alienation principle. Positive protection secures the associative 
duties of subgroups with respect for their structural dignity, while negative protection aims 
to preclude the infliction of existential alienation on subgroups.  
 
2. The first subprinciple: Safeguarding social Equality and preventing structural 
Alienation 
 
Here, I shall argue for the first subprinciple, which, based upon the value that it protects, I 
term the structural dignity (sub)principle (henceforth, Psd), which is defined as follows: 
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Psd: Insofar as a subgroup G is subjected to the political authority of host state, it has 
the right to have its structural dignity recognised by its state equally to that of other 
subgroups.  
 
I will begin by explaining how I conceive of justified consensual secession. Why not leave it to 
political negotiation, rather than a theoretical intervention? If secession is consensual, does 
this mean there is no dispute on the matter? First, I conceive justified consensual secession 
as a claim that requires careful deliberation by the government. This process should include, 
secondly, a political response, such as an official, sincere political negotiation with 
secessionists or an independence referendum. That means, thirdly, that a government needs 
to understand under what condition those strategies should be implemented. An appropriate 
response to a claim to consensual secession not only prevents an outbreak of unilateral 
secessionist feeling, but also regulates the behaviour of two sides (i.e. the government and 
secessionists), making it more likely that a political compromise can be reached, taking both 
interests into account. What autonomous scheme or political compromise fits the claim is no 
doubt a matter of political negotiation in each case, yet when a government should consider 
a claim seriously is really a theoretical question.  
 
The argument for the first subprinciple runs as follows: given that a subgroup encounters 
structural alienation, in circumstances where the government is trustworthy and 
constitutional safeguards can be relied on, the claimant, according to the positive reading of 




2.1. The positive reading of the non-alienation principle 
 
The first subprinciple is what I call the positive reading of Pna because every subgroup should 
be able to fulfil their associative duties with the provision of institutional resources. The state 
should hold an impartial and equal attitude to the distribution of identity-related resources 
necessary to sustain fundamental group interests and thereby structural dignity. Violation of 
this activates G’s right to further self-government, including consensual secession as a 
necessary means to compel the state to re-assess and re-negotiate G’s self-determination. 
 
How do we understand structural alienation and structural (in)dignity? According to 
Catherine Lu, structural alienation denotes the circumstance in which social or political 
structures deprive an agent of the power or capacity to achieve self-realisation in the world.2 
It can also be termed the loss of structural dignity, because the social structure fails to respect 
the agent’s structural dignity as an autonomous person. Structural dignity is a ‘fundamental 
prerequisite of a just social structure and an objective component of structural 
reconciliation.’ 3  Moreover, ‘an agent enjoys structural dignity when the social/political 
structures in which the agent is positioned empower her to participate in the making of 
meaning in the social world.’4 Structural alienation and/or indignity is evident in colonisation, 
because colonial rule is designed to exploit the resources, both natural and human, of 
colonies for the sake of metropoles and empires. The structure treats the colonised merely 
as a means to serve the interest of colonisers. The will of the former is dominated by the latter, 
 
2 Catherine Lu, Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 200-1. 
3 Ibid., p.200. 
4 Ibid. 
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from which we know that the structure conceives of the colonised as inferior to the coloniser. 
There is no structural dignity under colonialism for the colonised. 
 
Would a subgroup whose associative duties fail to be recognised by the state suffer from the 
same pathologies of subordination after 1960, when the UN declaration of decolonisation 
(Resolution 1514), was announced, and implemented by many colonisers? The answer is, as 
illustrated in the previous chapter, yes. There are still many subgroups living either in settler 
or decolonised states confronting deep structural injustice. Although there were indeed many 
new states born (representing the independence of colonised) in the postcolonial context, 
and most subgroups in those states have been given the same amount and quality of 
citizenship rights, they may still be outnumbered, forced to incorporate themselves into a 
society neither chosen nor formed by them, and considered less civilised or valuable by the 
ruling class. Kashmir and the Kurdish people are all cases in point. The formal decolonisation 
movement ceased after 1970, which implies that negotiations of the boundary-drawing of 
state territory have been frozen since then. If deep structural injustices have not been 
rectified or improved by the host states, which continue to assimilate and suppress these 
minorities, the structural indignity inflicting on the subgroups undermines their capacity to 
articulate their authentic agency. Recall the analysis in Chapter 3 and the relational account 
of alienation in this chapter. The fulfilment of associative duties is a necessary condition for a 
subgroup’s collective self-determination, while such collective self-determination is 
constitutive of the member’s agency or personal autonomy. It follows that a subgroup failing 
to articulate their authentic actions not only reflects an inability to fulfil their associative 
duties but also undermines the self-realisation of the members. Since this is a necessary 
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condition for the collective and individual agency, the subgroup has the right to demand 
institutional resources to fulfil their duties.  
 
One may wonder how the provision of institutional resources tackles structural alienation. 
Reconciliation, according to Lu, ‘enables the relevant agents to engage in an open-ended, 
meaningful, and respectful struggle for a mutually affirmed social/political order’.5 Such a 
political project is essential and helpful to the alienated because, as illustrated, individuals 
should be provided with social conditions that protect their self-realisation. Provided that 
each individual has a concept of self-realisation, reconciliation should open up social orders 
and make them respectful enough to develop the life projects of the alienated. However, 
genuine communication is also required. Examining, rebuilding and fulfilling the associative 
duties of alienated subgroups necessitates the space for a creative, syncretistic, and pluralistic 
discourse between the subgroup and the host state on the terms and conditions of their self-
determination. The formation of duties or collective agency can only be achieved in a non-
alienated manner, respecting both the basic structure of the external world and the 
subgroup’s self-understanding. However, because the social structure in which the subgroup 
is situated stigmatises their structural dignity, the host state has a duty to re-construct the 
social structure, in a way that is not only equal for every citizen, but also that empowers the 
alienated to rebuild and cultivate their self-understanding. In order to create space for 
genuine communication, impartial and equal distribution of identity-related resources has to 
be undertaken by the state (partial, unequal distribution of such resources normally precedes 
structural alienation). The first subprinciple therefore takes the equal recognition of a 
 
5 Ibid., p.193. 
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subgroup’s structural dignity as the basis of the claim and fair distribution of identity-related 
resources as the reparatory measure, in order to establish genuine communication between 
state and subgroup.  
 
Structural alienation compels political theorists to confront the inadequacy of formal 
recognition of citizenship rights. Alienated subgroups require more effective means to 
amplify their political voice. However, one may question whether we should necessarily take 
secession as a way to restore a subgroup’s structural dignity. Three responses are given below. 
First, when the structural alienation of a subgroup takes place in a society, it often implies 
that the state is not aware of, or rather ignores, the structural injustice inflicted on the 
subgroup. Moreover, the majority of the society may feel that the subgroup has to resolve 
the alienation by themselves, because culture or group identity is a private business in which 
the state should not interfere. This echoes the statist inertia identified in the previous chapter, 
out of which a state seldom remedies alienation willingly via institutional resources. Second, 
the alienated should be entitled to some leverage in terms of self-government against this 
inertia, which surely includes consensual secession. The reason to include such a seemingly 
extreme measure is to raise awareness of the structural indignities suffered by the claimants. 
That being said, a claim to consensual secession implies that the provision of identity-related 
resources should be offered to the subgroup to facilitate genuine communication and remove 
their structural indignity; otherwise, the group is entitled to restore their structural dignity 
for themselves, by establishing a state of their own. This conditional implication, third, shows 
that structural alienation can be rectified without appealing to secession necessarily, and the 
fair distribution of identity-related resource can, in and of itself, compromise the 
independence of the subgroup. However, there is undoubtedly a serious violation of 
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subgroup’s territorial rights by which the fundamental good (i.e. self-realisation) of the 
members is seriously intruded upon. Therefore, we can conclude that, besides different 
degrees of alienation, the reliability of the government or constitution also determines what 
form of secession a claimant might seek. If the state is reliable and committed to remedying 
the alienation, secession is not theoretically necessary. However, subgroups must be 
equipped with the countervailing force (namely consensual secession) necessary to tackle 
statist inertia effectively.  
 
How can we verify the reliability of a government? This is a crucial yet delicate matter. Neera 
Chandhoke proposes that contextualising the right of secession plays a pivotal role in settling 
a claim to secede, because so many important factors, such as the form of government (i.e. 
whether it is democratic or not), the minority rights of other subgroups, and the interests of 
third parties, all complicate the claim. 6  Determining those issues is beyond the work of 
normative theorising and so demands much empirical inquiry. Likewise, whether a 
government is trustworthy depends on the constitution, compliance with the rule of law, 
sincerity in negotiation, and whether the claim is outweighed by more important moral 
considerations. Since structural alienation alone cannot straightforwardly prove that a 
government is unreliable and other (countervailing) moral considerations have to be taken 
into account, a subgroup suffering from structural indignity can at most compel the 
government to re-construct social conditions to allow genuine communication between them 
and the state. As the role of consensual secession is to force the government to address 
 
6 Neera Chandhoke, Contested Secessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 90-124. 
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structural alienation and undertake sincere political negotiation of self-government, I term a 
claim to secede derived from structural alienation to be weak. 
 
However, it should also be noted that the above conditional implication implies certain 
transformative conditions, under which a violation of the promise to self-government might 
be transformed into a justified claim to unilateral secession if structural alienation is not 
addressed, but rather lingers and escalates into existential alienation. For example, (1) if 
promises of self-government made by the host state are repeatedly broken; (2) if such a 
promise is suspended or delayed without good reason; or (3) if inappropriate assimilation 
policies that contradict or inhibit self-government are legislated. These scenarios not only 
undermine the reliability of government but also sabotage the subgroup’s need for self-
realisation to a great extent, each of which will be accounted for in the following sections.  
 
2.2. On the continuum from consensual to unilateral secession 
 
Before moving on to the second subprinciple for unilateral secession, I give an account of a 
normative continuum from consensual to unilateral secession. This implies that the 
distinction between these two is not sharp, but rather a matter of degree, on which the 
consensual approach is justified in virtue of lesser violations of normativity, while the 
unilateral one relies on greater violations.  
 
Many theorists of secession (for example Buchanan and Wellman) focus on the justification 
of unilateral secession. It may seem that, insofar as consensual secession is within the scope 
of states’ political authority, this ‘civilised’ mode of secession does not need much theoretical 
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attention. Yet, such an attitude risks obscuring the whole development of secession: that is, 
how a claim to (justified) unilateral secession is established over time. Although consensual 
secession is partly justified by the consent of parent states, we still need to understand (1) 
what reason for claim to secede deserves the government’s attention; and (2) the criteria for 
granting or withholding consent. These two concerns, as illustrated in the last subsection, will 
be explored on the premise that there is a continuum of normativity from consensual to 
justified unilateral secession. 
 
If some definite grave injustice justifies unilateral secession, consensual secession can be 
proposed when those kinds of injustice occur but are less serious, or when some state 
behaviours are on the borderline of such an injustice. For instance, if a serious violation of 
basic human rights sufficed to justify unilateral secession, consensual secession could 
reasonably be proposed in response to any moderate violation of basic human rights. In other 
words, if unilateral secession is taken to be a remedy for grave injustice, then consensual 
secession might be seen as a remedy for less grave injustice, as argued by remedial right-only 
theorists. For primary right theorists, who advocate that right to secession is not preceded by 
grave injustice or any serious harm, this premise also holds. For example, Wellman argues 
that, out of respect for collective autonomy, any group can initiate unilateral secession 
provided that both states involved can sustain the requisite political functions. So, the only 
condition to prevent unilateral secession is when either state fails to maintain its political 
functions. Even if this occurs, secession could still be achieved if both sides were willing to 
cooperate to address the dysfunction. For example, if the seceding state struggles to obtain 
clean water, the two sides might negotiate an agreement according to which they both accept 
a duty to keep water clean, free-flowing and accessible. This reasoning for consensual 
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secession derives from justified unilateral secession. If unilateral secession should be granted 
due to respect for collective autonomy and the fulfilment of requisite political functions, 
consensual secession should also be given due consideration by devising a way of meeting 
the functional requirement. Once the settlement is found, government consent should be 
given. Primary right theorists also accept a normative continuum from consensual to 
unilateral secession. 
 
As illustrated, both camps of theorists should accept the presumption of a normative 
continuum of justified secession. My principles for justified secession also concur with the 
thesis of a normative continuum, as it starts from the main principle rooted in persistent 
alienation and the fulfilment of the SSD/associative duties of subgroups. Such normativity 
further entails two subprinciples, depending upon different degrees of persistent alienation. 
Consensual secession is based upon (less harmful) persistent structural alienation, while 
unilateral secession is based upon more serious, long-term existential alienation.  
 
3. The second subprinciple: Resistance to existential alienation 
 
One of the proper remedies for persistent alienation, as I proposed in the preceding section, 
is a claim to consensual secession as the instrumental and yet necessary leverage to force the 
government to undertake fairer provision of identity-related resources, enlarge the victim’s 
self-government and rectify their structural alienation, provided that the alienation is not too 
severe. Yet if alienation is not addressed, the transformative conditions will undermine the 
credibility of government and thus elevate the original claim to one of unilateral secession. I 
shall show why the claim has to be transformed, or what justifies a claim to unilateral 
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secession when structural alienation deteriorates. This is the negative reading of the main 
principle, because it pertains to greater or long-term persistent alienation, which is the 
foundation of the main principle. I will start with a definition of this negative reading, and 
then go on to further distinguish the value of non-alienation from non-domination, arguing 
for the former as the core normative basis of justified secession (although my principles also 
have the effect of non-domination). Such an argument will be illustrated with reference to 




3.1. The Negative Reading of the Non-Alienation Principle 
 
Call the second (subprinciple) the principle of resistance to existential alienation (henceforth, 
Prea), relating to justified unilateral secession and denoting a more serious violation of the 
non-alienation principle. It is defined as below: 
 
Prea: Insofar as a subgroup G is subjected to the political authority of host state, G is 
entitled to the right not to suffer from existential alienation.  
 
The right implies not only G’s right to further self-government but also self-preservation. If 
the principle is violated, G is entitled to secure self-preservation through any means G sees 
fit that is consistent with general moral duties such as respect for human rights. Such means 
no doubt include unilateral secession. As such, there are two key issues. First, why is 
existential alienation tantamount to a harm to self-preservation? Second, how does 
existential alienation connect to the transformative conditions? 
 
To address the first concern, let us look at the definition of existential alienation as ‘an agent’s 
anxiety and uncertainty about what constitutes authentic agency’.7 Given that the idea of 
authenticity has been explained in terms of self-realisation in the first section, it further refers 
to ‘a condition precipitated by the disruption and collapse of social and moral frames by which 
agents were socialised and engaged in the activity of self-realisation’.8 Yet how or why would 
the agent become anxious about  self-realisation? Following Kok-Chor Tan’s research on a 
 
7 Lu (2017), 184. 
8 Ibid. 
 181 
particular colonial experience, the problem creates an effect called double alienation, in 
which an agent is deficient in the identity-related resources necessary to establish a mutually 
just and cooperative relation with others: self-understanding and secure social conditions.9 
In other words, double or existential alienation articulates the social pathology with which an 
agent’s self-realisation is not only disturbed and stigmatised by the social structure, but also 
entrenched in a loop of self-doubt or self-deprecation.  
 
Structural indignity is likely to produce an existential crisis in areas where colonisation 
prevailed for long periods. Colonialism demands what Pratap Bhanu Mehta calls a deferral of 
recognition: ‘if you don’t recognise the merit that Empire preaches or are considered 
incapable of it, you are unworthy; if you do recognise the empire’s excellence and use the 
colonisers’ vocabulary, you are a usurper’.10 Insofar as they have endured colonial discipline 
all their lives, the colonised is exposed to double alienation, being both estranged from their 
(authentic) agency and trapped in the dilemma:  
 
to assert a difference from the normative hierarchies that imperial powers created 
was to confirm the very thing the coloniser thought about you; [but] to assimilate to 
those demands and fashion yourself in accordance with them was to grant him the 
ultimate victory.11  
 
 
9 Kok-Chor Tan, “Colonialism, reparations and global justice,” in Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries, J. Miller 
and R. Kumar, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 283. 
10 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “After colonialism: the impossibility of self-determination,” in Colonialism and Its 
Legacies, Jacob T. Levy and Iris Marion Young, eds. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011) 
11 Ibid. 
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Eroded by colonisation, the ‘native’ has either lost the traditions necessary to restore their 
lifestyle, or faces a society whose form is alien to them, and in which they have no appropriate 
role. The colonised thus refuse what they are, fall short of being what they were, and puzzle 
what they ought to be next. So understood, double alienation is in fact self-alienation in which 
the agent, by definition, lacks the necessary resources, social and mental, for successful self-
articulation. Double alienation makes the agent fail to recognise its action as its own. 
 
Is the problem of existential alienation likely to re-occur in the postcolonial world? 
Undoubtedly, the answer is yes. Recalled that structural alienation occurred even after the 
decolonisation movement in 1970s, because new states may still impose unequal social 
structures on the subgroups within their territories. Thus, colonialism persists in the 
postcolonial era, even though the coloniser is no longer foreign, but local and native. 
Structural alienation is by no means exclusive to the Western Colonial Era. Whenever the 
ruling class aligns with the ‘imperial’ attitude, the targeted subgroup confronts structural 
indignity, under which they fall into the dilemma described above, deciding either to 
assimilate into the majority group, or to accept the status of second-class citizens. In other 
words, the victim does not necessarily relate to any colonial history. What truly matters is 
whether the ruling reflects the form of colonisation. Moreover, many structurally alienated 
populations were victims of colonisation, which means that they are all facing ‘internal’ 
colonisation in the form of the wounds of ‘old’ colonialism, despite the decolonisation 
movement. The Rohingya in Myanmar, the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the people in Hong Kong and 
most indigenous peoples around the world all represent this problematic social pathology. 
On the one hand, the social structure obstructs or interferes in what they hope to achieve; on 
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the other, their capacity to achieve self-recognition and understand what they value, is 
deteriorating.  
 
‘Aphasia’ is a term I adapt from its clinical usage to describe the damage of existential 
alienation. A society deprives a victim of their capacity for self-realisation just like the brain 
damage inflicted on the sufferer of aphasia. The victim is not merely forced to be a means to 
another end, but also cannot explore or actualise the meaning of their existence. Self-
preservation should take this damage into account because such a being is, in many ways, not 
human anymore. The state therefore has a duty to create a secure environment (i.e. a genuine 
communication) to protect its citizens against existential alienation. 
 
3.2. Existential alienation as a precaution to prevent grave injustice 
 
When existential alienation has already taken place, the state or government cannot be 
considered reliable, as this state of affairs reflects not just the state’s failure to secure its 
territorial rights but also the long-term contempt it has for the subgroup. The alienated may 
consider a riot or violent protest to release the social pressure and express their anger and 
despair. Thus, the structural alienation of the victim has been long-ignored, and/or the host 
state may have attempted to resolve the problem via assimilation or antagonistic policies. 
That is the reason to propose the aforementioned conditions, under which a claim to 
consensual secession could become a claim to unilateral secession by virtue of existential 
alienation. To avoid the damage of existential alienation, every group subjected to state 
coercion should have ‘the right not to suffer from existential alienation’. Such a right also 
reveals the foundation of the nonalienation principle: once a subgroup is subjected to a 
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particular state, the group shows its commitment to the FSD of the state (i.e. its political 
autonomy); in return, the state has a duty to protect them from existential alienation.  
 
If the second subprinciple is violated, any claim from a subgroup to unilateral secession is 
then justified (provided the secession will not cause injustice to others) because their self-
preservation is in danger and the subgroup has the right to remedy their existential crisis by 
the means they see fit. Yet controversy may arise if an intra-state autonomous arrangement 
seemed possible. Would we allow the claimant to exercise their own discretion or should that 
arrangement have priority? As illustrated, I argue that the claimant is entitled to act as they 
see fit, provided the claim would not inflict injustice on others. This is because, firstly, as 
illustrated in my dualistic account of territorial rights (and as argued by Stilz), the state has no 
justification other than justice to coerce its subjects. Given the claimant holds territorial rights 
as well, the state’s prioritisation of intra-state autonomy is baseless. Second, existential 
alienation is empirical evidence of the state’s lack of responsibility, and disdain for the moral 
status of the claimant. Provided that the existential alienation is a result of repeated failures 
to rectify structural alienation over time, it is rational for the claimant to distrust its parent 
state and other citizens. For, before the alienation became existential, the state had plenty of 
time to correct the structural flaws in society, as did other citizens. As the whole society has 
ignored the wrong over time, it is reasonable to question the sincerity of any suggested 
arrangement of intra-state autonomy put forward by the parent state. Furthermore, because 
mutual trust between the alienated and the host state or majority has broken down, it is 
reasonable to claim that prioritising intra-state autonomy creates social instability. 
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If existential alienation can be evidence of the state’s and other citizens’ ignorance, moral 
bias and inertia, the alienated subgroup has sufficient reason to worry that remaining as they 
are will lead to grave injustices such as discrimination, inadequate assimilation, or even ethnic 
cleansing. Violent protest may also be foreseeable, bursting out from the subgroup in a 
moment of frustration. I propose, then, to justify unilateral secession with the following ideas:  
 
a) A strong claim to secede is created by a serious violation of human rights, or of the 
non-alienation principle (i.e. the second subprinciple is violated). 
b) Persistent/Existential alienation accounts for one of Buchanan’s conditions of 
justified unilateral secession, namely states’ persistent, serious, and unprovoked 
violations of intrastate autonomy agreement.12  
c) Existential alienation could be taken as a warning of imminent human rights 
violations. This causality provides the preventative condition of unilateral 
secession in addition to Buchanan’s injustice account: in order to avoid grave 
injustice, existential alienation is a sufficient justification for secession, provided 
this will not cause injustice to others.  
 
3.3. Non-alienation and non-domination 
 
Thus, persistent alienation can be a sign of a government or society that has acted towards 
grave injustice given that existential alienation normally produces mistrust and a hotbed of 
potential conflict. Apart from the connection to (in)justice, the ideal also reflects non-
 
12 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 351-
52. 
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domination because, by the same token, it can be said that the state should not impose 
arbitrary domination on any group. However, I shall argue for non-alienation as the value that 
justified secession secures. 
 
At first glance, my nonalienation principle appears to overlap with non-domination because 
the principle envisages the power structure of political authority being necessary to resist 
domination by another group. As defined by Philip Pettit, the dominating can arbitrarily 
interfere with the choices of the dominated, at will and with impunity.13 Informed by studies 
of colonialism, my nonalienation principle prevents any institutional scheme similar to 
colonisation happening in the contemporary era and so requires that we reform social 
conditions, so that no group can impose its will on others arbitrarily. In other words, the 
power structure of the ruling class should recognise the ideal of non-domination alongside a 
commitment to genuine communication. That is to say, secondly, the value of my principle of 
nonalienation balances negative and positive freedoms. On the one hand, it provides a secure 
environment for the exercise of positive freedom; on the other, it offers something stronger 
than negative freedom, allowing some justified forms of interference, viz. those demanded 
by virtue of basic justice and respect for each subject’s personal autonomy. Thirdly, since 
freedom as non-domination focuses on social power relations and equality, it corresponds to 
the ideal of social equality shared by my principle, i.e. our political projects should treat every 
subject as a free equal.  
 
 
13 Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 58-59. 
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However, four issues make the violation of the ideal of non-domination fall short of being a 
fundamental reason for justified secession, and suggest the violation of non-alienation as a 
better fit. Firstly, as noted by Fabian Schuppert, social equality is characterised by two forms 
of social relation: intersubjective, which pertains to how people treat each other (say social 
hierarchies between different classes) and reflexive, which refers to how a person perceives 
themselves (i.e. whether they have self-respect or feel inferior to others). 14  Since non-
domination mainly concerns how to restrain the abuse of power amongst agents, it pays little 
attention to reflexive social equality. Secondly, Sharon Krause has pointed out that theories 
of non-domination easily dismiss unintentional social suppression (say racism or sexism) 
because the idea, conceptually speaking, captures mainly the capacity for arbitrary 
interference, meaning a ‘conscious’ capacity for control.15 Recall the paradigm case in which 
a master holds domination over its slave. This refers to the power relation, which the master 
can utilise and manipulate at will. This case stresses the intentionality of the dominating, 
aiming to identify the potential power structure that the master is aware of, but chooses not 
to exercise. Nevertheless, social inequality may still take place when both sides subscribe to 
certain implicit social biases or discriminatory ideas, with the consequence that the 
dominating party and the dominated alike do not recognise the domination. For instance, a 
husband and his wife may share a biased conception of the role of women and so the wife’s 
freedom is jeopardised not only by the domination of her husband, but by broader 
discriminatory social conventions, including conventions that she herself upholds and 
subscribes to. Non-domination theories usually struggle to identify the underlying causes of 
 
14 Fabian Schuppert, “Non-domination, non-alienation and social equality: towards a republican understanding 
of equality,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18, No. 4, (2015): 440-455, 444-45. 
15 Sharon Krause, “Beyond non-domination: Agency, inequality and the meaning of freedom,” Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 39, No. 2, (2013): 187–208. 
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social inequality because they need to think beyond what the dominating party can do 
deliberately. Thus, thirdly, the nature of social (in)equality is too complex to be captured by 
non-domination. The harm of social inequality can be reflexive and refers also to certain 
subconscious and unintentional social norms, both of which suggest that unpacking inequality 
often demands an intersectional approach, and that resolution should go beyond 
legal/political reform. In other words, non-domination theorists struggle to define arbitrary 
interference16  and the complex nature of social inequality exacerbates such a difficulty. 
Therefore, non-domination alone is insufficient to protect social equality.  
 
Finally, my nonalienation principle not only reflects what non-domination attempts to protect 
but also deepens this thought by identifying the core rationale behind territorial rights i.e. 
regarding land or territory as a meaningful tool for self-realisation. Territory is morally 
necessary not merely because it is an incarnation of the state, but also part of our self-
realisation. According to the relational account of alienation, our selves are meant to be 
actualised only if they are involved in articulating what we conceive of ourselves and the 
external world. Such understanding of territorial rights undoubtedly concerns whether an 
agent can utilize the land on which they live to manifest their life projects, because our lives 
can only be carried out as we wish in certain places. This not only implies the land utilisation 
one relies on (say, nomadic or sedentary; agriculture or business), but also the mechanisms 
determining those lifestyles. As illustrated, an individual life project is conditioned by the 
 
16 Arguing for a proper definition of arbitrariness is always a difficulty in theorising non-domination as a political 
ideal. Simply put, the ideal may collapse into triviality without a satisfactory account because we cannot remove 
all factors contributing to the imbalance of power, such as differences in talent or physicality; as such, the 
theory has to articulate on what basis some factors constitute unbalanced power relations and yet do not 
violate non-domination. Since the causes of social inequality are complex and intersectional, it no doubt 
complicates this task.   
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development of the group to which one is attached, while such development depends, to a 
great extent, on how much institutional resource it can obtain. Thus, non-domination plays a 
key role in the distribution of institutional resources. Yet, this only tells half of the story of 
territorial rights. What is crucial here is not merely who carries out the entitlement, but what 
entitlement is articulated and how. Non-alienation is, therefore, more relevant than non-
domination because it captures the dynamics of autonomy or authenticity essential for self-
realisation. Territorial rights as a concept are philosophically and politically necessary: every 
subject is treated freely and equally, possesses sufficient capacity to form and recognise what 
life project they envisage and accordingly, political/legal entitlements might be created in 
order to support self-realisation. Non-domination plays an important role in this process and 
yet it is nonalienation that shapes the reason for non-domination (i.e. self-realisation). A 
justified claim to secede should be based upon the violation of the nonalienation principle; 
for the claimant suffering persistent alienation fails to articulate their life project in the state 
or territory alleged to be ‘theirs’. For the alienated, territorial rights, in this case, would cease 
to play the functional role implied by their philosophical foundation, making them feel 
homeless in the host state. Given that the state has trapped the claimant in this situation, 
secession should be the way out.  
 
To illustrate the argument, I would like to make a contrast between Hong Kong and mainland 
China. Scholars familiar with the multinational nature of China may agree that the majority 
Han people dominate Chinese society in nearly all aspects. The Chinese regime is 
authoritarian and fully controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. By contrast, although the 
political system in Hong Kong cannot be termed as fully democratic, it is more so than on the 
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mainland.17 That is to say, compared to Hong Kong, the social conditions in the mainland are 
further from the ideal of non-domination and perhaps one may draw on this to conclude that 
self-determination or territorial rights are better protected in Hong Kong. However, according 
to recent economic data and opinion polls, most people on the mainland feel positive about 
their society, while the Hongkongers not only feel the least confidence about the prospects 
for Hong Kong over the past five years, but also have the greatest distrust in the central 
(Beijing) government and the Hong Kong Special Administration government.18 It seems that 
the government in the mainland, although it dominates the people in many ways, governed 
according to the policies corresponding to their second-order values about society, whereas 
the Hong Kong government frustrates its citizens by failing to meet their expectations.  
 
The rationale behind the 2019 protests (which have lasted more than four months) also 
cannot be exhausted by the idea of non-domination. The underlying cause of the protest 
reflects my argument for the nonalienation principle, which should be a criterion for self-
determination or justified secession. The reasons go as follow. First, recall Pna proposes that 
a subgroup subjected to the political authority of host state is entitled to the fulfilment of its 
associative duties in a non-alienated manner. I shall assume that the Hong Kong people 
satisfies the account of self-determining people defined by a common political or group 
identity, a common political cooperative history and sufficient capacity to form a government. 
 
17 At the time of writing, Hongkongers still have not had a general election either on selecting the Chief 
Executive or the members of the Legislative Council. For more details, please refer to the Basic Law, Annex	I and 
Annex II, https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf. 
18 The proposition is derived from the recent CCI (consumer confidence index) and Gini coefficient in those 
regions. The social conditions on the mainland China are complicated: one might hear different views from 
people in Tibet or Xinjiang. So, it might be more precise to refer to the contrast between the Hongkonger and 
the ethnic Han in mainland China. See also the opinion poll of the Hong Kong people: 
https://www.pori.hk/charttempinternalusage2.  
 191 
So what matters here is whether their fulfilment of associative duties is justified and yet 
confronts persistent alienation. Second, the associative duty in question refers to the claim 
to restore their political rights (i.e. universal suffrage for electing the Chief Executive and 
forming the Legislative Council, henceforth ‘the double general election’); and the 
expectation of such a claim to the double general election is evidently legitimate because it 
does not violate basic justice and personal autonomy. This understanding can be seen not 
only in the mass media or opinion poll, but also supported by the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, particularly Articles 45 and 68. The Declaration is an 
international treaty signed between the Chinese and British government in 1984, according 
to which Hong Kong shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy despite being subject to the 
sovereignty of the People Republic of China.19 In Article 45, on the method of selecting the 
Chief Executive of Hong Kong, it is specified that the ultimate goal is the selection ‘by universal 
suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance 
with democratic procedures’. 20  Article 68, which articulates how the Legislative Council 
should be formed, also set out the same ultimate goal.21 
 
However, thirdly, the central Beijing government has interfered in the political participation 
of the Hong Kong people (i.e. the pursuit of the ultimate goal) on many occasions and thereby 
makes the people feel strongly alienated from the government. In other words, the people of 
Hong Kong has experienced persistent alienation even though they exercise political rights 
 
19 ‘Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,’ Sino-British Joint Declaration, 
Google, accessed 06 November 2019, https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm.  
20 ‘The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,’ the Hong 




(such as the freedom of association and some limited rights to vote). The first attempt at 
interference took place in 2004 when the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (in Beijing), which holds the highest power in legislative and judiciary, ‘actively’ filed 
the judicial interpretation on the method of selecting the Chief Executive of Hong Kong and 
the members in the legislative council. This is because, according to the Basic Law, the Hong 
Kong people would have an opportunity to transform the political system into full democracy 
(i.e. the double general election) after 2007. And the Hong Kong government have the duty, 
according to the Basic Law, to draft a political reform bill corresponding to that demand. Yet 
while the bill was still under negotiation in the Hong Kong government, the central 
government filed the constitutional interpretation prior to the legislation made by the Hong 
Kong government. Despite the criticism that the Congress’s attempt violates the principle of 
judicial restraint, the Congress has further shaped the electoral system in Hong Kong by 
imposing many constraints on the right to universal suffrage. In 2014, the Beijing Congress 
furthermore denied the petition for the double general election, which might have occurred 
in Hong Kong in 2017. In 2016, the Congress filed another active judicial interpretation 
disqualifying four legislators due to their controversial behaviour against the Beijing 
government. Again, this interpretation was made when the Hong Kong court was still dealing 
the case. Such a series of violation of Hong Kong’s political autonomy finally made the 
Umbrella Movement burst out in late 2016. Unfortunately, the Congress did not withdraw 
the decision and the Hong Kong government chose to side with the central government. This 
dissatisfaction with the government, therefore, has not been addressed properly and yet 
accumulated until 2019. That is, a more aggressive and larger scale of protest happened in 
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2019 when the Hong Kong government wanted to deliver the extradition bill22 sabotaging the 
judicial autonomy of Hong Kong. This move, I believe, has further agitated the people because 
the infringement of Hong Kong autonomy now extends from the executive and legislative 
powers to the judicial one, undermining judicial independence.  
 
Finally, we should assess whether the Hong Kong or Beijing governments have justified 
reasons to oppose the fulfilment of the Hongkongers’ associative duty. In fact, there is little 
basis for such a claim. First, it is hardly credible that the claim to the double general election 
would have cause any violation of basic justice or personal autonomy for any individual. 
Second, the Congress insists that, according to the Article 43, either the Chief Executive or the 
Legislative Council should be ‘accountable’ to both the Central People’s Government and the 
Hong Kong people. Given that the double general election in the foreseeable future has great 
potential to select the officials drafting policies against the central government, they argue 
that such interference is justified to rectify such ‘partial’ accountability. This argument, 
though based upon the law, is essentially a political or partisan consideration. For the 
argument not only narrows the idea of accountability down to preference accountability23, 
but also resolves one bias by supporting another one, namely by electing a pro-Beijing 
government. The ideology of the current Hong Kong government is clearly pro-Beijing, which 
can be seen in how they passively react to the largest scale of protest in the last decade. The 
government ignores and refuses to recognize the associative duty of Hong Kong people (i.e. 
 
22 The bill is devised to regulate the arrangements for mutual legal assistance between Hong Kong and Taiwan/ 
Mainland China/Macau. It also contains a mechanism for transfers of fugitives between those areas.   
23 I define preference accountability as the kind of accountability that the representative should be responsible 
for the people of its constituent. This idea, however, is controversial as a constituent seldom holds unanimous 
preferences on all issues. Moreover, this account should not be the whole picture of the idea, because we also 
care or even agree that sometimes our representatives are allowed to pursue the greatest welfare of society at 
the expense of the benefits of some constituents.   
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the expectation of the double general election) constantly; and furthermore, echoes the 
propaganda of the Beijing government accusing the protesters of being villains and 
separatists. Therefore, given that the Hong Kong people continue their political participation 
and yet the government refuses, wrongfully, to provide sufficient institutional resource for 
the fulfilment of their associative duty, we should conclude that what the Hong Kong people 
suffer is not just domination but also persistent alienation.  
 
I do not argue that the current social conflict can justify a claim for Hong Kong to secede. 
Sovereign independence is always the least popular proposal to resolve the Hong Kong issue 
in the opinion polls, even though recent data shows a gradual increase in support for this 
option. It seems, however, that the political structures currently in place in Hong Kong have 
not responded effectively to rapid changes in social inequality or social relations with the 
mainlanders. Moreover, despite the fact that Hongkongers have freedom of speech, 
association and demonstration, the government can simply ignore their views, as the people’s 
political participation is limited and cannot impact upon (for example) the constitution of the 
legislative council or executive power. Although there are suggestions that the will of the 
ordinary people is influenced by political and business elites, or even the Beijing government, 
what initiates and prolongs the protest is a feeling of hopelessness among Hongkongers. Their 
limited political participation is meaningless, undermining the self-realisation of the Hong 
Kong majority and threatening younger Hongkongers with future long-term alienation. Below 
are the words of a student protester, explaining to his university chancellor why the 
protesters are so determined to go against the government. 
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During the protest, I’ve been asking myself: what is the warrior’s bravery?24 […] 
Bravery is something innate, the virtue to do anything that most people dare not do. 
The thing everyone can do without hesitation is not bravery. It also means 
overcoming fear. [A] warrior represents action, which is expressive [of what one 
believes]. It by no means refers to the use of force, a narrow definition so to speak. 
The warrior’s bravery is rather to overcome the fear and put the beliefs into action.  
 
The biggest concern about the protest is why we, the students, keep standing in the 
front line regardless of the violence [we experience] from the state apparatus. [We 
are doing this] ‘out of love’ is my answer. Particularly, it is the love for our 
neighbours and for Hong Kong, of course.  
 
This love motivates a great number of the students and Hongkongers to overcome the 
fear and act on what they value. Everyone in the protest reflects the warrior’s bravery. 
So do you, Chancellor.   
 
This is what we call the warrior’s bravery. It is neither taking sides in partisanship nor 
a sign of force. It is expressive of love.25 
 
 
24 The student asked the chancellor to think about why he and many other students have to arm themselves for 
the protest. He pointed out that the equipment they carry and the outfits they wear are expressions of fear. 





The protest has been triggered by love for the place and the community. This sentiment forms 






In this chapter, I have inquired into what normative principles a claim to secede should follow, 
which, as pointed out in the beginning of the chapter, aims to articulate the dynamic of 
justified secession, as distinct from the right to secede (discussed in the next chapter). Based 
upon the dualistic account of territorial rights in the previous chapter, I proposed the non-
alienation principle as the fundamental, because a state’s FSD has to incorporate SSD without 
creating persistent alienation. In other words, a state derives territorial rights (including those 
of subgroups) when all of its subjects and subgroups can achieve political autonomy or self-
realisation without persistent alienation. However, persistent alienation is still some way 
short of justifying secession. The inquiry hence proceeded with two strands of investigation.  
 
First, I deepened the idea of persistent alienation, exploring what account of alienation my 
principle should subscribe to and the foundation of Stilz’s proposal for political autonomy. 
The ideal of nonalienation advocates protecting our pursuit of self-realisation manifesting the 
importance of personal autonomy and positive freedom. As this particular conception of 
autonomy must be carried out in certain form of society which recognises people’s right to 
self-realisation and so provides sufficient institutional resources for that recognition, we can 
reasonably assume the analogy between the conditions for personal autonomy and the ones 
for political autonomy. That is, political autonomy is derived because the state creates a 
secure social environment that allows most people to achieve self-realisation through 
political participation. Nevertheless, such an ideal relies upon the fulfilment of the collective 
autonomy of certain subgroups. I thus derive the main principle for justified secession:  
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Insofar as a subgroup G (as a qualified holder of territorial rights) is subjected to the 
political authority of a host state, G is entitled to the fulfilment of its SSD/associative 
duties in a non-alienated manner by the provision of institutional resources. 
 
Second, I developed this main principle in accord with two different degrees of violation or 
persistent alienation. Structural alienation, the weaker form, is inflicted on a subgroup when 
the social structure to which it is subjected treats their group identity or associative duties 
with contempt. This social pathology entails a positive reading of the nonalienation principle, 
namely the first subprinciple for justified consensual secession aiming to protect social 
equality. Hence, genuine communication between the victim and the host state should 
address the problem, which includes a claim to consensual secession as leverage. However, if 
the problem worsened to the point where the transformative conditions are satisfied, 
structural alienation becomes existential alienation, and justifies the alienated subgroup in 
proposing unilateral secession, because such violation of self-realisation endangers their self-
preservation. This denotes the negative reading and foundation of the nonalienation principle. 
Let me summarise this below. 
 
The first subprinciple for consensual secession: 
1. is defined as ‘Insofar as a subgroup G is subjected to the political authority of host 
state, it has the right to have its structural dignity recognised by its state equally’; 
2. entails weak claims to secede (which aims to enlarge the authority of self-government 
due to the occurrence of structural alienation), because the problem of structural 
alienation may be solved more satisfactorily by intra-state autonomous arrangements 
when taking other considerations into account (e.g. national diversity in the claimed 
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land, the State Viability Proviso or the interests of third parties); and the problem is 
not caused by serious violations of basic human rights or political autonomy; 
3. demands genuine communication with central government or the majority of society 
as the promotion of social equality; and 
4. warrants a promise from the parent state to satisfy self-government, where breaking 
this promise might transform the weak claim into a strong claim.  
 
The argument for a normative continuum from consensual to unilateral secession offers us 
the criteria of transformation from a weak to a strong claim, because long-term structural 
alienation has escalated to existential alienation, referring to a continuous violation of 
equality and freedom. The conditions of the transformation are as follows: 
1. if a promise of self-government made by the host state is repeatedly broken; 
2. if such a promise is suspended or delayed without good reason; and 
3. if inappropriate assimilation policies are legislated, despite the claim being granted. 
 
The second subprinciple for unilateral secession: 
1. is defined as ‘Insofar as a subgroup G is subjected to the political authority of host 
state, G is entitled to the right not to suffer from existential alienation;’ 
2. entails strong claim(s) to secede conditioned by incidents of grave injustice and the 
preventive clause: in order to avoid grave injustice, resistance to existential alienation 
is sufficient to justify secession, provided this will not cause injustice to others;   
3. is a strong claim because, given the host state is unreliable, the problem of claimants’ 
serious infringement of self-realisation) can only be resolved by secession; and 
 200 
4. implies that in a secessionist context, serious violations of basic human rights should 
be taken as a consequence of serious violations of persistent alienation.  
 
Finally, I concluded that my non-alienation principle, although it overlaps with the ideal of 
non-domination, is distinct from both justice and non-domination. Non-alienation is different 
from justice conceptually because (for example) grave injustice amounts to a violation of basic 
human rights, while my principles is envisaged to protect a territorial subgroup’s collective 
autonomy because such protection secures the goods for self-realisation. Nevertheless, a 
serious violation of my principles should be a warning that grave injustice is imminent in a 
society. In addition, the ideal of non-alienation adheres to the value of non-domination, but 
better captures the dynamic of justified secession. My principles share the ideal of non-
domination, proposing to create a social environment in which subjects should not dominate 
each other without just cause. However, if non-domination aims to protect social equality as 
my principles do, it cannot apprehend some intricate source of inequality independent from 
conscious controls. Non-alienation plays a better role not only because it can capture the 
complexity of social equality but also articulate that political territory should be a meaningful 









Chapter 6: The Right to Secede and its Legal Implications 
 
0. Preface  
 
I argued in the previous chapter that we shall gain a new understanding of the right to secede 
once we identify the normative dynamic behind justified secession. I also showed that the 
difficulty of theorizing the right to secede in the early literature, apart from the 
methodological dispute, is due to the lack of a satisfactory account of territorial rights. Since 
these prerequisites for the right to secede have already been articulated, this chapter will 
now revisit what the right should be (i.e. primary or remedial only). After illustrating 
justification of the right, I shall sketch what potential legal implications such an understanding 
of the right implies for the practices of constitutions and international law. I will argue for the 
following conclusions:  
(1) the right of secession should be redefined as the right of a subgroup to have an 
equal moral/legal standing when re-negotiating terms and conditions (for the 
protection of territorial rights) with the host state or any relevant agent. It thus 
consists in the remedial right to claim secession, the primary right to constitutional 
reform, and the primary right to erect a just global authority jointly with the extant, 
recognised states; 
(2) in order to legitimate the revised right in terms of achieving its remedial and 
primary functions, it must be understood as a group right that satisfies both the 
collective and corporate accounts and corresponds to Moore’s notion of a self-
determining people; 
 203 
(3) the right is grounded in two further fundamental and distinct rights: the right to 
exist, which secures basic justice; and the right to resist, based upon the 
protection of collective autonomy; 
(4) the right is justified permissively, which means that we should treat secession as 
the remedy for grave injustice or persistent alienation if and only if it confers 
simultaneously the primary right to constitutional reform and to form a global 
authority on the right-holder; that is, domestically, the right is both remedial and 
primary, in that persistent alienation or grave injustice should precede a claim to 
secede. And yet constitutional reform can be claimed without any violation of 
primary rights; internationally, the right is primary because it has the same moral 
standing as the state in facilitating and upholding (as an international member 
independent from its host state) the establishment of global authority.  
 
In other words, the revised right of secession protects the territorial rights of subgroups by 
entrusting their rights to a temporary, contingent, less inclusive omnilateral will (i.e. the 
current states) for vindicating a claim to secede, while also participating in forging a 
permanent, global omnilateral will for rectifying the former (i.e. the general will claimed by 
the extant states) whenever it appears partial or unjust. Based upon this account of the right, 
I shall further propose that,  
(5) the morality of the right to secede forbids states from legislating anti-secession 
laws or codifying such clauses in constitutions, as well as providing sufficient 
reason to constitutionalise the right; 
(6) international law should endeavour to erect a just global authority as an impartial 
arbiter able to settle territorial conflicts. Furthermore, it should integrate the two 
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pivotal principles or normative ideas into the following relation: territorial 
integrity can only be endorsed only if self-determination is achieved.  
 
The chapter is divided as follows. Section 1 explains the first proposition (the redefinition of 
the right to secede). Section 2 illustrates the second proposition, namely the characteristics 
of the right-holder. In the third section, I will argue for the alleged provisional justification of 
the right comprised of the proposition (3) & (4). The propositions (5) & (6) will be sketched in 
the final section.  
 
1. Redefining the right to secede 
 
I shall reframe the right of secession as the right to have an equal moral standing with the 
state in renegotiating terms and conditions for (the protection of) territorial rights with the 
host state or relevant agents. In other words, it is the right to become a state. By moral 
standing, I draw upon Ori J. Herstein’s account, which argues that it suffices for an agent to 
deflect ‘directives regardless of validity (whether or not a directive succeeds in giving a 
directive-reason) or the normative weight of the rejected directive’.1 The right to secede, 
 
1 Ori J. Herstein, “Understanding standing: permission to deflect reasons,” Philosophical Studies 174 (2017): 
3109-3132. He delineates the idea of deflection in terms of exclusionary permission. First, exclusionary 
permission is a kind of Razian exclusionary norm, which is a second-order norm providing second-order reasons 
overriding some first order reasons. The notion of first-order reasons is the initial reason for or against certain 
decision or action. They are often related to our personal beliefs or preferences. For instance, I like watching 
football matches instead of athletics. A second-order reason, nevertheless, has the effect of excluding some 
first-order reason when it is valid. For example, I firstly promised my best friend to watch the Olympic athletics 
game with him. Yet one hour later I found out there was a football match held at the same time. If I had known 
that information sooner, I would not have promised my friend’s invitation to watch the Olympic game with him. 
However, due to the promise, I had to refrain myself from, perhaps, going to a pub and watch that football 
match. In this case, my promise to my friend plays the role of second-order reason excludes or outweighs my 
first-order reasoning, that is, I prefer watching football than athletics. Back to the idea of deflection, it means 
that one is permitted to exclude or deflect the prescription of some first-order reasons when some second-
order reasons (e.g. moral standing) are shown and valid. For a detailed explanation of Razian exclusionary norm, 
see Joseph Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 39-40.  
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therefore, endows the right-holder with moral standing in deflecting arbitrary (external) 
intervention in their exercise of territorial rights, even in the event that such exercise does 
not correspond to principles of justice. For instance, if justice requires legislation permitting 
gay marriage, the moral standing of a state (or claimant to secession) legitimates the state in 
rejecting gay marriage without interference if it decides to do so.  
 
Redefined as such, the right entitles the right-holder to secure their moral standing in terms 
of territorial rights by being freed from arbitrary interference. It departs from the traditional 
considerations, asking under what condition secession (as a particular political demand) can 
be justified. Instead, it is the right to a moral standing that can be rightfully secured by 
secession, which consists of two main elements: what moral standing is at issue and how 
secession protects that moral standing (concerns addressed in the preceding two chapters). 
That is, it is the moral standing of subgroups’ territorial rights that secession should protect 
when the principles for justified secession are violated. Moreover, in order to make the 
protection effective, the right is comprised of the following: (1) the remedial right to claim 
secession (following my principles for justified secession); (2) the primary right to 
constitutional reform (which includes legislation of how secession should be conducted); and 
(3) the primary right to jointly form a just global authority as an international member 
independent of the host state. That is to say, firstly, if the principles outlined in Chapter 5 are 
violated, a subgroup is entitled to propose secession as a remedy; secondly, subgroups have 
a primary claim to improve their territorial rights, including legislation referring to when and 
how the government should embark on negotiating secession; thirdly, given that such a 
negotiation with the host state should be sincere and genuine (involving an impartial third 
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party), a subgroup can override its host state to join a global authority as an autonomous 
international member. In what follows I shall provide the reasons for such a revision.  
 
It is often emphasised that the right of secession, which points to a particular claim that may 
or may not relate to the ideal of self-determination, should not be conflated with the right to 
self-determination, which is an umbrella term that can be achieved through various means 
besides secession. Allen Buchanan holds such a view and stresses the distinction between 
consensual and unilateral secession, according to which inquiry into the right of secession 
should specifically investigate self-determination. According to his view, unilateral secession 
can be justified only if serious violations of basic human rights have happened. It is a last 
resort for self-preservation, not only because the host state has lost political legitimacy, but 
because other peaceful options have been exhausted.  
 
However, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, such a focus is too narrow to explore the 
normativity of justified secession or to identify the normative continuum of justified secession. 
Indeed, secession is a particular means with which to achieve self-determination or liberate 
a victim from some grave injustice. Yet if we recognise the normative continuum, then the 
significance of the right should go beyond an instrument of last resort. It should instead be 
understood as the very reason why a given group would like to establish their community 
upon particular land. That is, what is the connection of a group to a particular territory given 
that the group anticipates building their communal life on the territory?  With this in mind, 
the right to secede finds its roots in the protection of territorial rights and should be based 
upon the fundamental concerns about (1) the qualification of the rights-holder and (2) the 
(political) normative basis of territorial interests. Buchanan’s proposal for secession reflects 
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status qua bias or statist bias because he fails to recognise that a state, though eligible to 
claim the hold of whole territory, also includes multiple territorial rights-holders within its 
territory. Secession should therefore not be deemed as a last resort but a way to improve 
territorial rights. It is no doubt an extreme way of safeguarding these rights, but it is also, 
under certain circumstances, the best way. A qualified claimant to secession (i.e. a qualified 
territorial rights-holder) should then be prescribed with the moral standing in protecting their 
territorial interests.  
 
Buchanan argues for minimum justice, while the other camp (which includes, for example, 
Wellman and Miller) advocates collective self-determination. Informed by my dualistic 
account of territorial rights, both are valid: collective self-determination should be 
understood as a kind of justice in a fundamental sense. According to Rainer Forst, the primary 
question of justice is the question of power, which demands that we ascertain how the goods 
(to be distributed) come into the world and who decides the basis on which they are allocated 
and distributed. Moreover,  
 
each member of a context of justice has a fundamental right to justification, that is, a 
right to be offered appropriate reasons for the norms of justice that are supposed to 
hold generally; respect for this right is a universal requirement, and the moral equality 
expressed by it provides the foundation for farther-reaching claims to political and 
social justice.2  
 
 
2 Rainer Forst, “Justice, Democracy and the Right to Justification: Two Pictures of Justice,” in Justice, Democracy 
and the Right to Justification, ed. David Owen (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 21.   
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Given that most modern states have an unjust genesis, a particular ruler’s power to impose a 
social norm on the ruled always demands justification owed to the subjects concerned. In 
other words, justice is not just a matter of quality of ruling but also of who has the right to 
determine a certain social norm.  
 
Stilz’s account of territorial rights appears to satisfy both camps as it secures people’s 
interests in basic justice and political autonomy. However, uncertainty about who has the 
right to the whole state territory inhabited not just by individuals but also by multiple 
territorial subgroups, and about why secessionists must form their state on the land they 
occupy, both make her conclusion that the state is the sole rights-holder untenable. Moreover, 
Catherine Lu and A. J. Simmons both argue cogently that wrongful subjection and historic 
injustice have a huge impact on the structure of injustice, and that this sometimes makes 
reform of territorial structure necessary. We should then recognise rights-holders other than 
the state, which compels us to accommodate Moore’s theory and then restructure the 
relationship between multiple territorial rights-holders and the state. Secession is therefore 
envisaged as a means to protect the capacity of self-determining people to exercise their 
territorial rights and to create a secure social environment in which they can carry out their 
collective self-determination.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the expectation that states will respect the rights of subgroups is 
perhaps idealistic, even though the state should, theoretically, incarnate the omnilateral will 
of the people. This reflects the ‘relativity of Rousseau’s general will’, where the will might 
express the interests of a range of different subjects. According to Christopher Bertram, the 
will on which the state’s behaviour should and rely is public, ‘but always relative to a given 
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group of people, whether that group of people is some enduring institutional entity like a 
state or whether it is an episodic coming together of individuals on some occasion or for some 
purpose.’3 On the one hand, the will of sovereignty is relatively public compared to the private 
reason of individuals sourced from our self-regarding interests (call it the first form, F1); on 
the other, it is more private than the public reason of human beings as a whole (i.e. F2), which 
can be seen in morality or the normative basis of international law. A particular general will 
regulates the subjects or society such that the people can act beyond egoism but does not 
sacrifice their shared interests to cater for the vast majority of people who are located outside 
the state territory. In addition, the will should be relatively public compared to the corporate 
interest of subgroups (i.e. F3) whereas the latter should also be deemed to be relatively public 
compared to the private interest of individuals. While taking the prosperity of group into 
account, the corporate interest of subgroups has to go beyond members’ private interests. 
However, given that different groups of people intermingle with one another on the same 
territory, general will of the state should not be partial to certain subgroups but strive for the 
common interests of all people living in that territory. The above distinction or requirement 
for citizenship (i.e. F4 or FSD) puts the idea of general will into permanent tension with F1-F3. 
Firstly, the will is envisaged to overcome or suppress our selfishness but is also different to 
what is required by the most general, cosmopolitan reason. Second, the general will of the 
state should also not be an expression of the corporate interests of sub-state groups no 
matter they are the minority or majority of the state. Third, given that the concrete and 
substantive account (viz. F2 and F3) and the cosmopolitan account (viz. F1) are both rejected, 
it is then hard to find a way for FSD to be ‘both general enough to allow people to coexist with 
 
3 Christopher Bertram, “Rousseau on Public Reason.” In Public Reason in Political Philosophy, ed. Piers Norris 
Turner and Gerald Gaus (New York: Routledge, 2018), 249. 
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one another on terms of freedom, equality and non-domination, whilst being sufficiently 
concrete to motivate people in ways that overcome their individually selfish impulses.’4 In 
order to meet such a demand, my proposed conception of the right is compelling, as it equips 
the minority with the ability to resist the will of the majority. It would be wildly optimistic to 
adopt a restrictive view of international intervention on the right to secession and hope that 
the state would be encouraged to promote the collective self-determination of its people, 
without any effective constraint on the will of the majority. 
 
This, then, compels us to square the state power with the notions that, firstly, the exercise of 
state power should be justifiable to each subgroup as free and equal components of the 
whole; and secondly, subgroups should be able to resist the abuse of state power. I therefore 
prescribe a new account of the right to secede to subgroups, not only in order to improve 
their territorial rights, but also to establish a global authority that can tackle state inertia and 
encourage states to undertake genuine communication with subgroups. A more promising 
way of addressing secession should thereby appeal to an all-inclusive global authority to 





4 Ibid., 250. 
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2. Group right of secession 
 
According to the dualism of territorial rights, an eligible claimant to secession, which should 
be a territorial rights-holder, refers to territorial subgroups within states. To use Moore’s 
terminology, this refers to a ‘self-determining people’ characterised by a proper group (or 
political) identity, a history of political cooperation, and the capacity to form a government. 
Moreover, subgroups as distinct entities not only coexist with, but also constitute part of, 
Stilz’s endogenous peoplehood (i.e. citizens as a whole). Where a subgroup experiences 
persistent alienation (i.e. violation of my principles for justified secession), the group is 
entitled to seek secession. Such an account implies that the right to secession is a group right 
i.e. right(s) possessed by a group qua group, rather than being held by the members therein 
individually. So, the term has significance only if it refers to something beyond the scope of 
individual rights or a bunch of individual rights. When we proclaim a certain group as entitled 
to specific (group) rights, we assert that (1) the members as a whole are entitled to these 
rights; (2) the rights-holders cannot be reduced to the individuals within the group (although 
the justification of the right may depend on individual factors, such as individual basic 
interests). Moreover, this is different from the idea of group-differentiated rights (a right held 
by an individual in virtue of the membership they obtain). For instance, I will be entitled to 
the right to live in my university accommodation and claim a student discount once I become 
a university student. Such an entitlement arising out of my membership of a group is not the 
kind of group right in question.  
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Nevertheless, given that the revised right is both remedial and primary5, it is important to 
clarify how the right-holder bears the right, because each feature (the remedial and primary 
kind) is held in a different way. Recall in Chapter 1 the relationship between the two kinds of 
right: a remedial right can be exercised only if the corresponding primary right is violated. The 
remedial function of the right to secede thus implies the collective account that a group of 
individuals, without further qualifications of group identity, can jointly exercise the right 
whenever they confront the violation of some primary, shared interest and therefore invoke 
that right as the remedy. However, because the idea of a primary right means that the right 
can be implemented free from the violation of a particular (primary) right,  the primary parts 
of the right to secede prescribes the sort of entitlement that it can be exercised simply in light 
of the holder’s moral standing (distinct from any aggregation of individuals), this reflects the 
corporate conception of group right which demands an exposition of how group identity is 
maintained despite changes of membership over time.6 In other words, I shall argue that my 
proposed right of secession accommodates both group right accounts, as follows: (1) the 
collective account is justified when referring to the joint interests in basic justice or political 
autonomy, that is, when the claimants hope to resist grave injustice or persistent alienation 
or grave injustice; (2) the corporate account is justified, as Moore’s notion of self-determining 
people reflects a temporally extended entity grounding their territorial entitlements in the 
relationship-dependent goods; (3) given that the right of secession consists in a claim to the 
reconfiguration of political authority and a claim to a certain territory, the collective account 
 
5 Recall that I define the right of secession as comprised of the remedial right to claim secession (either 
consensual or unilateral), the primary right to constitutional reform, and the primary right to erect a just global 
authority jointly with the extant, recognised states. 
6 Peter Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’ The Journal of Political Philosophy, 1999, 353-377. 
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suffices to trigger the former claim while the corporate account anchors the corresponding 
territorial claim.  
 
2.1. The collective account 
 
An account of collective rights endows a group with moral rights when the following 
conditions are satisfied: (1) a group of individuals holds a common interest in a public good; 
(2) the protection of such a public good obliges others not to interfere; and (3) the group must 
hold and exercise the right collectively in order to realise the public good.7 Group members 
do not necessarily share some primordial common features such as culture or nationality. The 
pursuit of public goods is sufficient to prescribe the right for these persons as a whole.  
 
If secession is proposed in a given geographical area, the claimants believe that their common 
interests in some public goods can only be secured via secession. Yet, what are those public 
goods? According to my principles for justified secession, public goods refer to political 
autonomy and basic justice (i.e. the conditions for decent human life). The collective account 
of the right to secede thus manifests the remedial function that a group of victims may appeal 
to secession in order to secure their interests in political autonomy or basic human decency.  
 
As previously illustrated, a group of people, regardless of their group affiliation, is entitled to 
demand basic justice and political autonomy, creating a secure environment that permits 
them to achieve self-realisation. Moreover, fulfilling or safeguarding those interests requires 
 
7 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 207-09. 
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a collective enterprise. On the one hand, such common interests have to be fulfilled by the 
establishment of the state or institutions with justified public authority. On the other, serious 
violation of these interests (as shown in the previous chapter) calls for secession. Clearly, a 
single victim or a small family falls short of the threshold for creating a viable state or the duty 
of others not to interfere. That is, a single person’s interest in human rights and political 
autonomy cannot impose the duty on others. They must first form a group of similar people, 
enabling the establishment of institutions and thus subjecting others to the duty of non-
interference. Subsequently, the right of secession, as group right (as explained by the 
collective conception) is also justified.  
 
A justified claim to secede therefore meets the collective conception of a group right, as it 
shows the inability of any single claimant to secure joint interests in political autonomy, or to 
oblige others not to interfere, without firstly forming a group that then bears the right. 
However, such a conclusion does not fully account for the whole picture of justified secession 
since I propose to include the primary right to constitutional reform and the establishment of 
global authority. It is also necessary to show why the common interest in basic human 
decency or political autonomy can also entail a claim to certain territory. In other words, the 
collective account of group right qualifies the secessionists to seek the reconfiguration of 
state authority, but it is less clear how this right demands the permanent reconfiguration of 
state territory. For example, the host state might ask the claimants to form their own state 
elsewhere, rather than occupying land within the state’s territory. The corporate conception 
of group rights is then deployed to address this issue.  
 
2.2. The corporate account 
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To occupy certain land within the host state as the putative territory of a seceding state over 
successive generations, it is necessary to attribute the corporate account of group rights to 
the right-holders. This conception qualifies the claimants as a group that holds a distinct moral 
standing, different from an aggregation of victims. The group thus has an identity that its 
members cannot exhaust or replace. Accordingly, others violate such a group right because 
they owe a correlative duty to the group and thus wrong it by failing to respect its distinct 
moral standing. This reflects two demands or principles for the right. First, it has to satisfy the 
particular demand that roots the group in a particular territory. Second, the continuity 
demand necessitates that the group identity must remain consistent. To meet these demands, 
I shall show that three characteristics of subgroups can entail a temporally-extended moral 
standing, grounding territorial entitlement in relationship-dependent goods. 
 
It should be pointed out that the justification or existence of group agency in general is 
assumed in my arguments given that the theorisation of that idea is another demanding 
endeavour.8 Group agency is possible, not because there is a metaphysically justified being 
living and thinking independently from the individuals of a group that dominates the action 
of the members; nor is it impossible because only the minds and actions of individuals are 
verifiable. Rather, I subscribe to List and Pettit’s account, drawing on the epistemic or 
 
8 According to Pettit and List, there are two traditions as to the issue, one is the emergentist, the other is the 
eliminativist. The former proposes that ‘group agents emerge as new phenomena over and above the 
individuals constituting them; whereas the latter argues that ‘group agents can be eliminated from any serious 
inventory of the world; they are nothing but individual agents acting in concert’. See Christine List and Philip 
Pettit, Group Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 73. See also some prominent accounts prior to List 
& Pettit’s account, Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987); Margaret Gilbert, ‘Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice,’ Economics 
and Philosophy 17 (2001): 109-120; Raimo Tuomela, The Importance of Us (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1995).  
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methodological features of groups, which suggests that group-based facts can and should be 
distinguished from those that are individual-based. Some moral characteristics, say 
accountability or autonomy, can be attributed to the group as an agent, rather than reduced 
to the moral characteristics of its members.9  Such a thesis asserts that group agency is 
justified ‘superveniently’ by the contributions of group members, just as consciousness 
supervenes on the coordination and operation of neurons. Moreover, the result of the 
members’ attribution can correspond to some common interests of the members or shared 
understanding of the group, which manifests the idea of group autonomy or accountability.  
 
Brexit may be a good case in point. According to the result of the referendum (based upon 
the principle of simple majority) in 2016, the British people decided to leave the European 
Union. The result, however, cannot be attributed to all the people that voted ‘Leave’ or all 
the voters; rather, Britons as a whole decided the result. Because the society as a whole chose 
to address the issue by referendum, it makes sense that many MPs insist on delivering Brexit 
as the right way of respecting the will of British people. This is because, firstly, it was not the 
electorate, but the MPs (including the PM, David Cameron) that proposed the referendum. 
Secondly, it appears that referendum was prompted by a power struggle inside the 
Conservative Party, rather than a direct mandate from the voters. Thirdly, neither the 
mechanisms of conducting the referendum nor the power relations between the referendum 
result and parliament are determined by the voters. For instance, in addition to the 
referendum, parliament had to vote to trigger Article 50, as ruled by the Supreme Court in 
2017. Fourthly, the criteria that determined voters’ eligibility was also not decided by the 
 
9 Christine List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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voters, but the government. Many British people campaigned to include EU citizens residing 
in the UK, but the government decided otherwise. Who gives the government the authority 
over this and other such matters is not decided by a particular group, but is derived from the 
laws and conventions of British politics. That is to say, considerable group-based facts sourced 
from the members’ political participation in shaping the institutions and the form of decision-
making institutions, together constituted the result of the EU referendum and how that result 
should be delivered, by which we can and should recognise the group agency of UK society, 
which is distinctively different from the views of British people as individuals.  
 
We should recognise the group agency of a certain group (outlined above) because such a 
group must be equipped with a set of coherent institutions in order to constitute the so-called 
group-based facts. In addition, neither the structure of the institutions nor the members’ 
(political) participation alone can determine the group-based facts. The individuation of the 
right-holder thereby relies on the demarcation between institutions or systems of subjection: 
call it the institutional account. However, the three characteristics (i.e. a common group 
identity, a history of political cooperation and the capacity to form a government) of the right-
holder evinces another account, namely the identity-based account, which is a fit more 
plausible in a secessionist context. First, while the institutional account supposes a shared 
institution to be a necessary constituent of group agency, claimants to secession often seek 
to found their own institutions. That is to say, a group claiming to secede often possesses a 
group agency that is incompatible with the existing institutions, or the institution in question 
caters for both them and others intermingled with them. These extant institutions are 
resisted by secessionists, craving institutions of their own. The institutional account cannot 
accommodate this. Second, common subjection normally produces different effects on 
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different groups of subjects, which again the institutional account fails to account for. This 
compels us to presuppose identity-based group agency before the establishment of 
institutions. For example, in Northern Ireland, Unionists have become a significant minority, 
responding violently against both Home Rule and integration with the Republic of Ireland 
since the nineteenth century. Failed assimilation policies, such as the Stolen Generations in 
the early twentieth century in Australia, show that the very existence of group identity pre-
dates the institutions to which a group is subjected. Provided that secessionists and anti-
secessionists share the same institutions, the identity-based account outweighs the 
institutional account with respect to the individuation of the secession right-holders. 
 
Identity-based group agency has to be supplemented with another two conditions, as 
mentioned: a history of political cooperation and the capacity to form a government. As 
pointed out in Chapter 3, the three characteristics together constitute the ‘temporally 
extended entity’ rooted in the land they legitimately occupy. To reiterate, while a common 
political/group identity is taken to be a means of identification, it should also be considered 
as a sign of common destiny, revealing their will to live together as a self-determining 
community. This legitimate expectation of self-rule is further backed up by a political 
cooperative history (proof of their bonds of solidarity) and the capacity to form a viable 
government (proof of their ability to sustain and realise self-determination). The group thus 
connects its present self to its developmental history and the prospect of controlling its group 
destiny. Furthermore, individuating the right-holder by a common group identity can avoid 
the essentialist framing in which the group must appeal to certain substantive elements, such 
as being Caucasian or appreciating fish and chips, in order to keep its identity constant. Since 
the right-holder is specified only by investigating whether the group label (i.e. political 
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identity) is still upheld and whether it exemplifies the temporally-extended entity, the group 
can endure and accommodate various characteristic changes while retaining the same 
identity. As a result, a subgroup meeting the three conditions of Moore’s self-determining 
people forms a long-lasting moral standing distinct from an aggregation of its members, which 
reaches the continuity demand of the corporate group right.  
 
The final concern is how to meet the particularity demand, namely how to legitimate the 
territorial claim (of secessionists) against the host state. Again, I will briefly reiterate Moore’s 
argument. While a group of individuals resides on certain land, on which they have formed a 
community, they form a cooperative system binding each other with social or political norms. 
Social relationship goods therein (particularly dependent norms, rather than generic norms 
such as the provision of basic justice) become an important reason for the continuity and 
development of the group. The fulfilment of these goods should be carried out by the 
members of this community, because the members share a common history of political 
cooperation and a commitment to maintain the group.  
 
It may be helpful to illustrate the significance of relationship-dependent goods more 
concretely by introducing David Miller’s argument for national self-determination, which 
employs the same notion (i.e. relationship-dependent goods), even though his 
characterisation of a nation is different from Moore’s self-determining people.10 According to 
Miller, a nation might desire self-determination out of three basic common interests. The first 
 
10 Miller defines a nation as a community that: (1) is constituted by shared beliefs and mutual commitment; (2) 
has an extended and shared history; (3) is active in character; (4) is connected to a particular territory; and (5) is 
marked off from other communities by a distinctive public culture. Such a definition overlaps with Moore’s self-
determining people in many ways. See David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
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is a better implementation of social justice. An intuitive and natural sentiment in national 
communities asks the members to care about the group because co-nationals can directly or 
indirectly benefit from such care. Further, it is not implausible to assume that co-nationals by 
and large hold similar conceptions of social justice or more easily achieve consensus on such 
an issue because of their shared nationality and social norms. Nonetheless, a nation is, unlike 
a family in which every member is familiar with one another, a large and impersonal 
community. That is to say, the duty of co-nationals to follow and the duty of others not to 
interfere are both required once their agenda for social justice is confirmed. Assigning a state 
apparatus or institutional resources to a nation therefore helps them realise social justice 
more easily and effectively. The second interest is in being better able to protect the national 
culture. National culture is a constituent of personal identity, which should not be altered 
arbitrarily. For instance, a national culture is entitled to resist an assimilation policy imposed 
by the majority of a society. The culture should be situated within the society, providing a 
level playing field with other cultures. In addition, culture has a public element. Any national 
culture may be threatened, not only by other national cultures, but also non-cultural factors 
such as commercial considerations or globalisation, which can access far more capital 
resource than a nation can normally control. A nation then has the right to demand necessary 
institutional resources in order to develop and safeguard their culture. Therefore, Miller 
claims, ‘if you care about preserving your national culture, the surest way is to place the 
means of safeguarding it in the hands of those who share it—your fellow-nationals.’11 Thirdly, 
a nation has a joint interest in the pursuit of collective autonomy. Miller illustrates this by 




in domestic issues, but also in demanding international status equal to a metropolitan state. 
‘It was not absurd for people to expect that they would have a greater sense of control over 
their destinies when ruled by local oligarchies than when ruled by imperial power’.12 If we see 
colonisation as a violation of collective autonomy, secession can be regarded as the pursuit 
of collective autonomy. In other words, because independent statehood guarantees to a 
nation the greatest authority to govern and secure the public, common interests of fellow 
nationals, it confers the right to secede on the claimants as a group, in order to pursue 
collective autonomy. 
 
I believe that Miller’s argument fits with Moore’s self-determining people in terms of the 
value of relationship-dependent goods. In other words, by virtue of social justice, collective 
autonomy and the importance of public culture within a self-determining people, the group 
is entitled to self-determine their group prospects on the land they occupy. The holders of 
the right to secession, qualified as a self-determining people, aim to realise a particular 
common life project that most of the members appreciate and/or how the project should be 
carried out is widely shared by the members. Non-members do not share this future 
commitment, and thus the group has sufficient reason to demand self-determination, and to 
place others under the duty of non-interference. Given that the group legitimately occupies 
their current living area, they are entitled to treat it as the setting in which they intend to fulfil 
the common life project. The particularity demand inherent in the corporate right of 
secession is therefore satisfied, as the right-holder grounds their territorial entitlement in 





In conclusion, both the collective and corporate accounts of group rights are necessary for 
the right-holder to bear my revised right of secession. The remedial function of the right is 
delineated and fulfilled, as the collective account identifies the common interests in terms of 
basic justice and political autonomy, the violation of which justifies the right-holder in seeking 
remedy for the state’s wrongdoing via reconfiguration of political authority. Yet, this is only 
half of the revised right to secede. While the right-holders are characterised by a common 
group identity, a history of political cooperation and the capacity to form a government, the 
group is also endowed with a moral standing distinct from that of the members when 
considered as individuals, and able to maintain the group identity. Such a temporally 
extended entity not only meets the corporate conception of group rights, but further bases 
its territorial claim upon its (social) relationship-dependent goods. It thus enables the right-
holder to bear the primary right to constitutional reform and establishment of global 
authority, and of course, legitimates the territorial claim to the area they now occupy. The 
second half of the revised right of secession is then supplemented by the corporate account. 
In a nutshell, whereas the collective account is sufficient for the right-holder to seek 
reconfiguration of political authority as a remedy for grave injustice or persistent alienation, 
the corporate account is appealed to, to prescribe the primary dimension of the right for the 




3. Justification for the revised right to secede 
 
After delineating who holds the right and how the right is held, I now move on to the 
justification of the revised right to secession. I shall provide two kinds of justification. The first, 
which aims to explain why the right should blend with primary rights (instead of remedial 
only), draws on Jens David Ohlin’s proposal that the right of self-determination should both 
meet the idea of the right to exist (protecting basic justice) and the right to resist (protecting) 
collective autonomy.13 The second deploys Kant’s idea of permissive law, that the right is 
justified in prescribing the remedial right to the right-holder if and only if more permissible, 
extensive participation in constitutional and international reform is granted. 
 
3.1. The significance of existence and resistance 
 
According to Ohlin, our current international legal conventions recognise the right of self-
determination as comprised of the right to be free from aggression and the right to self-
defence, each of which can be further reduced to two more basic rights: the right to exist and 
the right to resist. The remedial-right-only theorists, who draw many of their ideas from 
international law, normally base their accounts of justified secession upon the right to exist 
because firstly, the state legitimacy is justified as it has a duty to secure the basic justice of 
subjects; and secondly, when it fails to fulfil these duties, it violates the victims’ right (to exist). 
These victims are thereby entitled to seek secession as a way to escape danger. The moral 
reasoning behind this is two-fold. First, it treats the right to exist as the primary interest, and 
 
13 Jens David Ohlin, “The Right to Exist and the Right to Resist,” in The Theory of Self-Determination, ed. 
Fernando R. Tesón (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 70-93. 
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the right to resist as a means to manifest or protect the first right. Accordingly, for example, 
Buchanan ascribes the protection of basic human rights as a primary reason for secession and 
then conceives secession as a last resort against the violation of this bundle of rights. Second, 
the above consequentialist reasoning reflects the principle of proportionality, because the 
right of secession is justified only if other less extreme means of resistance have been 
exhausted. Nevertheless, I shall point out in this subsection that such a reductionist view 
(since the right to resist is reduced to a means of safeguarding the right to exist) is inadequate 
as a right of secession. Instead, the right should not only be associated with the right to exist 
and the right to resist, but also treat the two as distinct values, namely subsistence and dignity, 
or basic justice and collective autonomy. That is to say, while the remedial part of my right to 
secede is based upon the right to exist, the primary element of the right (i.e. the right to 
constitutional reform and to erect a just global authority jointly with the extant, recognised 
states) take the right to resist as its normative basis. 
 
The reductionist understanding underlying the remedial theories has two flaws. First, since 
consequentialist reasoning relies on the idea of proportionality, it tends to embrace the 
‘success condition’, which advocates that defence against aggression that falls short cannot 
be justified. Such a condition entails counter-intuitive effects, such as that we should not 
defend ourselves. We thus have good pro tanto reason to reject such reasoning. Second, it 
fails to acknowledge the moral rationale behind the right to resist, that is, collective autonomy, 
distinct and independent from the reason for the right to exist. If the right to resist is based 
on respect for collective autonomy, rather than as an instrument for the right to exist, the 
right to resist (and hence the right to secede) should be rooted in some primary moral interest, 
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by which the right-holder is justified in resisting autonomy-threatening attacks. Let me 
illustrate the arguments for these points in below. 
 
Ohlin introduces Daniel Statman’s proposal that ‘the logic of defensive force includes a covert 
requirement that the defensive force is only justified if it is successful in stopping or averting 
the threat; otherwise the defensive force represents wasted blood’.14 This success condition 
equates the use of force with efficacy: ineffectual resistance loses legitimacy, because such 
force produces needless harm. Moreover, being unable to defend oneself with force may 
promote more sincere negotiation. However, these benefits sit alongside perverse effects, 
some of which are morally unacceptable. First, the condition may lead to resistance being 
excessively violent in order to exceed the threshold, perhaps justifying the abuse of defeated 
enemies or prisoners of war. This concern can be neutralised if we take other values into 
account, such as including a provision to respect the dignity of each individual. The second 
flaw of the condition is more problematic. Ohlin takes rape as an example and asks us to 
consider how absurd it would be if the victim was forbidden to resist or attack their rapist, 
out of fear that such resistance might cause harm to the rapist. Moreover, such a condition 
could be misused, with an attacker attempting to justify their aggression by deliberately 
misinterpreting a lack of resistance as consent. Many totalitarian regimes justify their 
propaganda with such rhetoric, attempting to rationalize their suppression. If it is implausible 
to derive the right to resist via consequentialist reasoning from the right to exist, how can we 
restructure the relationship, given that both rights are fundamental to the right of secession? 
Ohlin proposes to place the right to resist into a deontological category, according to which 
 
14 Ibid., 87. See also Daniel Statman, “On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defence,” Ethics 118 (2008): 
659-86. 
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resistance is justified when it protects one’s autonomy, or aims to resist an attack on one’s 
autonomy. As such, the right enjoys a moral standing equal to that of the right of existence 
(i.e. they are both a primary right) and we thereby should devise a distinct and independent 
criterion for the right to resist. His argument runs as follows.  
 
Firstly, it is natural to respond to an unjustified attack with force. This is not merely an animal 
instinct, but more like an expression of dignity or moral agency, refusing to be coerced. It is a 
rejection of being a means to reach someone else’s end. Secondly, in an act of self-defence, 
the agent is exercising their autonomy. They are employing moral, practical reasoning to 
judge what is valuable. Resistance to unjustified coercion should therefore be conceived as 
resistance to a violation of autonomy and the right to resist should be derived from the 
protection of an agent’s autonomy. The value of autonomous agency is not limited to 
individuals but can also apply to groups (I illustrated the connection between personal 
autonomy and the agent’s group identity in Chapter 4). Thirdly, consider the wrong of 
assimilation policies. The Chinese government has set up a series of ‘education’ camps in the 
southern part of Xinjiang, detaining Uyghur ‘reactionaries’ indefinitely and forcing them to 
learn Mandarin, Chinese culture (as conceived by the Chinese Communist Party), and 
acquiring basic skills such as room service or working on an assembly line. The government 
rejects criticisms of these camp as prisons, declaring them to be something like summer 
camps, at which Uyghurs will learn the necessary skills or knowledge to incorporate 
themselves into Chinese society. Once they have done so, they are permitted to leave. Setting 
aside the rumour that misbehaviour is punished with torture, this policy clearly violates the 
collective autonomy of the Uyghurs, in terms of the policy, the objectives, the selection of 
‘participants’ (we might more accurately call them ‘inmates’) and the criteria for leaving, none 
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of which has been agreed with the Uyghurs. Because, given that the Uyghur are not 
immigrants but the indigenous people with its own territorial interests in Xinjiang, why do 
they have to be fluent in Mandarin if they can already communicate with one another, using 
their mother tongue? Why should they study Chinese culture or Communist Party values over 
their own Islamic culture and practices? Since their authority over those collective issues has 
been removed by the government, the increase in police forces and military budgets in the 
region is also attributed to the protests against and resistance to this assimilation policy.  
 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, let me outline how my revised right of secession is 
derived. Firstly, provided that the right of self-determination in international law consists of 
the right to exist and the right to resist, the paradigmatic conception underlying the remedial 
theories conceives of the right to resist as a means to safeguard the sole primary right they 
recognise with respect to secession, namely the right to exist. However, secondly, the logical 
relation between such two rights, shaped by consequentialist reasoning, generates some 
morally unacceptable effects, such that it is reasonable to reformulate the relation between 
the two rights. Thirdly, following Ohlin, it is reasonable to ground the right to resist in 
collective autonomy. By so doing, the right to resist refers to the primary moral interest, 
distinct from the right to exist, retrospectively informing the right of self-determination 
whose normative basis should now be two fundamental ‘primary’ rights (the right to exist and 
the right to resist). Consequently, my revised right of secession, which draws on the dualistic 
account of territorial rights aiming to secure subgroups’ basic justice and their collective 
autonomy (without persistent alienation), corresponds to and advocates the above two 
primary rights. That is, I maintain the original remedial understanding that violation of the 
right to exist justifies a claim to unilateral secession, while at the same time unilateral 
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secession is also justified if the right to resist (viz. my non-alienation principles) is seriously 
violated. Furthermore, since the right to resist is considered a primary right, subgroups can 
propose constitutional and international reform to protect their collective autonomy without 
prompting grave injustice. The right of secession, therefore, is justified in blending the 
remedial account with another primary concern, that if collective autonomy is threatened, 
resistance is necessary.    
 
3.2. A permissive justification for the right 
 
After showing why it is necessary to characterise the right of secession with the value of 
collective autonomy, I shall then argue that the remedial and primary rights within my revised 
right to secede are structured by Kant’s concept of permissive law.  
 
In line with the non-alienation principles and the dualistic account of territorial rights, the 
general outline of my right to secede is justified as follows. First, we examine whether a given 
state follows the non-alienation principles (and if not, how far the principles are violated). 
Were the first subprinciple Psd to be violated, the victim has the right to seek consensual 
secession; were the second Prea to be violated, a claim to unilateral secession is justified. Such 
measures suggest viewing the right, governed by the state as the remedial right, given that 
secession is the remedy for serious violation of basic justice or collective autonomy. However, 
secondly, the right is also primary since it advocates, despite compliance with the principles, 
that a subgroup is entitled to constitutional reform of their self-determination and to jointly 
construct a just global authority for supervise territorial conflict with the host state. Granting 
the remedial account of secession on the condition of the primary right to constitutional 
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reform and participation in shaping global order, therefore, reflects the Kantian idea of 
permissive law (see Chapter 4). 15  Each territorial rights-holder should ideally have the 
(primary) right to decide whether to form a state; and yet if rare and valuable natural 
resources are monopolised by a few, and if the extant state boundaries are the consequence 
of historical contingency, we should justify the remedial right through the primary right of 
(greater and better) self-government and forming a just global authority for settling territorial 
conflicts. The following paragraphs provide the argument for this permissive justification. 
 
According to the dualistic account of territorial rights, subgroups within states have moral 
standing in territorial rights equivalent to that of their host states. It follows  from  the 
argument presented in Chapter 4 that, on the one hand, the state’s entitlement to occupy 
and claim exclusive use of certain land can only be justified via a commitment to bringing 
about a just global authority; and yet on the other, statist inertia and the representative 
problem both demand recognition of subgroups’ territorial rights by existing states, and 
subsequently their right to become a state. Let me briefly reiterate such an argument below. 
 
First, the concept of state legitimacy justifies its authority over and/or coercion of a particular 
population within certain boundaries. State authority arises naturally from the natural duties 
of justice, by which the state is prescribed for the people living within its bounds. This account 
reflects the idea of reciprocity and Stilz aligns the idea with resistance to persistent alienation. 
 
15 It is worth recalling that a permissive account of territorial rights has two distinct features. First, the unit of 
justification is universal, which goes across space and time (namely, it includes the people of other states and 
the stateless, and its validity takes future generations into account). Second, the nature of justification is two-
tier. In order to reach a conclusive justification, some contested entitlement can be justified provisionally and 
permissively if and only if all the agents in question are committed to advancing an all-inclusive principle of 
right. The disputed entitlements can thus be recognised currently but conditionally, and will be adjusted later 
on (if necessary) once the condition for a conclusive justification is obtained.   
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However, there should be further reciprocity between the ruling party and subgroups ruled 
by the host states. The state apparatus belongs to whoever seizes power, which implies 
partisanship. Yet partisanship originating from secession is not as common as occasions on 
which different political partisans can refuse to compromise their fundamental party interests. 
Most struggles towards secession, triggered by and rooted in deep structural injustice such 
that a minority’s territorial interests are outweighed by those of the majority on most 
occasions. That is to say, the unjust genesis of a state favours certain groups, and often the 
partiality this creates is hardened by democracy in which such groups are numerically 
dominant. It is therefore necessary to safeguard the collective autonomy of subgroups, in 
addition to protecting citizenship rights. Recalling the relativity of general will in the first 
section and the statist inertia described in Chapter 4, it would be naïve to rely on states’ 
discretion in settling the matter positively and voluntarily. This entails that any resistance 
born out of concern for subgroups’ collective autonomy should be deemed to protect and 
develop their territorial interests, and by extension, group members’ self-realisation. While 
the subjection of some subgroups accompanies deep structural injustice, reciprocity between 
the state and subgroups should be repaired by granting greater collective self-determination. 
 
Second, clarifying and securing the territorial rights of subgroups concerns not just the host 
state or other subgroups therein, but also the states whose fundamental interests might be 
seriously affected (e.g. neighbouring states). This, in additional to the problem of historical 
illegitimacy, may make a state’s accommodation of subgroups’ territorial rights partial or 
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inconclusive. According to T. M. Scanlon, ‘principles [of right] are ones that no-one, if suitably 
motivated, could reasonably reject’;16 moreover,  
 
in order to decide whether it would be wrong to do X in circumstances C, we should 
consider possible principles governing how one may act in such situation, and ask 
whether any principle that permitted one to do X in those circumstances could, for 
that reason, reasonably be rejected.17  
In other words, while the justification for incorporating subgroups’ territorial rights goes 
beyond the moral standing of the host state, justification is owed to the relevant agents, 
which can be determined conclusively only if a just global authority is in place to adjudicate 
such disputes. The Kurdish people or the Rohingya are cases in point: accommodating the 
territorial rights of the Kurds in Turkey may have to take the Kurds in Syria, Iran and Iraq into 
account. Likewise, a proper way of addressing the Rohingya humanitarian crisis requires 
cooperation between the Myanmar and Bangladeshi governments. 
 
As such, given that a state’s rights to the territory is commonly held by itself (or citizens as a 
whole) and subgroups, and given that the settlement of territorial rights influences more than 
these two agents, the subjugation of subgroups (to the state’s authority) does not really mean 
submitting, but rather entrusting their territorial rights provisionally to the host state in order 
to achieve basic justice and political autonomy. After all, the state lacks the necessary 
standing in subjecting subgroups’ territorial rights to its authority, without the establishment 
of an overarching global authority. However, one might question what role the state’s 
 
16 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 189. 
17 Ibid., 195. 
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authority plays in terms of subgroups’ territorial rights. The answer is that the state should 
devise provisional terms and conditions for the fulfilment of their territorial rights (including 
on what grounds a claim to secede should be conducted, permitted or rejected). Yet why are 
such terms and conditions just provisional? Here it is necessary to briefly recapitulate the 
typical Kantian argument for the state by appealing to property rights, although the argument 
is well-known by now.18 First, we require the use of objects outside to our bodies to pursue 
or complete an end set by ourselves. Second, the use of certain objects entails the exclusion 
of others from making use of those objects, which puts others under a duty to respect our 
property rights. Third, the exact details of this duty cannot be determined unilaterally by my 
conception of the rights, but should go through a contractualist justification that no-one 
affected could reasonably reject. In order to address the problem of unilateral acquisition, 
fourthly, a state should be created, as it could formulate an omnilateral, general will, binding 
each citizen to determine the content of such rights. Before this, in the state of nature, we 
should recognise each person’s unilateral acquisition provisionally and leave any dispute 
about rights to the general will. Meanwhile, a state acquires its territorial boundaries 
alongside the establishment of omnilateral will, because those closely living together, while 
communicating and interacting with one another, integrates their living area with its vicinity 
to be subject to the state authority and so form the scope of the state territory.  
 
This Kantian account of how a state derives the boundaries of its territory is, however, 
oversimplified. As suggested by my dualistic account of territorial rights, a subgroup meeting 
Moore’s criteria of self-determining people should be able to claim institutional resources in 
 
18 My understanding of Kant’s political ideas owes much to Ripstein. See Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom 
(London: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 86-106. 
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order to secure their territorial rights and the host state should respect those rights by 
recognizing their moral standing as equivalent to that of the state. Yet, in the paradigmatic 
Kantian argument just outlined, subgroups’ territorial rights or boundaries of (the traditional, 
prior to being incorporated into the extant states’) territory are dissolved or forcibly 
incorporate into the extant states’ territories. In other words, the argument neglects to 
account for a situation in which the individuals coerced into the state authority may have 
already formed their traditional territory, which determined their conception of property 
rights (no matter how primitive) among themselves. Such a dismissal undermines the Kantian 
argument because, although the principle of vicinity is justified in coercing stateless peoples 
into living under the subjection of state authority, recognising their entitlement to (traditional) 
territory should precede the recognition of their rights to property. It is also important to 
recall that some subgroups were conquered, which entailed the destruction of their states 
and other egregious injustices. Even though it is necessary to coerce persons in the same 
circumstance into obeying an omnilateral will (i.e. the state) to address unilateral acquisition, 
it is equally crucial, prior to the establishment of a new state, to recognise and respect any 
previously established (quasi-) general will. If a person’s property rights in the state of nature 
ought to be deemed provisionally justified before the creation of the state, the subgroups’ 
territorial rights should likewise gain provisional recognition by the host states before a just 
global authority endowed with a global omnilateral will can reformulate or confirm such rights. 
Before the new, global will is formed, the state should firstly recognise that its territorial rights 
are partly constituted by the territorial rights of subgroups and subsequently restore these 




The revisited conditions of territorial rights, therefore, are provisional or inconclusive; for the 
relativity of general will (mentioned in the section 1), the dualistic account of territorial rights, 
the statist inertia and the interests of third parties in territorial reform all show that the extant 
host states fall short of forming a full-blown omnilateral will to settle the issue with their 
subgroups conclusively. Two scenarios may illustrate this problem. First, a subgroup (though 
not yet formed into a Weberian modern state) may be coerced to incorporate their living area 
into the existing host state with unjustified force (e.g. Native Americans). Second, a subgroup 
may forge its distinct group identity in the face of a host state adopting a discriminatory policy 
towards the group (e.g. Western colonialism).  
 
Consequently, my revised right of secession, which derives from the dualism of territorial 
rights, is justified on the grounds that subgroups cannot claim to secede as they wish, but 
follow my remedial account (i.e. the remedy for grave injustice or persistent alienation) if and 
only if the primary rights to greater collective self-determination are granted. The reason for 
this permissive account is to achieve real reciprocity between states and subgroups without 
causing political chaos. An over-permissive account of secession may easily push the world 
into endless acts of secession. Empirically, reciprocity is undermined by deep structural 
injustices, statist inertia and the relativity of general will. Conceptually, the state lacks the 
conclusive moral standing needed to settle a secessionist conflict in relation to a third party 
or restore subgroups’ territorial entitlements conclusively. The redefined right of secession 
therefore provides the primary right to constitutional and international reform in order to 
encourage all relevant agents to resolve issues via real reciprocity, namely all-inclusive 
principles of right.  
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4. Conclusion and the legal implications 
 
In this chapter, I proposed a new account of the right to secede and illustrated how it is 
justified. The right is redefined as the right to equal moral/legal standing in re-negotiating 
terms and conditions for the protection of territorial rights with the host state or any relevant 
agent; and is comprised of the remedial right to claim secession, the primary right to 
constitutional reform, and the primary right to erect a just global authority jointly with extant, 
recognised states. Simply put, it is the right to form a state: the right-holder is entitled to the 
territorial rights as the precondition for forming a state. However, due to historical 
contingencies, those subgroups are incorporated into their extant host states, meaning that 
(1) if the host states protect their territorial rights by realising their political autonomy, the 
subgroups in question are forbidden to secede; and yet (2) the right still entitles them to claim 
constitutional reform to enhance their internal self-determination and to be involved in the 
establishment of a global authority as an independent international legal entity; (3) where 
the states fail to secure their territorial rights (that is, the subgroups suffer from persistent 
alienation), they are entitled to propose secession in accordance with my principles for 
justified secession illustrated in the previous chapter.  
 
I firstly argued that the right should be a group right, accounting for both the collective and 
corporate accounts. Given the remedial dimension of my revised right to secede, the right 
must be held collectively by a group of individuals confronting grave injustice or persistent 
alienation. This collective account indicates that the right is held whenever the joint interest 
of the group in a decent human life is violated. My principles for justified secession reflect 
how such common suffering or trauma entitles people to pursue sovereign independence. 
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However, the collective account is only sufficient for the claimant to propose the 
reconfiguration of political authority, which is merely half of secession. For the other half (the 
reconfiguration of territory), and also to hold the primary parts of the right (i.e. the right to 
constitutional reform and the right to establish a global authority in collaboration with current, 
recognised states), the corporate account is necessary. Based upon the dualism of territorial 
rights, the group must be a qualified territorial rights-holder whose members share a 
common political identity and history, and also possess the ability to form a government. 
These three conditions can produce relationship-dependent goods, which forge a self-
determining people holding a constant group identity, who ground their claim of secession in 
a certain territory because they are entitled to fulfil the goods via the support of institutional 
resources.  
 
Finally, I provided two justifications of the right. The first approach accounts for why the right 
contains both remedial and primary incidents. This is because secession manifests both the 
right to exist and the right to resist, corresponding to two distinct, mutually irreducible values: 
basic justice and collective autonomy. That is to say, given that the right to exist falls short of 
exhausting the reason for resistance, secession should be recognised as a means of protecting 
the claimant’s existence and collective autonomy. Justified secession then has two distinct 
normativities. On the one hand, it follows the understanding of the remedial-only theory, 
which conceives the activity as a remedy for the crisis of existence. On the other, it aligns with 
the value of collective autonomy that the right-holder is entitled to resist or remove a threat 
to its autonomous agency. This second route has remedial and primary perspectives. Shown 
by my second subprinciple, unilateral secession should be justified as a remedy to existential 
alienation because such a serious violation of collective autonomy pushes the victim to the 
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brink of grave injustice. Yet it also creates the conditions for consensual secession, the right 
to constitutional reform, and the right to join the construction of a global authority, all of 
which are constituent parts of the right (to secede) envisaged to safeguard the collective 
autonomy of subgroups.  
 
The second approach justified the internal logic between the remedial and primary incidents 
of the right. Namely, the remedial account of unilateral secession is justified if and only if the 
extant host states are committed to forming a global authority jointly with the subgroups and 
recognising the territorial trusteeship with the subgroups. Such a permissive justification 
reflects two important reasons for my revised right to secede. Firstly, it acknowledges that 
the territorial rights held by the current states are not justified conclusively. This means that 
holding these rights is disputable even though the state can provide rightful occupancy, basic 
justice to subjects and secure their political autonomy. That is, there is a gap: we cherish the 
state’s achievement in protecting those three fundamental interests, so we have good reason 
to accept the jurisdictional authority over a particular population and territory claimed by the 
state; yet we understand that this falls short of a conclusive justification. To fill the gap, 
secondly, we should respect the territorial rights of a state that protects these three 
fundamental interests, on the premise that each of them is willing to be subject to a 
common/global rightful condition making their hold of the rights conclusive. In a secessionist 
context, this means a state is justified in prohibiting a claim to unilateral secession (not 
originating from serious violation of basic justice or collective autonomy), provided it is 
dedicated to creating social conditions impartial and equal for any claimant to secession by 
conferring the primary right to constitutional reform, and to jointly erect a global authority. 
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This is because first, the subgroup is entitled to negotiate with the host state on a level 
playing-field; second, secession goes beyond the interests of the seceding and seceded state. 
 
In closing this chapter, I shall consider some noteworthy legal implications that are derived 
from my right of secession, despite the fact that my whole enquiry is based upon pre-
institutional moral reasoning. The impact on current international law is twofold. First, my 
proposal reflects the urgent need to establish a common, shared, just global authority with 
effective, binding powers to address territorial conflict, for the problems of secession are 
normally not limited to the relevant government and secessionists. Building up such an 
authority is onerous, demanding thorough and careful endeavour. Yet my proposal has shown 
that each territorial rights-holder (i.e. the extant states and their subgroups) has the duty to 
remove the current, semi-state-of-nature international relations and to be coerced into a 
commonly-shared rightful condition. The requirement for such practical authority is 
mandatory not because the alleged state-oriented international order should be overturned, 
but because that structure has to be set on a solid normative basis. In other words, if we insist 
on or believe in the current form of international law, we have to support our state system 
(viz. the state’s territorial sovereignty) on justified moral grounds. Second, my account of 
secession reconciles the potential tension between the principle of territorial integrity and 
the principle of self-determination by advocating that the former can be upheld only if the 
latter is secure.19  In international law, the principle of self-determination claims that ‘all 
peoples have the right of self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’20 
 
19 For a similar view, please see Abdelhamid El. Ouali, ‘Territorial Integrity: Rethinking the Territorial Sovereign 
Right of the Existence of the States,’ Geopolitics, 11, (2006): 630-50. 
20 ‘Article I of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ UN charter Civil and Political Rights, google, accessed 
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However, the rival, territorial integrity principle is also endorsed by every state to secure 
respect for their holding of territory and thus the stability of global order. What should the 
law say to those peoples who do not recognise their host states as their own, or as a place in 
which they can freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development? My answer is 
that a state’s territorial sovereignty or claim to territorial integrity is justified only if it secures 
occupancy rights, basic justice and self-determination within the territory, and has committed 
to establishing a just global authority. That being said, the principle of territorial integrity 
should be considered the fruit of compliance with the self-determination principle. Where a 
state fails to uphold self-determination, its claim to territorial integrity should be questioned 
under international law. Secession can therefore be justified within such a scenario and 
demand the protection or intervention of international law.  
 
What about the constitutionality of secession? I believe the most tenable prescription for 
constitutions is that any anti-secession legislation is morally unjustified. Criminalising 
secessionists has no moral basis, because such legislation clearly fails to respect people’s 
entitlement to propose secession as a means to protect their subsistence or collective 
autonomy. The state’s right to forbid the dismemberment of the territory, though justified, is 
not absolute but limited to the circumstances in which the state has already successfully 
secured people’s right to occupancy, basic justice, and collective self-determination. One may 
ask whether a state can issue a qualified anti-secession law that articulates that secession is 
banned except when the principles are violated. To this I would still insist that such qualified 
legislation is morally unjustified because it is inconsistent with my central position on 
 
12 November 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.   
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territorial rights, whose justification cannot be deemed conclusive until all rights-holders are 
subject to a common rightful condition, namely a just global authority. An anti-secession law, 
regardless of what qualification it subscribes to, should be regarded as unilateralism claiming 
to have ‘conclusive authority’ over the acquisition of and settlement on certain land, which 
contradicts the permissive account of territorial rights. 
 
On whether constitutions should recognise a right to secede, my account of the right and the 
relevant principles tend to support constitutionalising the right, despite the counterargument 
that doing so would undermine the commitment of each subgroup to deliberative democracy, 
reciprocity and the tolerance of diversity. Since I advocate that the right of secession includes 
the primary right to constitutional reform and also that consensual secession should be 
permitted as effective leverage to promote claimants’ structural dignity, legal institutions may 
devise a mechanism specifying what constitutional reforms the claimant can propose and 
how to adjudicate and evaluate the violation of their structural dignity. It is reasonable to 
hold that such a legal scheme, while protecting the moral interests of the claimant, can also 
regulate secession, or any proposal for constitutional reform in a reasonable, predictable and 
peaceful manner, because, prior to taking action, either the government or the claimant 
understands how to address the relevant issues through a clear procedure, or by appeal to a 
neutral, impartial arbiter. This may offset many perverse consequences centred around 
secession.21 Nevertheless, it is also worth admitting that the argument above is valid provided 
that society can provide a reliable and trustworthy legal system, and also that the claimant 
acts in good faith and does not abuse the right. According to Cass Sunstein, the use of 
 
21 For a more detailed argument for the point, please see Daniel Weinstock, ‘Constitutionalising the Right to 
Secede,’ The Journal of Political Philosophy, volume 9, no. 2, (2001): 182-203, pp. 186-89. 
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constitutionalism, or the reasoning behind what right ought to be recognised by constitutions, 
should manifest the precommitment strategy, by which the right constitutionalised is 
envisaged to be the consensus or precondition for helping bring about a common life project 
chosen by the people or facilitating social coordination.22 In other words, constitutions should 
be deemed as the basic structure of how citizens run a society. Yet, while a right to secede is 
constitutionalised, the willingness or effort to take others’ interests into account may 
decrease, since any group of people can cease to co-operate if they find acting upon their self 
(group)-interest can benefit them more than staying in the host state. For instance, a 
subgroup may not discuss public issues sincerely, but rather take advantage of their vote on 
the issues in exchange of the implementation of (the right to) secession. Such consequences 
not only sabotage deliberative democracy, but also undermine social cooperation by 
encouraging devious, strategic behaviour. While we should recognise this counterargument 
against constitutionalising the right of secession, however, we should also understand that 
the argument for the right originates from the precommitment strategy, as it holds a 
reasonable belief in eliminating social conflict through the regulation of secession, or the 
provision of dispute settlement. It thus becomes a matter of interpretation and reflects how 
to assess the potential consequences of constitutionalising the right, which, as pointed out in 
Chapter 2, is a context-sensitive matter requiring massive support from empirical study. 
Therefore, I conclude that my account of secession provides only sufficient reason for 
constitutionalising the right, and the determination of such a policy depends upon the social 
conditions of society.
 








This dissertation has proposed and attempted to justify a particular account of the right to 
secede. Although I have also specified some legal implications such as constitutionalising the 
right, the establishment of a just global authority or the reform of current practices 
concerning the principle of territorial integrity, I leave a question open about whether the 
relevant institutions should translate them into policy straight away. This is because, as 
argued in Chapter 2, I concur with the necessity and benefit of pre-institutional moral 
reasoning in theorising a proper account of justified secession, which means that I also 
respect the sovereignty of institutions; that is, any political reform should also be prudent and 
sensitive to the social and political contexts to which it is envisaged to apply. However, this 
by no means implies that my account of justified secession or the right is, in Jeremy Bentham’s 
words, ‘nonsense upon stilts’. Instead, it identifies what significant moral values would be 
enhanced if the rights and principles for secession I advocate were to be followed, and, 
alternatively, what moral loss would occur if the proposals were to be dismissed or rejected.  
 
While the remedial right to claim secession, the primary right to constitutional reform, and 
the primary right to erect a just global authority jointly with extant, recognised states, are all 
conferred on a qualified claimant to secession (i.e. a self-determining people), not only can 
the state and sub-state groups safeguard their territorial rights, but subgroups can also tackle 
statist inertia in improving internal self-determination and help the state to get closer to the 
ideal of a general will. This is the upshot of the investigation in Chapters 4-6. Of course, a just 
global authority should be established and appealed to in order to implement such an ideal. 
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This is not just because, practically speaking, an impartial third-party is helpful to adjudicate 
a territorial conflict between the state and its subgroup, but also because, theoretically, the 
state lacks the conclusive moral standing needed to settle a secessionist conflict in relation to 
a third party or restore subgroups’ territorial entitlements conclusively. Furthermore, given 
that sub-state groups’ collective autonomy and basic justice are both protected and deemed 
to be two distinct values, the state can legitimate its right to forbid secession in order to 
secure the regional peace and territorial interests of other citizens. In particular, such benefits 
can be obtained when a more nuanced distinction between justified consensual and justified 
unilateral secession is articulated in accordance with my principles for secession as outlined 
in Chapter 5. Following the principles promotes not only group autonomy, but also personal 
autonomy, because it helps create the social, political environment that secures people’s 
fundamental goods for self-realisation.  
 
Consider what moral loss would take place if my proposals were rejected. First, the state 
would fail to secure either basic justice, rights of occupancy, or collective self-determination 
within its territory. More specifically, the state’s claim to territorial integrity would no longer 
be upheld, given that its territorial rights over its claimed lands were undermined. This would, 
no doubt, initiate great political disorder in society, providing some self-determining peoples 
with sufficient reason to contest the moral or political entitlements of the state to their 
communal area. Suppose that the state confronted such a problem because it had imposed 
persistent alienation on a certain subgroup. My principles for secession then show that the 
subgroup would initially encounter structural indignity and eventually suffer from existential 
alienation if the violation continued. Moreover, such an existential crisis would push the 
society to the edge of grave injustice, because, given that normal political participation could 
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not adequately address their concerns about political autonomy, the alienated group would 
attempt to restore their moral agency through violence; and in retaliation, the state would 
undertake more egregious abuses of power to suppress this violence. Further, this unrest is 
likely to be contagious, spreading to other subgroups or subunits of the state that might want 
to claim secession in order to secure social order in their communities, or some neighbouring 
states/superpowers might take advantage of this chaos to initiate annexation, or some other 
intervention. Although at the time of writing the situation in Hong Kong has not yet 
deteriorated into widespread violence and there have only been a few deaths, it is clear that 
the Chinese government has consistently ignored the political autonomy of the Hongkongers, 
creating feelings of persistent alienation and eventually triggering violence between 
government and protesters. Further, precisely because a global political authority is not in 
place, able to intervene and coerce both sides to follow principles of right, no effective 
international intervention has taken place and we are watching might-is-right play itself out, 
not only in Hong Kong but also in the international community. Most international members 
submit to the superpower, China, and choose to be silent on the matter. 
 
In conclusion, I hope I have argued convincingly that (1) the current boundaries of (state) 
territory, though a result of historical contingency, can be morally justified if my dualistic 
account of territorial rights is followed. This account also entails that (2) qualified claimants 
to secession are entitled to the same moral standing as the host states in securing their 
territorial interests. However, (3) provided that the account is based upon the permissive law 
justification, both agents (secessionists and states) should constrain their rights to propose or 
prohibit secession and commit themselves to erecting a just global political authority for 
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